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ABSTRACT 
This work seeks to explore the problem of self/other relationality
with reference to certain key tflinkers in western philosophy and
theology. To this end we have deployed the notion of coadunacy as a
specifically theological model of human relationality.
In chapter one we present a substantive picture of the biblical
tradition's understanding of human communality, suggesting that this
presents Christian theology with its ideal of coadunacy expressed in
the Old Testamenfs insistence that "it is not good that man should
be alone" and the New Testament ideal that we should be "all one in
Christ". We continue by examining the observable social phenomenon
of radical individualism and isolation within our society and
suggest that this ought to stand as a challenge to modern Christian
theology.
In chapter two we outline the fields of inquiry which will guide us
through the task of constructing a theological understanding of
human coadunacy and in presenting a critique of those approaches to
self/other relating which are in some way insufficient or
unchristian.
Chapters three to six contain analyses of the approaches to the
issue of self/other relationality argued for by Kant, Fichte and
Hegel, Barth and Pannenberg. These thinkers are selected for their
major contributions to both western thought and theology in
particular.
It will be argued that in each of these thinkers a significant
deficiency exists in their treatment of self/other relationality
which ultimately does violence to the other by prioritizing the
self. Furthermore it will be argued that the issue of situatedness,
as an element within the discussion of human relationaltty is, by
and large, ignored by the aforementioned thinkers.
The concluding chapters suggest that a truly Christian notion of
coadunacy ought to prioritize the other by way of a Christ-like act
of self-abandonment and take into account the human experience of
situatedness and embodiment.
The Notion of Coadunacy 
and the Problem of Self/Other Relationslity in la-pa-logy 
with special reference to Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Barth and Pannenberg.
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PREFACE 
Before we begin it is important to make perfectly clear that this
work is intended to be a piece of Christian theology. That is to say
our concerns, analyses and critiques are by no means disinterested
ones but operate from within the Christian tradition in the hope of
contributing to it. Any attempt to engage with this work in
abstraction fromtksaid tradition will undoubtedly result in
misunderstanding. We shall be reiterating this point again in
subsequent chapters by way of reminder.
The motivation for this thesis is partly a phenomenological one and
partly a theoretical one. That is to say it is prompted by the
unavoidable observation that within contemporary western thought and
life to say "human being" is taken to say, at the most fundamental
level,	 individual and that	 this tendency towards radical
individualism and isolation is ideologically rooted.
The roots of this totality of the individual self are many and
varied, and their relationships to each other are tortuously
complex. However, although it is only possible in a work of this
kind, to point to a small number of notable examples of this mode of
considering the human being, it is clearly the case that such a
prioritizing of the individual subject does pertain within western
culture.
Accepting the veracity of the above observation the following
question must arise within Christian theology: is the view of the
human being as essentially individual, and thus concomitantly as a
constitutive element within larger corporate complexes, consistent
with Christian theology as traditionally conceived? It is the
contention of this work that this is not the case, and that a notion
of human being as an essentially corporate reality is required if we
are to take seriously both the protological dimension of human
createdness in the image of the triune God, and the eschatological
dimension of human redemption and reconciliation with both God and
the rest of humanity. To this end we will be introducing the notion
of coadunacy as a way of speaking about the capacity for
relationality essential and thus necessary for human being.
The concept of coadunacy is introduced here for two basic reasons.
Firstly we are concerned to deploy a concept of human relationality
which is expressive of the essentiality of human communality. In
other words we wish to speak of human relationality as a necessary
mode of human existence in the image of God. The Oxford Dictionary
defines coadunate as to be "joined together, congenitally united"
and coadunation as "The action of joining or state of being joined
together in one." It goes on to refer to Cardinal Manning's use of
the term in connection with the unity of body, soul and spirit in
the one person. It is the notion of congenital unity, v•h s ithat this
term suggests with regard to radical and familial reciprocity, that
we are particularly concerned to emphasize here and it is for this
reason that we chose to make use of the term "coadunacy".
The second reason for making use of the term coadunate has to do
with our concern to colonise a potent relational term for theology.
To this end we will be seeking to fill the notion of coadunacy with
a specifically theological content through the course of this work.
Ultimately we will be concerned to articulate a theological
understanding of human being as essentially a complex incorporating
self, other and context. By the "self" we have in mind what is
traditionally understood by that term; in other words discrete self-
consciousness, the "I". By the "other" is meant self-consciousnesses
that are not "I". The notion of "context" is potentially more
ambiguous inSo far as it inevitably includes the other within it,
along with practically everything which is not-self. For our
purposes we shall shall adopt the literary meaning of context which
understands it in terms of those elements which encompass a
particular point thereby informing its meaning. In other words we
are talking about situation, the "when" and "where" of human being.
Thus our discussion of context will involve consideration of
situatedness - that is, the subjective experience of being located,
and place - the actual empirical experience of human location.
It is hoped that once such a theological notion of coadunacy is
spelt out it will form at least the basis of an heuristic by which
various forms of the totalism of the individual subject might be
criticised, while also providing the beginnings of a theological
understanding of self/other relationality which might be developed
in the future.
CHAPTER ONE
	 THE CONTOURS OF COADUNACY 
The social order at present emerging may contain
within it potentialities of destruction and
dehumanization of which any previous order was
incapable. On the other hand, it must be recognized
that the concepts of community, personality, freedom,
responsibility and morality demanded as the content
of salvation within it are in fact closer to the
Christian definition of these things than those
demanded either by pre-scientific or capitalist
society. Moreover, if God gave to the Church so to
interpret its gospel of salvation as to fulfil both
the one-sided social ideals of incorporation and of
individualism, then surely he may be trusted to
empower his followers to present it now, when
society demands it, in what can be the fully
Christian	 terms	 of	 redemption	 to	 personal
community.'
In this chapter we intend to examine what might be referred to as
the contours of coadunacy. By this we have in mind the presentation
of a sequence of suggestions as to why coadunacy is of theological
significance and furthermore what a notion of coadunacy ought to
involve. The purpose of this exercise will be to provide a tool for
the examination of various notions of relationality drawn from a
range of thinkers. It is hoped that at the end of our investigations
we might be in a position to articulate a more detailed theological
notion of human coadunacy. Before we begin, however, some
preliminary clarifications need to be made.
It cannot be stressed too strongly that in this chapter we will be
attempting to put together a tool, a quite substantive one perhaps,
with which to engage, dialectically, with certain key thinkers. In
other words we will not, at this time, be attempting to construct a
fully developed picture of the notion of coadunacy but rather a
sketch suggestive of the major features necessary to such a picture.
It is hoped that the utilization of such a tool as a means of
entering into dialogue with the aforementioned thinkers will result
in a fuller articulation of the notion of coadunacy in our
concluding chapter.
A further point that we would like to make here is that the notion
of coadunacy we are attempting to articulate here is a Christian. 
theological notion and thus both our critique of various
understandings of relationality and our attempted construction of an
alternative perspective must be viewed in this light. It will be
fundamental to our discussion, for example, that coadunate 
existepce, in other words a form of inter-personal relationality, is
normative for human being on the grounds of human creatureliness.
Thus, whether it is made explicit in every case or not, wherever we
speak of coadunacy we have in mind a thoroughly theological notion.
We shall turn now first to a brief discussion of the significance
and problematic nature of the notion ,of coadunacy and secondly to
our proposed outline of the possible shape that such a notion might
take.
The significance and problem of coadunacy 
Before embarking upon any theological enterprise it is important to
identify what exactly is at stake in the prospective discussion, By
this we have in mind such questions as : "why is the question of
human relationality of importance to Christian theology?" and "why
does the notion of human relationality need to be considered
critically by theologians at all?" We shall consider the former of
these two questions first.
i. The importance of relationality for Christian theology 
Although the question of the status of the Judeo-Christian
scriptures takes the form of a fundamental theological problematic,
nevertheless to claim that these scriptures are in some sense
primary for the Christian tradition is, to my mind, in no way to
side-step the problems. Irrespective of the many and varied
hermeneutical approaches, the biblical writings have always been
understood as the primary texts of the Christian faith. 	 Kelsey
points out that
Virtually every contemporary Protestant theologian
along the entire spectrum of opinion from the "neo-
evangelicals" through Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, to
Anders Nygren, Rudolf Bultmann, Paul Tillich and
even Fritz Burl, has acknowledged that any Christian
theology worthy of the name "Christian" must, in
some sense of the phrase, be done "in accord with
scripture".2
Clearly such a claim does not address the question of biblical
authority and it is beyond the scope of this present work to take up
the issue here. All we intend to do at this point is to affirm that
Christian theology, to be Christian, must engage with the text of
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scripture in some way. Thus any notion of human relationality which
lays claim to being Christian and theological must also be related
to the biblical witness "in some sense".e
In his work Sanctorum Communio Bonhoeffer makes the claim that "it
is no accident that we read in Genesis 2:18: 'It is not good that
man should be alone.'" 4 The reason for this, he argues, is that
man in the primal state must be thought of as being
in immediate community of service with God... This
community is a real connection' of love between an I
and an I. In the Christian conception of God, known
to us from the revelation in Christ, but also from
the church of Christ, the community of God and
social community belong together.e
This is an important insight and one which we would certain wish to
affirm here, that human sociality is of protological significance,
in that it has to do, in the first instance, with humanity's
relationship with its creator. The very fact of our creatureliness
establishes us as fundamentally relational. The Jewish scholar Moshe
Greenberg draws attention to this point when he makes the claim that
"The proper aim of the Torah is to establish harmony among men;
being the word of the universal God who cares for all his creatures,
the scope of the Torah is no less than all men." e He continues by
indicating that the unity of all people in Hebrew thought has both a
protological and an eschatological dimension:
The kinship of all men as the descendants of one
father and the creatures of one Creator impressed
itself upon the Hebrew imagination...The myth of one
mankind under one God in primeval times - from Adam
to the Tower-builders - pressed for a complementary
vision of a reunited mankind under God at the end of
time.7
For this reason it can be affirmed that it is not good that we be 
alone. It is because this statement concerning the wrongness of
human isolation derives its force from the logic of the
creator/creature relationality that we can, along with Barth, regard
the specific content of male/female relationality as secondary, in
some sense, to I-Thou encounter in general.e
The reason for utilizing the notion of coadunacy to describe human
relationality theologically is intimately tied up with what we have
said above. The Oxford Dictionary defines "coadunate" as to be
"joined together, congenitally united". In other words, in speaking
of human coadunacy we are first and foremost speaking of that which
is normative for human existence and not merely giving expression to
the results of social engineering. The Judeo-Christian tradition
has relationality at its very heart in that it is expressive of
humanity's relationship both with its creator God and with its
fellow creatures. J. Muilenburg identifies the symbol of the family
as being "the most elemental expression of community in ancient
Israel". He goes on to argue that the unity of the family has as its
locus the father who is regarded as its creator and source and also
its representative and redeemer;
The relationship of the father to his family is not
merely physical; it is psychical and "spiritual" as
well. The physical relationship is the bearer of the
psychical. All of this suggests that family
terminology was suited for an expression of the
relationship between God and his people, and
especially for the nature of the relationship which
united them.9
In his Theology of the Old Testament W.Eichrodt makes this point in
the strongest of terms when he asserts that; "...Old Testament faith
knows nothing, in any situation or at any time, of a religious
individualism which grants a man a private relationship with God
unconnected with the community either in its roots, its realization
or its goal."'° It is for this reason that Jesus is able to sum up
the whole of the law in the famous couplet demanding love of God and
love of neighbour.
The need to assert that relationality has to do with humanity's
"primal state" is a vital one for Christian theology and is integral
to its traditional tripartite schema of creation, fall and
redemption. In maintaining the protological significance of human
relationality, the logic of the Christian tradition allows us to
make sense of the clearly observable brokenness of human society,
while still laying claim to a hoped-for redemption and restoration.
Christian theology has always recognised human fallenness as having
to do, ultimately, with the breaking down of humanity's relationship
with God, and concomitantly of that with its fellows. The Genesis
stories speak of human alienation from God in that Adam and Eve hid
themselves from Yahweh, and also of human self-alienation. Adam and
Eve are depicted as being ashamed to face one another in their
nakedness. Finally, the tragedy of human relational brokenness is
witnessed to in the first murder, where Cain utters the words which
may be seen as paradigmatic for human relational brokenness, "am I
my brother's keeper?ull
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Already it ought to be clear that relationality and the human
experience of its brokenness are at the very heart of the Christian
story, and thus of fundamental significance. The Christian religion
has to do, at its most foundational level, with human beings'
relationships with their Lord and creator and with their fellow
creatures. Indeed, the message of salvation preached by Jesus
Christ may be characterized as a message of reconciliation, through
which humanity is brought back into relationship with God and with
itself. John Robinson makes this point eloquently when he writes:
...conversion must be, through and through, a
community affair. For a man becomes a person when he
discovers himself in the I-Thou relation of
community, and in actual experience grasps with the
total response of his being that he has been made
for, and has his centre in, other persons12
Wolfhart Pannenberg, whom we shall be considering in some detail in
a subsequent chapter, also highlights this relationship between
Jesus' message of salvation and what we have called humanity's
"primal" relationality - that which is essential to human being
....the natural essence of man is revealed in Jesus'
eschatological preaching. By promising salvation
without preconditions it demanding unconditional
trust for this premise, he brings man into his
natural relationship with God, corresponding to
man's creaturely destiny. 13
Jesus' message of salvation and the proximity of the kingdom of God
contains within it the promise both of restoration and
transformation. A restoration of our relationship with God and our
fellows but also an empowering to new life, what St. Paul refers to
as the new creation in Christ."- It is important that we remain
aware of these twin poles of Christ's redemptive work, particularly
in the light of criticisms we shall make of both Barth and
Pannenberg who appear to reduce the significance of the protological
dimension of human being, subsuming it within the doctrine of
salvation as one single reality. ' s The Christian tradition clearly
recognizes the redemptive work of Christ as both restoring and
transforming. There is a very real tension here between Christian
protology and teleology which must not be reduced to similitude.
While the New Testament witness certainly does speak of a new
creation in Christ, being born to new life, being raised with Christ
from death to life, it also makes use of the language of healing and
restoration.
- 13-
In the Gospels we find Jesus' message of forgiveness of sins
inextricably linked with our forgiveness of others, in the Lord's
prayer.	 The Gospels exhort us not only to love our neighbour as
ourselves but also to love our enemies. 1 E.	 The parable of the
prodigal son may be regarded as a most striking précis of the whole
Gospel story. In it we see illustrated the primal familial
relationship with the Father, the fall into broken relationship, the
presence of hope for restoration and the actuality of restored
relationship. Indeed, if the parable of the prodigal son might be
regarded as illustrative of the history of humanity's relationship
with God, then the parable of the Good Samaritan might equally well
be seen as the Gospel ideal for human relationality as
indiscriminate love of the other."
In the Fourth Gospel, in the so-called high priestly prayer, Jesus
is recorded as making this request of the Father:
My prayer is not for them alone (the disciples). I
pray also for those who will believe in me through
their message, that all of them may be one, Father,
just as you are in me and I am in you. May they
also be in us so that the world may believe that you
have sent me. I have given them the glory that you
gave me, that they may be one as we are one: I in
them and you in me. May they be brought to complete
unity to let the world know that you sent me and
have loved them even as you have loved me.le
Here we have expressed, in the plainest of terms, the Christian hope
for human community with God and with the rest of humanity. This is
the message of the Gospel of Christ, that all who acknowledge the
Lordship of Christ are to be reunited with God and with each other.
Indeed Jesus is said to have prayed here that his followers be
empowered to an intimacy of relationship with both God and each
other that is equivalent in some way to that which he shares with
his Father. In this respect, and we shall see this developed in
some detail in both Barth and Pannenberg, Jesus' relationship to the
Father is regarded as the paradigmatic form of inter-personal
relationality. Indeed the question of the nature of Jesus'
relationship to his Father becomes a central theme in early
Christian theology, giving rise to the classical trinitarian
debates. In the light of this it will come as no surprise to find
that in our subsequent analysis of Barth and Pannenberg's treatment
of human relationality we shall be considering the significance of
-14-
their understandings of the triune nature of God as a possible
source for human coadunacy in some detail.
The Gospel emphasis upon Christ's work as one of restoring and
transforming human relationships with God and with others is taken
up in the rest of the New Testament. In the letter to the Galatians
we have summed up for us once again the essence of the Gospel in
terms of restored relationality through Jesus Christ:
You are all sons of God through faith in Christ
Jesus, for all of you who were baptised into Christ
have been clothed with Christ. There is neither Jew
nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you
are all one in Christ Jesus.19
It is this intimacy of relationship with both God and others which
is regarded as both normative for human being but also, in the light
of the reality of human brokenness, as possible only in Christ
Jesus. 20
The New Testament epistles speak of an empowering to a new
relationship with both God and others, a relationship of familial
Intimacy. Often it is "the Spirit" who is regarded as the agent of
this new Community:
...those who are led by the Spirit of God are sons
of God. For you did not receive a Spirit that makes
you a slave again to fear, but you received the
Spirit of adoption.
	 And by this we cry, "Abba,
Father".	 The Spirit himself testifies with our
Spirit that we are God's children.2'
Indeed, in this same chapter of the epistle to the Romans we find
some remarkable verses linking the status of human interpersonal
relationality with the created order in genera1. 22
 In the light of
this we hope to give due consideration throughout this work to the
question of the relationship that exists between humanity and its
environment or place.
The empowering to unity via the activity of the Spirit is taken up
again in the first epistle to the Corinthians. Here we are
presented with the famous image of the Church as a single body made
up of many parts; "we were all baptised by one Spirit into one body
-whether Jews or Greeks, slave or free". 3	Yet this picture of
unity is regarded as merely a preliminary to the classical New
Testament definition of love in 1 Corinthians 13. 	 Love, we are
told, is the highest of all virtues, never self-seeking, always
trusting, protective and preserving. 	 This is the self-abandoning
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love of Christ, the love which Christ demands of his followers as a
sign of the presence of the Kingdom of God.
A new commandment I give you: Love one another. As
I have loved you, so you must love one another. All
men will know that you are my disciples if you love
one another. 24.
This imitation of Christ and his self-abandoning love is a theme
which continues throughout the New Testament 2	not only in an
anthropological mode but also in an ecclesiastical one. It is the
Church of Jesus Christ, as those for whom the Kingdom of God is a
present reality, which is called and empowered to true communion
with God and with others.26
In the first letter of John we have the love of Christ juxtaposed
starkly with the archetype of broken human relationality - the sin
of Cain. Here also we find a reiteration of the definition of true
Christ-like love, first found in the Fourth Gospel, as total self-
sacrifice.
This is the message you heard from the beginning: we
should love one another. Do not be like Cain who
belonged to the evil one and murdered his brother...
We know that we have passed from death to life,
because we love our brothers. Anyone who does not
love remains in death... This is how we know what
love is: Jesus Christ laid down his life for us. And
we ought to lay down our lives for our brothers. 27
Even from this rather cursory examination of the biblical tradition
we can see that relationality is at the very heart of its protology,
its anthropology, its Christology, its pneumatology, its
ecclesiology and its eschatology. Having said this it is important
that the place and significance of the individual is not
marginalised. Talk of community within the biblical tradition
always presupposes that said community - be it the nation of israel
or the Church of Christ - be made up of persons in relation. The
body of Christ is always regard as being constituted by many
distinct parts. We shall say more concerning the importance of this
dynamic of the one and the many later. What is important for us to
do now is to give some indication as to why the theme of self/other
relationality is to be regarded as problematic for contemporary
Christian theology, despite its observed centrality to the earliest
recorded traditions of the faith.
ii. The Problematic 
As we have noted, it ought now to be clear, even from the brief
examination above, that the theme of relationality is absolutely
central to the Christian tradition. Furthermore, any theology which
seeks to engage with the biblical texts as primary in some way for
the Christian faith must attempt to do justice to the ideal of human
relationality found therein. This is not to say, and we have
already pointed this out, that the -biblical texts are not also
concerned with the significance, responsibility and dignity of the
individual person.	 Indeed relationality within the Christian
tradition is always understood in terms of discrete persons in
communion, a self and an other. 	 There is no sense in which
communality might be understood as absorption or the negation of the
other. We are not swallowed up into the God with whom we relate;
neither do we subsume the other with whom we relate into ourselves.
The Judeo-Christian tradition appears to maintain a tensive
relationship between the communal and the individual, the emphasis
upon the latter presenting the former from collapsing into some form
of undifferentiated collective.
The motivation for this present work is two-fold, and may be broadly
categorised as phenomenological and ideological, although it is with
the latter of these two that we will concern ourselves most.
By phenomenological we have in mind the clearly observable tendency
towards radical individualism and privatism within contemporary
Western society. There has been considerable sociological analysis
conducted in tias area, and it is not the task of the present work to
rehearse such analysis here. 29 Statistically, at least within the
United Kindom, human isolation is increasing at an alarming rate.
One of the most notable features of the period since
the Second World War has been the increase in people
living alone: in 1986 nearly a quarter of
households in Great Britain contained only one
person, compared with about one tenth in 1951. At
the same time the proportion of households
containing five or more people has halved, and is
now less than one tenth.29
This tendency towards increasing privatization supports the findings
of J.H.Goldthorpe and D.Lockwood who, in the early 1960's, began
their now famous study of the "affluent manual worker". The
original point of the project was to test the validity of the
"Embourgeoisement thesis" which held that with the advent of higher
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wages and the accompanying improvement in the standard of living,
the traditional working classes were being assimilated into a broad
middle-class, with respect to their ideals and social activities.
The results of the study demonstrated however that while this was
not in fact the case, the working class maintaining its own distinct
set of values, it was found that with an increase in material
prosperity the working classes did exhibit a strong tendency towards
increased privatisation.
It would be difficult to sustain the idea that the
affluent workers we studied typically possessed dual
social identity - still working class in their role
as rank-and-file production employees but in their
out-of-work roles indistinguishably part of the
middle-class society... Rather than such an
assimilation, our findings would indicate as the
most probable concomitant of these workers'
orientation to work and of their present type of
employment what we have earlier referred to as
privatisation - a process, that is, manifested in a
pattern of social life which is centred on, and
indeed largely restricted to, the home and the
conjugal family.3°
One of the most significant observations to issue out of this study
was that given the choice of remaining within the context of the
larger kinship network and moving to the socially isolating
environment of a new town or city in search of financially more
rewarding employment, the latter was generally chosen. Some of
those couples interviewed expressed misgivings concerning the move.
To break away from their existing pattern of
sociability had been, in other words, a prerequisite
of their becoming affluent; and this, despite the
possibility of isolation, was the course of action
that they had chosen to follow.31
The occasions to socialise were also found to be affected
drastically by the tendency for both couples to be gainfully
employed and more often than not being involved in shift work and
over-time.	 Of those interviewed a scant 16% of husbands reported
activities that were both "extra-mural" and extra-familiar. 	 The
study concludes on this point that
we have, then, a variety of evidence to show that
for the majority of our affluent workers and their
wives time outside work was time devoted
overwhelmingly to home and family life rather than
to sociability of any more widely based kind.
This observation we see as being fully in accord with the
individual's "dominant orientation to work - their emphasis upon
economic pay-off". 32
Privacy is no longer the accepted right of a privileged few, every
Englishman's home is now his castle. With the concept of privacy
being pushed back within the border of individual self-consciousness
partly as a result of the Cartesian cogito, as we shall see in
subsequent chapters, privacy and property are no longer so
intimately linked. Arthur Britton points out that
The belief in the interiorisation of a world of
meaning and uniqueness of experience is embodied in
the language and literature of Western society
Privacy is not only taken for granted, it is
	
elevated to a moral category.	 The violation of an
individual's privacy is viewed in the same way as
the desecration of the sacred by the unfaithful.33
Britten suggests that it is upon the women that privatisation has
had its most debilitating effect. The picture painted by the social
sciences of the horrors of inner city life and the boredom and
monotony of the isolated suburban housewife are justification enough
to condemn the privatised world. The process of privatisation has
had the effect of placing the wife and the "domestic structure"
under unnatural and harmful strain. The privatised husband expects
to find all the support and resources necessary to cope with the
stresses of everyday life within the obviously limited context of
his wife and family. This relatively small community simply cannot
maintain such a demanding drain on its emotional and physical
energies and hence elements within it often break down.
The family was the place where you found a haven
from the exacting world of work, from the 'rat-race'
of the factory floor and the 'status differentials'
of office. And there was your wife - 'the little
woman' - waiting for you with your meal prepared,
your socks washed and your children disciplined.34
This is the curse of individualism and its attendant doctrines that
places under so much stress the remaining coadunate units as to
burst them at the seams. Stanley Hauerwas points out that in
America the family is more often than not seen as primarily a
contractual arrangement using the language of rights and exchange to
define it. 39 This is because the coadunate unit of the family is
becoming more and more difficult to sustain, without supporting
legal structures, under the present pressures.
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Martin Pawley in his book The Private Future examines this issue
further, drawing out the concomitant effect of privatisation, that
being the evacuation of the public realm.
There is now nothing but a vacant terrorized space
between the government - which controls and
maintains production - and the isolated consumer,
who increases his consumption in proportion to his
Isolation.
The advent of suburban man is, says Pawley, the direct result not of
an eroding of so-called traditional values by the barbaric elements
within society, but rather of the development of industry,
consumerism and the media. The intensive utilization of what Pawley
refers to as "energy slaves", that is, items such as cars, washing
machines and vacuum cleaners, reduces the need for social
interaction and dependence. 37 Trapped on this path of isolation
Western society must consume at an ever increasing rate to maintain
the level of detachment necessary for social harmony. The breakdown
of the extended family consisting not simply of husband, wife and
children but also of grandparents and even aunts and uncles, coupled
with a general trend towards a lower level of occupancy speaks of a
terrible movement towards isolationism all but completed in the
latter half of this century.
Today, one's home is seen, for all practical purposes, as one's
total environment in which one's basic and recreational needs are
amply provided for by the technological marvels of our age. It is
now possible to live one's life in a manner considered successful
and comfortable by Western standards without ever leaving the
confines of one's home. Computer links are available via the
existing telecommunications network, through which one may conduct
one's business, collaborate on a book with a colleague hundreds of
miles away, pay one's bills, do one's shopping and send letters and
documents without even having to go to a post-box. Videos make it
unnecessary to visit a cinema or the theatre, hi-fl can reproduce
operatic, orchestral and rock music with pin-point clarity while one
pops a pre-packed gourmet meal into the micro-wave oven ready for an
evening of isolated entertainment.
What is missing from this individualistic utopia is the transcendent
other.	 Indeed, personal stereo allows one to remain within one's
cosseted solipsistic world even while indulging in the unsavoury
business of entering the public sphere. Pawley points out that even
such an innocuous invention as central heating, by heating every
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part of the house, makes it unnecessary for members of a family to
congregate in one place. Thus the elderly are shunted off to old
folkd homes and children abandon their parent's home as soon as
possible in search of their own autonomy, their own total
environment.
	 Despite the rabid individualism outlined above the
notion of community is still a current one. 	 However, it is now
completely in the hands of the image makers, the media men;
Recognition of the fact that this community... has
become an illusion, an image, a roll of tape, a
spool of film , a splendid but empty palace, is too
painful. Hence the retention of the language and
pagentry of community and obligation to describe an
increasingly gim-crack facade of public events for
which self-interest is the only comprehensible
motivation. This massive self-deception, the best-
kept secret of our century, is only betrayed by
behaviour, never by words - for 'we' intentionally
lack the words to describe it. Behaviour in this
sense has become increasingly divorced from the
language that purports to explain it as part of the
same	 self-protecting	 process.	 A	 triumph	 of
security.3e
Thus, while we are assured through advertisements that by using a
certain brand of washing powder our family life will be enhanced,
the presupposition being that this is a state of affairs sought 4er
by Western man, in actual fact we continue to seek complete
irresponsibility.	 The most comforting phrase in our society is
"without obligation". In this sense, the rejection of the
transcendent other permits us to live our lives without the need for
relating or indeed, more disturbingly, without the social and
emotional apparatus to begin to relate to those beyond us.
The disintegration of humanity's coadunate nature, coupled with the
atrophying of the correlative social structure, has created a
poisonous no-man's-land of the traditional public realm. The public
sphere is now a place of all-powerful and malevolent bureaucracy,
escalating prices and mob violence. Comfort and security are
available only within the environment that has been tailored to
one's individual needs - in other words, the home - although to an
equally significant degree, the car provides a similar cocoon-like
environment. Pawley speaks of a "secondary reality" that is
constructed by the individual to counter the undeniable horrors of a
public realm left to run wild. It is this secondary reality that is
fed by the media, consumerism and of course politicians, the latter
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of whom has discovered that what wins elections is not issues but
tax-cuts and higher wages.
The privatized individual vacates the public realm
which thus falls progressively into the hands of a
bureaucracy laced with speculative corruption. Such
administration in turn leads to more news of
families evicted and old ladies living in their
bathre -ams and thus confirms the wisdom of the
initial withdrawal itself. Because the public realm
is less and less often experienced and more and more
reported it becomes an image consisting of rapes,
hijackings, riots, speeches, murderers and
rackets... Like unprofitable railways which can only
be kept running with massive subsidies, collapsed
communities are attended by increasing numbers of
social workers who are paid to prop up a structure
collapsing of its own weight... the old patterns of
community care patched up repeatedly by infusions of
public money and professional ski11.39
Those who have most successfully fortified themselves against the
outside world are also protected from the horrors of its
disintegration by the controlled and emotionless reporting of the
news on television and radio, where the announcement of thousands of
deaths through floods and starvation and war is given out in the
measured tones of society's professional shock absorbers.
Clearly this tendency towards tblation presents a powerful challenge
to Christian theology to restate the ideal of human communality, to
assert that it is not good that we be alone and that in the light of
the redemptive work of Christ, we can be empowered to a new
communion with God and our fellows. However, simply to indicate
that true human coadunacy is both demanded and made possible through
the salvific work of Jesus Christ is, to an extent, to take refuge
behind one of the primary symbols of the Christian faith. It will
be necessary to unpack this theological assertion and explain what
we might call the necessary conditions for human coadunacy and this
we intend to do in our concluding chapter.
The second of our motivations in engaging with this issue of human
communality is in ideological one. By this we have in mind concern
over elements within the Western intellectual tradition that have
contributed to the prioritizing of the subject over the object, the
self over the other.	 Clearly it would not be possible here to
assess the whole of Western intellectual history as it relates to
this issue. What we propose to do however is to limit ourselves to
the consideration of certain key figures, within the disciplines of
both philosophy and theology, who have exerted a powerful influence
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over contemporary thought. We need say very little here as regards
the precise nature of our concern over the treatment of self/other
relationality found in the work of our chosen thinkers. 	 This will
constitute the bulk of this thesis proper. However, it might be
suitable at this point to indicate briefly the areas that we expect
to prove problematic.
In our consideration of the idealistic philosophies of Kant, Fichte
and Hegel we will be concerned to highlight what might be referred
to as a totalism of the subJect or the ego. While all three of
these thinkers may rightly be seen as having a fundamental concerrn
with the issue of relationality there is a clear tendency in them
all to prioritize the subject.	 It is the "I" or the "self" or the
"ego", the "subject or "mind" that always initiates relationship and
has power over the act of relating. 	 In such a view the place and
significance of the other is subsumed under the overwhelming power
of the "I".	 The dangers inherent in totalistic modes of thought
have been more than apparent in this century and certainly do not
require rehearsal here. Suffice it to say at this point that any
notion of relationality which regards the other as merely a means to
an end for the self, or in which the self alone is seen ultimately
as the power behind self/other relating must be viewed with
suspicion by Christian theology. As we have already noted above,
the earliest recorded traditions of the Christian faith seem to
Indicate that communality has to do with discrete persons in a
relational dynamic. Indeed if a prioritizing of one or other of the
poles of this dynamic is to be witnessed at all in the biblical
tradition, it might well be argued that it is the other who is
empowered over the "I" in Christ-like self-abandonment. We shall be
considering this further in a subsequent chapter.
Our examination of two leading twentieth century theologians will
take the form of an assessment of the sufficiency of their treatment
of self/other relationality from within the Christian tradition. As
we have already mentioned in our introductory chapter, the choice of
Karl Barth and Wolf hart Pannenberg for this purpose is dependent
upon a number of reasons. 	 Firstly, both Barth and Pannenberg are
thinkers of undoubted stature who could not be accused in any way of
operating at the margins of theology.	 Furthermore, both thinkers
are concerned to engage with the theological agenda in its broadest
terms, seeking to provide the most comprehensive and all-embracing
picture possible. 	 In the light of this the issue of relationality
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is found in their thinking to be inextricably linked to the rest of
the theological enterprise, and is not simply treated as an isolated
doctrinal concern. For both of them human relationality has to do
with the very essence of what it means to be human and in the divine
image. Finally, it may be said that in selecting Barth and
Pannenberg we have to do with two opposing theological methods,
often characterised as theology "from above" and theology "from
below". Another way of considering this may be to see Barth and
Pannenberg as representative of the revelation/natural theology
debate. It is clear that they do represent two distinct theological
approaches and for this reason it seems valuable to focus our
attention upon them.
Ultimately we are concerned to ascertain whether or not Barth and
Pannenberg provide us with an understanding of human interpersonal
relationality which is consistent. with the ideal of communality
witnessed to in the biblical tradition; in other words, whether or
not they recognise the essential nature of human communality,
whether they maintain the important distinction between the self and
the other, and thus avoid totalisation of the subject, and whether
they give due expression to Christ-like self-abandonment to the
other as the fundamental condition for human coadunacy. One of the
major problems which we will be attempting to highlight within these
representative theologies is the tendency to produce a form of
theological totalism in the shape of Christological determinism. In
such an instance, the person of Christ becomes the all-powerful
subject, determinative for all human being, while "actual" created
humanity becomes the subordinate "other" subsumed under the
Christological ideal.
In the light of all we have said above, we shall turn in the next
chapter to a statement of three basic themes within the notion of
coadunacy. It is intended that these themes will function, in some
respect, as the categories of a theological hairistic which ought to
provide the background to our analysis of the aforementioned
thinkers.
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CHAPTER TWO	 THREE FIELDS OF ENQUIRY 
In the previous chapter we have attempted to draw attention both to
the importance of the notion of coadunacy for a Christian view of
humanity and also to the problem of increasing isolationism and
radical individualism within western culture. In this chapter we
plan to outline our foci for analysing a selection of thinkers who
have had a significant engagement with the issue of human
relationality. In so doing we shall be concentrating our attention
on three fundamental themes of coadunacy: the nature of human
coadunacy, the loss of human coadunacy and the restoration of human
coadunacy.
We will be concerned here to suggest questions that need to be asked
concerning the status of human coadunacy; whether it is in any sense
normative for human being; the nature and extent of self/other
estrangement - that is whether the human capacity for relationship
with the other is understood as damaged or impaired or perhaps
completely destroyed; and the nature, extent and mode of any
possible restoration of human coadunacy. It is important to note
that while these themes and the questions they generate will not 
manifest themselves as a formal structure for our subsequent
analysis, they do represent our overall concerns and are implicit 
both in our selection of material and in the way in which we use
this material. They will of course be of particular significance
when we turn from the analysis of each thinker's approach to the
Issue of relationality and to our critique of said approach. In this
respect the questions that are to be expressed in this chapter will
form the matrix out of which our subsequent analysis and critique of
certain thinkers' approaches to the issue of human relationality
will arise. Furthermore it will be in response to the emergent
critique of these thinkers that our own substantive theological
statement of the normativity of human coadunacy will develop.
Thus, the rest of this thesis will fall into three parts: Firstly we
shall outline three basic, albeit implicit, fields of inquiry which
will constitute the dialectical threshold for our subsequent
analysis of certain thinkers, that is to say the limits of our
dialogue with said thinkers. These fields or themes have already
been identified above as the nature loss and restoration of human
coadunacy. In other words these groups of questions will serve both
to focus our attention and to limit the range of our examination.
Secondly we shall be engaging with five major thinkers, from both
philosophy and theology, who have, in one way or another, addressed
the issue of human relationality. These thinkers will be considered
in the light of our tripartite dialectical threshold - that is to
say we shall be primarily concerned with their understandings of
human relationality, the failure of human relationality and the
restoration of human relationality. This engagement will take the
form of analysis and critique. Finally we intend to present a
positive theological statement of the normativity of human coadunacy
once again drawing upon our three themes but this time in their
Christian mode: the Christian ideal of coadunacy, the Christian
understanding of sin and the Christian understanding of
reconciliation. These last two themes, it must be made clear, will
be treated with respect to the issue of relationality and not in any
exhaustive way.
It should by now be clear how the three themes of inquiry that are
to be outlined below will run through the rest of this work, how
they will function both as a tool for critical engagement with other
thinkers and also as a basis for substantive theological
construction. We turn now to the presentation of these fields of
inquiry.
The nature of human coadunacy 
Clearly the primary question that needs to be directed towards any
system of thought which purports to give an account of human
relationality is that concerning the nature and foundation of this
relationality. Any answer given to this question will undoubtedly
depend upon whether one is operating with what we might broadly
designate an essentialist or an existentialist perspective on human
being. By this we mean whether human being is understood as having
to do, primarily, with a pre-established ontology - pre-established
by God for example - or whether human being is largely a function of
the choices made within the environment and context in which it is
located. Is human being an a priori given or is human being in some
way self-creating? Does essence precede existence or vice versa?
This issue arises most significantly for us in the context of the
question concerning whether coadunacy is considered to be normative 
for human being or not.	 It will be this aspect of the
essence/existence debate on which we will be focusing in this work.
In so far as the Christian tradition clearly maintains, at its most
fundamental level, that the human being is a creature of God I do
not believe it to be out of place here to indicate that our own
substantive treatment of human coadunacy will seek to argue for its
ontological, that is to say normative, significance for human being.
In other words we shall be arguing that coadunacy is essential to
human being as being intended by God. While we do not wish to cloud
our present statement of the fields of enquiry by the incorporation
of constructive theological material better suited to our concluding
chapter, I think it nonetheless important that the theological
character of this work be kept in mind. That is to say we are not
disinterestedly engaged in this study of human relationality but
are conducting our examination from within the Christian tradition
and this participation in a given tradition will inevitably
influence our mode of analysis. Wherever this influence is most
pronounced we hope to make it apparent.
Thus, for our own purposes, we need to ask whether relationality is
considered to be normative for human being by those thinkers with
whom we shall engage, and if so in what sense is it normative? Are
human beings understood to be in relation by virtue of their
ontology? In other words, is coadunacy a necessary mode of human 
being? or is human communality simply regarded as the product of
social engineering?
Questions of this kind are of vital importance with respect to the
larger question concerning whether or not there is an ideal mode of
human existence. If there is such an ideal state for human being, is
this something that has been lost and thus requires restoration or
has it more to do with a human destiny yet to be achieved? A
question of equal significance is the one concerning the basis and
status of any alleged ideal standard for human being. From whence do
we derive this ideal standard? Is it some manner of Platonic
universal, or perhaps, rather, has it to do with divine creative
intent? On the other hand behavioural science tells us that "We have
not yet seen what man can make of man." If human being is indeed
self-creating by means of enviromental and social control then any
answer given to the question concerning an ideal human state must
surely be a relative one. With respect to the issue of human
coadunacy we must then ask whether communality is in fact a more
ideal state for human being than some form of radical individualism
and if so why? It might well be argued that human coadunacy is in
some sense pragmatically ideal in that as a species we are stronger
together than we are apart and thus human community ought to be
encouraged as a strategy for human survival and progress. However
such a utilitarian perspective upon human communality is
substantially different to any view which argues that communality is
the a priori proper mode of human existence. It will be found that,
in one form or another, all five of our chosen thinkers fall more
readily into the latter category than into the former in so far as
they all wish to argue that human being is, in some sense,
necessarily in relation with the other.
However,	 if human being is indeed understood as, to a greater or
lesser extent, coadunate being, then we need to ask questions
concerning the fundamental basis of this unity between self and
other. That is to say we need to consider the mode of this
relationality. For example, is this relationality a function of the
unity of perception within human rationality, 2
 or is it understood
in terms of the subsumption of all particularity under one unifying
reality; 3 or rather has it to do with creation in the image of the
three personed God - that is to say in the image of a divine
society?4 It will be important to consider to what extent human
being can be said to be "naturally" in relation with others and to
what extent human relationships have to be worked at. Clearly, and
as we shall discuss in our concluding chapter, human beings do not
tend to encounter the other in the first instance as "friend" but
rather as "stranger". Even if this were not the case we would still
need to inquire into the possible distinction between passive and
active relationality. In other words even if the ontological status
of coadunacy for human being is accepted we still need to inquire
Into the nature of coadunacy in particularity that is to say "my"
relationship with "you". As we shall see during our subsequent
analysis certain thinkers, due to their preoccupation with the
universal categories of relationality, have a tendency to neglect
the important dimension of particular persons in particular 
relationships.
Following on from this concern for the particularity of human
coadunacy the character and quality of coadunacy also needs to be
considered. For example, is coadunacy to be understood in primarily
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personal terms, best expressed in the language of friendship, family
and love or is the language of dignity, worth and value regarded as
more appropriate? Has coadunacy more to do with a priori formal
structures, rational or otherwise, or interpersonal dependency and
human agency? In other words are Buber's I-Thou, I-It distinctions
understood to be in any way substantial ones and is human coadunacy
seen as belonging to the former or the latter category?
As we have already intimated above, to say that human being is being 
in relation need say nothing concerning the quality of that
relationality. In a sense we are all in relationship with each other
by virtue of sharing a common environment. It is common to talk of
cultural groups, for example, as "societies u p however, while there
are general factors which might help us to identify, let us say,
British society, this tells us very little about my actual
relationship with any particular member of that society. Furthermore
while we might wish to argue that human relationality must be
founded upon some understanding of human dignity and worth we need
to ask whether this in itself constitutes a sufficient basis for
full human coadunacy or indeed whether it can even account for human
relationship as we ourselves experience it.&
An issue that will be of central concern throughout this work is
the one relating to the question of power in human relationality.
Within self/other relationality where is the power over the
relationship located? in other words, who has the initiative in
human relationality? Is it the self who has priority over the other
in such relating or is the other empowered over the self? Are we to
understand human coadunacy as manifesting itself in some form of
Hegelian life and death struggle where one is destined to be
subsumed by the other - what E.Levinas refers to as totalism 6 - or
has it more to do with the disempowering of the self for the other?7
This particular question concerning the mode of coadunacy, the
location of relational power and the prioritizing of either the self
or the other within human relationality, will emerge as absolutely
fundamental to both our critique and to our substantive statements
concerning a possible Christian understanding of coadunacy.
In general therefore it will be questions of	 the sort outlined
above which will need to be kept in the forefront of our thinking as
we examine the nature of human coadunacy 	 as understood by our
selection of thinkers. We turn now to the field of inquiry
concerning the apparent loss of human coadunacy.
Loss of coadunacy 
One of the most fundamental questions which needs to be addressed to
any system of thought which seeks to deal with the issue of human
relationality is this: does it do adequate justice to the undeniable
human experience of alienation from the other? Does it explain why
the self encounters the other as stranger? and does it identify the
nature of this strangeness? Any attempt to address this field of
questions will naturally depend quite substantially upon the
answers given to those questions which constituted our previous
field.
If the normativity of coadunacy for human being is accepted, in the
sense of an ontological or essential ideal, then the clearly
discernible alienation of the self from the other needs to be
accounted for. In other words we need to ask why there exists an
apparent disparity between ideal and actual human nature and what
constitutes the cause of this disparity. Clearly any talk of a
deviation from an ideal must sooner or later give rise to the
language of loss and damage. Thus for any system of thought' which
seeks to argue for coadunacy as an ideal for human being an
understanding of the apparent loss of coadunacy is clearly
necessary.
This concern over the loss of coadunacy gives rise to a whole range
of subordinate questions. For example, is this loss of coadunacy
symptomatic of a more fundamental human malaise or is it in fact to
be understood as the root of all human deviation from whatever might
be considered normative for human being? As we shall see in a
subsequent chapter the theologian Wolf hart Pannenberg wishes to
understand human brokenness or sin as ego-centricity, in other words
a self-centered mode of human being which denies both the divine and
human other, 9 Furthermore we need to consider to what extent this
loss of coadunacy is a tragic one and to what extent humanity might
be considered culpable for it. That is to say, is the present human
experience of alienation from the other the result of some event or
process of cosmic significance such that we are powerless in the
face of it or is it rather to be understood as a function of human
agency such that the situation might be changed and the ideal be
- 32 -
restored via an act of human will? This will of course have obvious
implications for anything that might be said with regard to the
possible restoration of coadunacy. Clearly this line of inquiry
leads us on to questions concerning the extent of the loss of human
coadunacy.
Are we to suppose that in speaking of such a loss we are suggesting
that human beings have lost the capacity for communality or is this
capacity simply impaired? We also need to consider whether all human
relationships are similarly damaged. We are all undoubtedly aware of
our alienation from other human beings but what of alienation from
God and from our surrounding environment? It will become clear from
our analyses of Barth and Pannenberg that there exists a strong
tradition within Christian theology that wishes to understand human
brokeness in all its forms - in other words sin - as the direct
result of the breakdown of relationship between human beings and
God. However, we shall find cause to question the adequacy of the
treatment of human relationship to an external context or
environment provided by all five of our chosen thinkers and thus
plan to develop this neglected theme in our concluding chapter.
Of course, if coadunacy is not understood as normative for human
being qua human being then the question concerning why, if indeed at
all, alienation from the other - divine, human or environmental -
needs to be overcome, and in favour of what?, requires an answer. As
we have already intimated above, without some notion of an ideal
mode of human being any attempt to identify human deviancy from the
norm becomes problematic. I think it would be true to say that all
five of our chosen thinkers appear to operate with some notion of
what is normative for human being, whether that norm by bound up in
some future destiny or in the person of Christ for example. These
thinkers seem to want to understand human being with reference to
some transcendent ideal such as Hegel's Spirit or in the case of
Barth and Pannenberg the person of Christ as the one true imago del,
or in the instance of Kant the transcendentality of human
rationality. The point we wish to make here is that in the abse..nce.
of such an ideal notion of human being one is surely forced to adopt
a more phenomenal approach to the question "why ought self/other
alienation to be overcome?"
Throughout our analysis it will be important-h.consider how the notion
of alienation or brokenness or sin is understood in the context of
human relationality. In other words how does the breakdown of human
coadunacy actually manifest itself? Is it, for example, primarily a
psychological problem having to do with emotional and mental states
in principle open to resolution via clinical means or has it to do
with human participation in an as yet unresolved metaphysical
process? On the other hand it could be that the brokenness of human
relationality has to do with social structures which promote radical
individualism and human isolation. Clearly, as we shall attempt to
argue in our concluding chapter, the Christian tradition wishes to
maintain that human relational brokenness is a function of sin and
as such is more than simply an apparent disjunction between the self
and the other. Rather it has to do with the spoiling of human being,
at an ontological level, as a result of our estrangement from the
creator God who is the very source of human being. It is important
that questions concerning the nature and extent of human brokenness
be addressed to theologians particularly in the light of the
doctrine of reconciliation via the person and work of Christ and it
is thus to the theme of restoration that we turn now.
Restoration of coadunacy 
Clearly one of the most significant questions that needs to be asked
of a system of thought claiming to deal with human relationality, in
the light of its afore-mentioned brokenness, is whether ft actually
makes any provision for the restoration of coadunacy? Assuming that
coadunacy is considered normative for human being and further that
this essential unity of self and other is in some way spoilt,
giving rise to estrangement and alienation, is this damage
understood as reparable and if so, in what way?
Questions concerning the possibility, mode and extent of a
restoration of human coadunacy relate directly to our two previous
themes. Clearly the way in which both the ideal of human
relationality and our experience of its brokenness are understood
will be determinative for any treatment of its restoration.
Questions concerning the mode of restoration are of particular
significance for it is here that we have to do with the issue
relating to our own direct involvement in this process. Is the
restoration of human coadunacy something which is initiated and
proceeds without actual human involvement? Are we speaking here of
an irresistible divine act of restoration on our behalf or perhaps
of a similarly irresistible metaphysical synthetic process where all
things are, by the very nature of reality, being brought into unity?
We shall find that for most of our chosen thinkers the movement from
alienation and towards unity has something of an inevitable
character about it in that it has to do with a cosmic process or an
unavoidable destiny or divine lordship.
On the other hand, if human agency is understood as essential to the
task of restoring coadunacy then questions concerning the strategy
for such an involvement need to be asked. How do we go about
relating to the other as friend rather that stranger? By what means
do we disempower ourselves with regard to the other and overcome our
fear of the other? Any treatment of human involvement in the task of
restoring human coadunacy must attempt to answer such questions.
Indeed we shall find cause to question the sufficiency of this
important issue within the thinking of our respective thinkers. For
this reason we shall attempt, in our concluding chapter, to outline
a possible strategy for human involvement in the restoration of
coadunacy.
Furthermore, questions must be asked concerning the extent of
restored human coadunacy. That is to say, if the language of
restoration is to be used with respect to human coadunacy we need to
consider whether this restoration is to be understood as total or
partial, as immediate or as part of an ongoing process to be
consummated at some point in the future. As we have already
mentioned above, while Christianity speaks of the overcoming of sin
and estrangement through the person and work of Christ the present
experience of the church is by no means one of sinless perfection.
Any understanding of the restoration of human coadunacy must
therefore still account for the continued human experience of
estrangement from the other. Thus, to reiterate, we need to ask
whether the restoration of human coadunacy is understood as total or
partial, as ideal or actual, as an immediate change in the human
constitution or as a process towards a coadunate destiny. Finally we
need to ask whether a particular understanding of the restoration of
human coadunacy accords with actual human experience, that is to say
whether the claim that coadunacy is restored or is in the process of
restoration is borne out in our actual experience of the other.
In the light of all that we have said, our overall analytic concerns
ought now to be clear. Throughout the course of the next four
chapters of this work we intend to elicit answers, from each of our
five thinkers, to some of the fundamental questions raised above
concerning human relationality. We will attempt to uncover what each
respective thinker understands human relationality to entail,
particularly as regards its basis and priorities, how it is that
they attempt to describe and account for alienation or relational
brokenness and how they go about treating the theme of a possible
restoration of self/other communality and once again the emergent
priorities of such relating. Having done this we shall continue by
offering a critique of the thinkers based both upon the sufficiency 
of each respective treatment of the notion of relationality, whether
they provide an adequate and satisfying account of the human
experience of relatedness and alienation, but also upon their
similarity and dissimilarity to a Christian theological
understanding of these issues. This last criterion clearly requires
further comment.
As we have already mentioned above this work is to be regarded as
operating from within the Christian tradition and as such any
attempt to understand it as a disinterested study will be
fundamentally mistaken. Our ultimate aim is to present at least the
beginnings of a Christian theological understanding of human
coadunacy founded on foundational doctrines of the faith but also
in response to and issuing out of dialogue with certain thinkers who
have made a significant contribution to our understanding of human
relationality. Clearly our treatments of Barth and Pannenberg will
have to table a more specific question concerning the adequacy of
their respective theologies as descriptions of the Christian
tradition and experience which would perhaps be less appropriate,
although by no means inappropriate, to ask of Kant and Hegel.
However, while both Kant and Hegel clearly understood themselves to
be engaging, to a greater or lesser extent, with the Christian
faith, this is by no means clear in the case of Fichte as we see in
a subsequent chapter. We hope that the insights gained and the
pitfalls identified through our examination of Kant, Fichte, Hegel,
Barth and Pannenberg will permit us to begin the task of
constructing a uniquely theological understanding of coadunacy.
Once again it needs to be stated quite clearly that throughout this
work we intend, as far as possible, to let our chosen thinkers speak
for themselves free from the constraints of an obtrusive analytic
agenda. For this reason the analytic questions outlined above will
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not be found expressed as such during our analysis. These questions
and concerns will form rather an implicit orientation to this
study. They influence, for example, our selection of thinkers, the
material focused on, the limits of our analysis and the nature of
our emergent critique. Ultimately these three fields or themes of
inquiry will reappear more explicitly in our concluding chapter
where we will seek to provide a theological response to them. The
explicit appearance of these three themes in our final chapter,
deliberately avoided in the previous analytic chapters, will be
justified as a self-imposed agenda in no way alien to our own
thinking.
We turn now to a consideration of the philosopher Immanuel Kant and
his particular contribution to the issue of human relating as
treated by him in terms of subject/object relationality.
NOTES 
1. B.F.Skinner. Beyond Freedom and Dignity, London: Penguin, 1977,
p210
2. Cf. Chapter 3, Kant
3. Cf. Chapter 4, Hegel
4. Cf. Chapter 5 on Barth and Chapter 6 on Pannenberg. Both of
these theologians regard the triune nature of God as significant
for human relationality. In Chapter 7 we shall also utilize the
doctrine of the Trinity in this way.
5. This formalism will prove to be one of our major criticisms of
Kant's understanding of human relationality. Cf. Chapter 3.
6. Cf. E.Levinas, Totality and Infinity Section 1, "The Same and
the Other", p33ff.
7. This will emerge as our own understanding of the active nature
of human coadunacy and will require that we outline a strategy
for the disempowering of the self for the other. Cf. Chapter 7.
8. Cf. Chapter 6.
CHAPTER THREE THE PRIMACY OF THE SUBJECT: KANT AND RELATIONALITY.
The inclusion of a chapter on the critical philosophy of Immanuel
Kant in a work concerned with the nature of human relationality
might appear somewhat out of place. While it would certainly be true
to say that Kant did not concern himself with this issue directly
there is a very real sense in which his epistemoiogical
considerations have important implications for the problem of human
sociality.'
What is of the first importance for Kant and is ultimately of
significance for our present discussion is the epistemic question
concerning the nature of the relationship which pertains between
subJect and object. This concern and indeed the perspective that
Kant ultimately arrives at with respect to it is summed up quite
clearly in the First Critique when he writes:
The transcendental unity of apperception is that
unity through which all the manifold given in an
intuition is united in a concept of the object. It
is therefore entitled objective, and must be
distinguished from the subjective unity of
consciousness, which is a determination of inner 
sense - through which the manifold of intuition for
such [objective] combination is empirically given.2
We shall be returning to this important notion later on. It must be
stressed here however, that Kant in no way regards himself as having
to do with any ontological or traditionally metaphysical notions of
subject and object; rather his concern is fundamentally epistemic.
Kant is motivated by the desire to establish the necessary a priori 
or transcendental conditions for human knowledge in the face of what
he saw as the potentially devastating scepticism of Hume and those
of like opinion. It is as an out-working of this primary concern
that he concentrated his attention upon the structure of human
knowing, that is the obJect's appearance to the subject.
From this we may identify certain loci within Kant's thought which
have significance for our own concern with human relationality.
Firstly, what is it that constitutes the determinative nature of the
subject for the object in Kant? That is to say, in what sense, if
Indeed any, is the subject to be regarded as constitutive of the
appearance of the object? Concomitantly we need to ask whether, for
Kant, there exists a real disjunction between the object-for-subject 
and the object-in-Itself. Certainly, as we shall see in the
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following chapter the German Idealist tradition rejected the notion
of the "thing-in-itself". It seems clear to us from the outset that
Kant may be seen as engaging with the three fields of inquiry spoken
of in chapter two. He is concerned with the normative nature of the
subject's relationship to the object, he is clearly aware of the
problematic of the subject/object disjunction and his critical
philosophy represents an attempt at describing the way in which this
disjunction is overcome in the transcendental unity of apperception.
In seeking to clarify the subject/object relation Kant found himself
engaged both in a consideration of the limits of human
understanding, suw.med up in his critique of metaphysics and his
introduction of the notion of noumena and, concomitantly, in an
analysis of the application of the categories of the understanding
to the phenomenal world. We shall turn now to an exposition of both
of these issues as they present themselves in Kant's thought
primarily from the Prize Essay up until the first Critique.
Our reasons for electing to focus upon these particular writings
within the Kant corpus are partially pragmatic in that we are not
here attempting to address the complete work of Kant but simply to
draw attention to certain tendencies exhibited within the tradition
of which he is often considered to be the leading exponent. Our
second reason involves our concern to indicate that these tendencies
were integral to the development of Kant's thought and do not simply
represent a minor aberration drawn from the First Critique and
brought to an artificial prominence by the present writer.
It could of course be argued that we ought to concentrate our
efforts on all three Critiques, representing, as they do, the end-
product of Kant's mature thought. However we accept the observation
of the translator and scholar of Kant, L.W.Beck, who writes:
Although the Critique of Pure Reason was written
almost exclusively for the professional philosopher,
it was nonetheless the foundation for most of Kant's
other writings, nearly half of which were addressed
to the general learned public.3
This observation is further amplified when Beck points out the
analogical relationship that exists between principles in the first
and second critiques. 4 It is in the First Critique that Kant
presents us with his definitive epistemology, which forms the
undeniable foundation for all his subsequent writings irrespective
of possible changes in emphasis. It is in the First Critique that
the phenomenal/noumenal dualism is established and, as we shall see,
it is where the Cartesian cogito is developed and indeed transformed
into Kant's notion of the transcendental unity of apperception.
We have chosen to begin our examination of Kant's critical thought
with the Prize Essay for it is here that Kant begins his formal
investigations concerning the nature and limitations of human
knowledge. It may well be that traces of his mature critical
philosophy might be discovered further back than this but for our
purposes the question set by the Berlin Academy represents the
formal presentation of a problem that would concern Kant for the
rest of his life. All this having been said we will be engaging with
Kant's Second Critique in the later part of this chapter for reasons
which will become clear if they are not so already.
The Quest for Clarity and the Limits of Human Reason. 
In many ways it would be true to say that the turn to the subject in
Kant has its roots in his consideration of the nature and extent of
metaphysical knowledge. It is undoubtedly the case that one of the
central concerns of Kant's thinking was that of the place of
metaphysics. During the mid-1750's and early 1760's Kant lectured in
metaphysics and mathematics along with courses on physical
geography, natural science, mechanics, geometry and theoretical
physics. Despite the vast and varied range of subject matter that he
was called upon to teach, Kant complained:
I sit daily at the anvil of my lectern and keep the
heavy hammer of repetitious lectures going in some
sort of rhythm. Now and then an impulse of a nobler
sort, from out of nowhere, tempts me to break out of
this cramping sphere...'
Nevertheless he continued with the drudgery of academic life until
1762 when he began to concern himself with those issues upon which
he was to have his most lasting effect. The Berlin Academy of
Science had set as the problem topic for the year 1763 the
following:
It is desired to know whether metaphysical truths in
general and the first principles of Theologia 
naturalis and of morals in particular are
susceptible of clear and evident proofs like those
of geometrical truths, and if they are not
susceptible of aforesaid proofs, what the particular
nature of their certainty is, to what degree their
stated certainty can be brought, and whether this
degree is sufficient for complete conviction.'
Kant was deeply aware of the importance of this topic and began his
response to the question by claiming that "The question proposed is
of the kind where fitting solution results in higher philosophy
necessarily receiving a definite shape." 8 With the Prize Essay Kant
Initiated a major change in direction from that exhibited in his
earlier work the Universal Natural History and Theory of the 
Heavens. In this latter work Kant had maintained that while it is
true that metaphysics is founded upon experimental data, through
the synthetic power of imagination it is permitted to go beyond
experience, enhancing and making real additions. However in his
Prize Essay, the Enquiry Concerning the Clarity of the Principles of 
Natural Theology and Ethics, Kant abandoned this view arguing that
metaphysics contributes to human thought only by way of its
clarificatory revelation of the structures of that thought. In no
way does metaphysics make a substantial contribution to the body of
our knowledge.
What I am trying to say is primarily this: in
metaphysics one must proceed entirely by analysis.
For the business of metaphysics is indeed the
disentangling of confused knowledge.9
Kant argues that while the mathematical sciences proceed by way of
synthesis, that is through an "arbitrary connection of concepts",
the philosopher may only formulate concepts analytically, in other
words "by separation from that knowledge which is clarified by
analysis." Thus while the geometer takes four lines and constructs a
square or a trapezium from them, the philosopher takes, for example,
the already existent if muddied notion of time and seeks to clarify
it by means of an examination of its constituent parts. '° It is
Kant's opinion that despite the analytical nature of philosophy,
philosophers still attempt to proceed synthetically in imitation of
the mathematician. Consequently, says Kant, a true metaphysics has
never been produced. In this connection it is important to note that
Kant does make provision ,
 for a synthetic approach towards
metaphysical concepts that have received adequate clarification by
means of analysis."
Although mathematical knowledge and metaphysical knowledge are
approached in their own distinctive ways, both are capable of
certainty, albeit of different sorts. One of the basic differences
between mathematical and philosophical certainty arises from the
aforementioned synthetic and analytical natures of these two areas
of human thought. As a mistaken view of a concept stems, according
to Kant, from the failure to recognise a certain characteristic of a
thing, philosophy and metaphysics are more open to uncertainty than
their mathematical counterparts. 12 This is necessarily the case as
in mathematics we proceed synthetically and therefore we choose
which particular characteristics we wish to bring together to form a
concept. However, continues Kant, in philosophy where the concepts
are already given, one's analysis may prove to be faulty; a vital
characteristic might have been ignored and the resultant definition
rendered inaccurate. It would thus not be unreasonable to maintain
that for Kant, at least at this point in his development, while
mathematics is regarded as a constructive discipline philosophy is
essentially a deconstructive one
Ultimately, whereas mathematical knowledge may be approached by
concrete "signs" as Kant calls them, philosophy may only be engaged
with in the abstract and via the imprecise medium of words. Despite
this Kant is still prepared to allow that "Metaphysics is capable of
a certainty which is sufficient for conviction". He goes on to say,
in the section of the essay bearing the above title:
Metaphysical certainty is the same as that of any
other philosophical knowledge, for the latter can
only possess certainty, if it accords with the
general principles furnished by the former. It is
known from experience that, even outside
mathematics, we can in many cases be perfectly
certain, to the extent of conviction, by means of
rational argument, metaphysics is only philosophy
applied to more general rational Judgements.
Once again Kant ventures his opinion of "mistakes" which are not
matters of ignorance but the results of Judgements made in the
absence of complete data. In the course of this discussion Kant
clearly reveals his Cartesian roots when he tells us that "some
predicates are known with certainty of a thing. Good! Make them the
basis of your inferences and you will not go wrong." It is clarity
and the disparaging of all vagaries which characterise the post-
cartesian quest for epistemic certainty and Kant is clearly heavily
influenced by this perspective on the nature of knowledge.
Nevertheless, he continues, once you attempt to go beyond
"inference" and establish "definition", despite the lack of the
necessary data you will fall into error. "It is thus possible to
avoid errors, if one seeks out certain and clear knowledge,  without
however pretending so lightly to definitions."''
It is not altogether clear what Kant means when he says here that,
on the one hand, we can have a degree of certainty concerning
certain predicates sufficient to build inferences upon them, and
also that we should actively seek out "certain and clear knowledge",
and on the other hand that such knowledge may not be resolved into a
clear definition for fear of error. However it seems obvious that at
least at this stage in his development Kant would wish to allow
metaphysics some role in human thought, albeit only a clarificatory
one, whilst also imposing limitations upon its ability to provide
definitive knowledge comparable to that derived from empirical
sources.
We can already see here the beginnings of a fundamental problem that
will continue to plague Kant's treatment of the relationship between
the self and the other. The quest for clear and certain knowledge,
in the Cartesian sense of epistemic indubitability, implies both
that the other be engaged with at the level of formal knowledge and
further that that knowledge be complete. There is no room for
mystery here; to be lacking in data as regards some object or
concept is to court error. Further problems arise when we consider
whether our engagement with the other is analytic or synthetic in
nature? Is the other in some way "given" to me in its totality as
are, according to Kant, time and space, such that I know that other
through, for want of a better term, a process of exploration or do
I construct the other for myself in the same way as the
mathematician brings together three lines and calls them a triangle?
By the time Kant had developed his mature critical thought he had
clearly allied himself with the latter of these two options and it
is in this that we will subsequently find the essence of our
dissatisfaction with his treatment of self/other relationality
In the section of his Prize Essay immediately following that which
we have just considered, Kant allows the truths of metaphysics a
certainty "no different in kind from that of every other rational
knowledge with the exception of mathematics". Ultimately Kant means
by this that it is equally possible to come to certainty as the end
result of metaphysical analysis as it is with mathematical
synthesis, but it is simply that mathematic conviction is far easier
to arrive at. It would seem that in this essay, while fearlessly
cutting back on the effective influence of metaphysical thought,
Kant still finds himself duty-bound to find a place of relevance for
this discipline in his epistemology.
In 1766 Kant had published, anonymously, his strange and
uncharacteristic work, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer, Illustrated by 
Dreams of Metaphysics. A very idiosyncratic work, Cassirer refers to
it as an exuberant and satirical work, "which in its literaq form
and in its stylistic dress alike upset all the traditions of the
literature of scientific philosophy." 6 Dreams of a Spirit-Seer 
charts a significant development in Kant's understanding of
metaphysics and its subject matter. His concern over those things
which go beyond the empirical and synthetic leads Kant to examine
the claims of visionary and mystic Emanuel Swedenborg specifically
in his major work the Arcana Coelestia.  The final result of Kant's
investigations is summed up in the preface to Dreams of a 
Spirit-Seer:
The author confesses with a certain humility that he
was so simpleminded as to track down the truth of
some tales of the sort mentioned. He found - as
usual, where one has nothing to look for - he found
nothing.16.
Then why did Kant, a man of proven philosophical seriousness, expend
his energies upon what seemed to many to be highly dubious areas of
study? Cassirer answers this question in a way that would place this
rather strange work of Kant fully in line with his central concerns:
All this... (that is, the reasons given by Kant in
the preface for the production of the book) ...
would hardly have influenced Kant, who was not
easily led astray by any 'author's itch', to occupy
himself so intensely with the 'arch-phantasist'
Swedenborg, the 'worst visionary of them all', if it
were not that what he discovered in Swedenborg had a
queer, indirect link with the crucial questions to
which his own inner development had led him. '7
Cassirer continues by pointing out that for Kant "Swedenborg is ...
the caricature of all supersensible metaphysics.,..". As we have
already seen in earlier works, Kant laments the lack of any true
metaphysics and indeed rejects most of the existing systems as
founded upon an erroneous methodology, but here he equates the
substance of such systems, despite their pretense at philosophical
respectability, with the empty imaginings of the visionary.
The result of Kant's enquiry into the spiritual realm expounded by
Swedenborg and his like is far closer to the opinion held in the
First Critique than it is to the prize essay which preceded it by
only a few years. Contemporary metaphysics, says Kant, exerts an
almost unbearable fascination upon the human mind and yet for all
that it cannot truly be understood nor can it constitute true
knowledge. Only out of empirical human experience can knowledge,
that is clear and certain knowledge and not the vagaries of the
visionary, properly be fashioned; the so-called "spiritual realm"
can no longer be thought of as a subject for rational thought claims
Kant.
... Metaphysics is a science of the limits of human
reason... I have not determined these limits with
any precision here, but have indicated that the
reader will find on further reflection that he can
excuse himself from all vain inquiries with regard
to a question the data for which are to be found in
a world other than the one in which he perceives
himself to be. 18
Thus Kant expresses his characteristic "enlightened" rejection of a
supersensible reality open to human thought, and sets about a
redefinition of metaphysics to suit its new role. As Cassirer puts
it, "...metaphysics is still a science for him; however it is no
longer a science of things in a supersensible world, but of the
limits of human reason."le
It would be in the Inaugural Dissertation, written four years later,
that Kant would begin to formulate his language of limitation in
more detail, redefining metaphysics in terms of the faculty of human
knowing. We shall be returning to this important work in the
following section.
To be aware of the single-mindedness of Kant's developing thought
from the time of the Inaugural Dissertation up until the completion
of the First Critique one need only examine his letters to Marcus
Herz. Although very sporadic, gaps of years separating some of them,
there is no indication that Kant ever turned from the task to which
he had set himself, despite considerable pressure being placed upon
him to publish before he was ready. In his letter of June 1771 he
tells Herz that he is working on a book entitled "The Limits of
Sensibility and Reason". By February 1772 he has decided upon two
subsections, one practical dealing with phenomenology, the other
theoretical, having to do with metaphysics. He also makes reference
to "transcendental philosophy" in connection with the categories of
reason and speaks of his readiness to embark upon a "critique of
pure reason". November 1776 sees Kant expressing, apparently as a
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result of much labour, the same opinions as put forth in his
previous work, that:
... it must be possible to see the field of pure
reason independent of empirical principles in its
judgments, since it lies in us a priori and can
expect no revelations from experience. Now in order
to delineate, in accordance with sure principles,
the complete compass, divisions, limits and whole
content of pure reason, and in order to place the
boundary-stones so that one may know with certainty
in the future whether one is on the territory of
reason or that of sophistry, the following is
essential... 20.
Kant then goes on to outline his proposal for a critique of pure
reason.
In the preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason 
Kant considers the paradox of human reason, that is the constant
pressure of questions whose answers are beyond the capability of
human rationality. Nevertheless, these questions persist and despite
centuries of philosophical thought all that has been achieved is a
cacophany of differing opinions and systems of thought none of
which, claims Kant, are valid, for all of them "overstep all
possible empirical employment". Indeed, rather than illuminating the
human condition,
by this procedure human reason precipitates itself
into darkness and contradictions... For since the
principles of which it is making use transcend the
limits of experience, they are no longer subject to
any empirical test. The battlefield of these endless
controversies is called metaphysics.2'
It is to this battlefield that Kant proposes to bring the "peace" of
critical thought by the setting up of clearly defined boundaries for
human thought. In his Reflexion on the Critique (No. 128) Kant speaks
of it as bringing light to the darkness and gloom created by
metaphysics, however this is a light which "illuminates the dark
spaces of our own understanding, not the things unknown to us beyond
the sense world". It is the very nature of human thought which
should now concern metaphysics and the knowledge that such an
analysis would provide is the only true transcendental knowledge. It
is important to make clear that Kant does not refer to actual a
priori concepts and principles as in themselves transcendental.
Rather, it is the knowledge of such principles and their function,
as relating to phenomena, that is true transcendental knowledge;
what can alone be entitled transcendental is the
knowledge that these
	 representations are not of
empirical origin, and the possibility that they can
yet relate a priori to objects of experience.22
In other words, transcendental knowledge has to do with the mode of
human thought and its capacity to function rather than any specific 
°pet...ration of rationality in its encounter with phenomenal objects.
In the light of this Kant concludes that the presumptious title of
"ontology" once assumed by metaphysics must now be replaced by "the
modest title of a mere Analytic of pure understanding." 23 The pure
categories of thought have absolutely no application beyond the
sensible realm; they constitute simply the form of the
understanding.
To prevent sensible intuition from going beyond the bounds permitted
of it, Kant introduces his notion of the noumenon. All things which
are not within the sphere of appearance are noumena: "the concept of
a noumenon is ... merely a limiting concept, the function of which
is to curb the pretensions of sensibility". The understanding cannot
approach those things pertaining to the noumenal realm and thus
"must think of them only under the title of an unknown something. u'2
Coupled with the inaccessibility of any supersensible world Kant
also debars us from knowledge of the "thing-in-itself". That is to
say, according to his doctrine of transcendental idealism, those
appearances which are vouchsafed to us via our senses are only
representations. The significance of allthis for our present concern
will become apparent when we discuss the notion of the noumenal self
latter in this chapter. Furthermore, and in full accord with the
argument contained in the Inaugural Dissertation, the aforementioned
representations are given order and form by the twin categories of
space and time which themselves have no independent existence beyond
us and are in no way related to the objects of our sense. It is
precisely the error of transcendental realism, says Kant, to produce
the illusion that in our experience of the phenomenal world we are
actually dealing with things-in-themse1ves. 2E' H.E.Allison helpfully
clarifies Kant's argument in this way:
Kant is here arguing that transcendental realism
leads to empirical idealism, which is the doctrine
that the mind can only have immediate access to its
own ideas or representations (the 'ideal' in the
empirical sense). The point is that because the
transcendental realist misconstrues the reality of
spatial objects ('objects of the senses') he is
forced to deny that the mind has any immediate
experience of such objects. Transcendental realism
is thus presented as the source of the
pseudo-problem of the external world and of the
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typically Cartesian version of skepticism that is
associated with it.2e
As we shall see later it is arguable that Kant himself does not
escape a similar charge of scepticism due to the difficulty his
system has in giving and account of the reality of both the self and
other selves. Certainly Kant already seems to be suggesting that the
other qua other is inaccessible to the self as anything other than a
representation construed by that self and this we shall consider in
more detail later in this chapter.
In the Preface to the Second Edition of the Critique of Pure Reason 
Kant outlines the failure of philosophy to establish any form of a
priori knowledge on the basis of an assumed conformity of our
knowledge to objects in the world. Utilizing such an epistemology,
only a posteriori knowledge is available to us. Indeed in a
subsequent work Kant goes as far as to claim that if objects of our
knowledge are seen as things-in-themselves, then we can in actual
fact have no knowledge at all. (26)
We shall turn our attention now to Kant's consideration of the
subject, that is to say the mind with its categories of
understanding, as determinative for the appearance of the object.
The Cognitive Determination of the Active Subject.
It is significant to note that even as early as the Prize Essay Kant
was already concerning himself with those issues which were to
become fundamental to the First Critique. In the opening
Introduction to the Prize Essay Kant makes it clear that he is
concerned to formulate a philosophy of knowledge which would be the
counterpart to the Newtonian approach to the physical sciences.
Later in his essay he claims that
The true method of metaphysics is basically the same
as that introduced by Newton into natural science
and which had such useful consequences in that
field.2e
Kant is essentially concerned to discover the fundamental rules or
principles or even laws of human thought just as Newton had done for
the material world. As we shall see this was precisely his concern
In the First Critique, the Introduction to which echoes the
Introduction to this earlier work. Although the term "transcendent"
is not used here one can already see Kant struggling towards his
understanding of the transcendental categories of human thought as
he seeks to find an appropriate place for metaphysics. "Metaphysics"
says Kant "is nothing other than a philosophy of the first
principles of our knowledge."
A correlative to Kant's concern over the right approach to
metaphysical enquiry is his dismay at the constant misuse to which
it is subjected by thinkers who seek to support their own
philosophies by means of metaphysical creations derived from a
synthetic method inappropriate to the discipline. In subsequent
works Kant takes issue with the respected Newton for precisely this
reason. The essential argument of the Prize Essay is encapsulated
in the Second Reflection which explains the nature of metaphysical
certainty:
In metaphysics I have a concept given to me already,
although it is a confused one. My duty is to search
for the clear, detailed and determinate formulation
of this confined concept.... In philosophy, and
especially in metaphysics, one can often know a
great deal about an object with clearness and
certainty, and also derive certain conclusions
therefrom, before possessing a definition of that
same object.... I can be immediately certain about
various different predicates of any particular
thing, in spite of the fact that I do not know
enough about that thing to give a detailed and
determinate concept of the thing, that is a
definition.
Thus as we have already observed the Kant of the Prize Essay had not
entirely abandoned metaphysics as an authentic epistemic concern
although he had substantially cut back on its actual utility as a
source of knowledge.
In the Summer of 1770, on his taking up of a Chair in Logic and
Metaphysics, Kant delivered his Inaugural Dissertation On the Form
and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World. The structure
and style of the Dissertation are a return once more to the
conventions of philosophical literature, after the radical departure
exhibited in Dreams of a Spirit-Seer. Kant clearly outlines the
various elements involved in the notion of a world beginning with
"Matter", "Form" and "Entirety", and moving on to the more complex
problems of space and time. However, these sections of the work
constitute little more than rough working definitions whereas the
sections dealing with "sensibility" and "metaphysics" are of
considerable importance for our understanding of the point which
Kant had reached in his view of human cognition3°, and, as a result,
his understanding of the relationship between subject and object.
In Section Two of the Dissertation Kant makes his first reference to
the terms phenomenon and noumenon; the former he associates with
sensuality, the latter with intelligence. It is important for our
present purposes to note that by sensibility Kant means the
"receptivity of a subject", that is to say, the possibilit of a
subject being affected by external object. By intelligence or
rationality he has in mind the "faculty of a subject by which it has
the power to represent things which cannot by their own quality come
before the senses of that subject." 3 ' From this Kant maintains that
objects which are presented to us via sensation "are representations
of things as they appear" whereas things which are thought of via
the intellect only are "representations of things as they are". It
is at this point in the discussion that Kant introduces his now
famous notion of the transcendental categories of human thought, an
understanding of human cognitive power which, as we shall see, has
serious implications for the nature of the rational subject's
engagement with the other. We can already see here in the
Dissertation Kant's critical understanding of the subject as
constructing a representation of the object with which it then
engages and it will be with this notion of the-subject as powerful
over the other that we shall have cause to question in the
concluding section of this chapter.
While not yet making use of the term transcendental, Kant points out
that all sensual knowledge necessarily has to do with both matter
and form, these being the substance and specificity of a given
sensation, but whereas the former is merely evidence of "the
presence of something sensible", the latter points to an ordering
process which Kant hinted at earlier when he spoke of "a certain
natural law of the mind":
... it is not some adumbration or schema of the
object, but only a certain law implanted in the mind
by which it co-ordinates for itself the sensa which
arise from the presence of the object. For objects
do not strike the senses in virtue of their form or
specificity. So, for the various things in an object
which affect the sense to coalesce into some
representational whole there is needed an internal
principle in the mind by which those various things
may be clothed with a certain specificity in
accordance with stable and innate laws.32
Although Kant speaks of the intellect as the faculty of
non-sensitive representation he does make a distinction between the
real and logical use of the intellect. The former does indeed have
to do with given, pure ideas, which it orders into particular
experiences. However, despite this exercise of the intellect upon
empirical concepts they still remain within the category of sense
data no matter how refined is the rational process through which
they have come. They are the product of what Kant calls inner sense.
He goes on to argue in the light of this that philosophy has done
itself a great disservice (and he singles out Christian von Wolff
particularly here) by the failure to maintain the distinction
between the phenomenal and noumenal realms.
It is precisely this concern which is the only proper subject for
metaphysics and Kant applies himself to it with all his energy.
Now the philosophy which contains the first 
principles of the use of the pure intellect is
METAPHYSICS. But its propaedeutic science is that
science which teaches the distinction of sensitive
cognition from intellectual cognition, and it is of
this science that I am offering a specimen in my
present dissertation.33
Empirical principles, says Kant, cannot be found in metaphysics,
likewise one will not discover metaphysical concepts within the
sensual manifold, but only within pure reason or intellect. And by
metaphysical principles Kant reminds us he does not mean those
things pertaining to any supersensible realm but rather "concepts
abstracted out of the laws planted in the mind". These concepts
Include the notions of "possibility, existence, necessity,
substance, cause etc..." and their correlates.
Thus we see Kant, in contradistinction from Newton, speaking of the
"contagion of sensitive cognition with intellectuel"; there is no
room, nor is there any need for any form of deus ex machine in the
thought of Kant. Indeed, in a letter to his friend Marcus Herz as he
approached the completion of the First Critique, Kant rejected the
epistemic systems of Plato, Malebranche and Crusius on the grounds
that they all opted for some form of pre-established harmony to
explain the possibility of human thought:
... in determining the origin and validity of our
knowledge, however, the deus ex machina is the most
absurd argument one could choose,
It is interesting to note that the concepts of space and time
expounded in the Inaugural Dissertation would appear to be in all
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but their final critical form as they remain unchanged, albeit
greatly expanded, in the First Critique. In Section 3 of the
Dissertation Kant informs us that the two most primary formal
principles of the phenomenal universe are space and time. Further to
this, these concepts, far from being in some way generated by the
material world and its effect upon the senses, are in fact
transcendental conditions of human knowing. Time is a ."pure 
Intuition", which precedes every sensation:
Time is not something objective and real, nor is it
a substance or an accident or a relation, but it is
the subjective condition necessary by the nature of
the human mind for co-ordinating with each other by
a fixed law whatsoever things are sensible, and it
is a pure intuition.3s
The notion of time as an objective reality Kant dismisses as "a most
absurd fabrication", the greatest offenders being the English. The
status of time as the formal principle of the sensible world is
arrived at by means of the contention that all things are thought of
either simultaneously, that is, at the same time, or in related
succession.
The notion of space receives a very similar treatment to that of
time. As with the concept of time, "The concept of space is not
abstracted from external sensations", it is a pure intuition which
manifests itself in the presence of sensible objects which could not
be thought of apart from its supposition. Kant uses exactly the same
formula down to the last word to describe space as he does time:
"Space is not something objective and real... Space is therefore the
formal principle of the sensible world, absolutely first..." 36, and
so on, even down to the comment concerning those who erroneously see
space as "real", for example the English and Leibniz. As categories
which provide the grounds for empirical knowledge it goes almost
without saying that neither time nor space have anything to do with
any supersensible reality; they are strictly applicable only to the
phenomenal realm.37
For Kant, as we have seen, knowledge - rather than issuing out of a
conformity of the mind to external objects - is the result of the
mind's ability to provide conceptual structuring to the manifold of
experience provided by the material world. In other words, knowledge
is to be understood as the conformity of external objects to the a
priori categories of the human mind, categories such as substance
and causality. It is solely due to these categories that we
apprehend reality as anything other than a chaotic mass of
uncoordinated sense-impressions. Kant outlines his hypothesis
clearly in his Preface to the Second Edition of the Critique of Pure 
Reason:
The examples of mathematics and natural science,
which by a single and sudden revolution have become
what they now are, seem to me sufficiently
remarkable to suggest our considering what may have .
been the essential features in the changed point of
view by which they have so greatly benefited. Their
success should incline us, at least by way of
experiment, to imitate their procedure, so far as
the analogy which, as species of rational knowledge,
they bear to metaphysics may permit. Hitherto it has
been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to
objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of
objects by establishing something in regard to them
a priori, by means of concepts, have, on this
assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore make
trial whether we may not have more success in the
tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects
must conform to our knowledge. This would agree
better with what is desired, namely, that it should
be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori,
determining something in regard to them prior to
their being given. 39
It is here that we come to the heart of the Kant's understanding of
the priority of the subject in that the primary desire of critical
thought appears to be to establish the a priori determination of the
object by the subject. We shall consider this central issue in more
detail subsequently.
To return to our exposition, another fundamental concern of the
critical philosophy is its insistence on the realm of sensory
experience as constituting the only material available to the a
priori categories:
Our nature is so constituted that our intuition can
never be other than sensible; that is, it contains
only the mode in which we are affected by objects. 39
By this means Kant hoped to bring final reconciliation to rival
metaphysical systems. He argued that such metaphysical disagreements
were the inevitable result of a misguided attempt at forcing the
categories of understanding beyond their operational limits. Thus,
despite man's "natural disposition" towards metaphysical question
and speculation, all attempts at a resolution of the problems raised
in this area are destined to failure:
Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one
species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions
which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason
itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as
transcending all its powers, it is also not able to
answer.4°
Thus, while the concept of "God" might still be thought without
contradiction, as an ens realissimum for example, it is not possible
that such a God might be known, being "outside" the manifold of
sense experience. The same would appear to be the case for the self
and other selves. Essential to the whole structure of the Kantian
epistemology is the dichotomy between phenomenal and noumenal
realities, coupled with the attendant acknowledgement of the
unknowability of the "thing-in-itself". J.J.Davis maintains that
without this doctrine the Kantian analysis is difficult to sustain.
He points out that Kant saw it as,
essential for the achievement of two of the major
goals of his enterprise: ending the conflict of
metaphysical systems through the limitation of the
categories of the understanding to an empirical use,
and preserving the autonomy of human moral
experience and the possibility of freedom in the
face of the necessity prevailing in the realm of
phenomena.'"
Let us consider further the determinative priority of the subject
over the object in Kant's thinking, that is to say the constitutive
role that the mind has for phenomena.
There is, to quote L.W.Beck, a "promethean revolution" operational
within Kant's philosophy which goes a long way towards establishing
the subject as pre-eminent in terms of epistemology and, some would
argue, morality. It is the subject that establishes its own reality
In Kantian thought not by virtue of creating a physical world, for
Kant insists on maintaining the independent reality of the thing-in-
itself, but by the application of the categories of the mind to
establishing what we know as "nature" or the "natural order".
It was Prometheus who seized the prerogative of the
gods and gave it to humankind. Through possession of
fire, everything else could be created... Man is no
god, but in his creativity he may be godlike, and
many of the tasks previously assigned to god in the
creation and governance of the world are reassigned
by Kant to man. d2
It has been said that the ultimate question being addressed in all
of Kant's work is "What is man?" Beck claims, quite rightly I
believe, that his final answer, typified in the First Critique, is
"man is creator". In the First Edition of the Critique of Pure 
Reason Kant expounds an understanding of man as the creator of his
world by the operation of the categories of understanding upon the
manifold of sense experience.
the order and regularity in the appearances,
which we entitle nature we ourselves introduce. We
could never find them in appearances, had not we
ourselves, or the nature of our mind, originally set
them there, For this unity of nature has to be a
necessary one, that is, has to be an a priori 
certain unity of the connection of appearances; and .
such synthetic unity could not be established a
priori if there were not subjective grounds of such
unity contained a priori in the original cognitive
powers of our mind, and if these subjective
conditions, inasmuch as they are the grounds of the
possibility of knowing any object whatsoever in
experience, were not at the same time objectively
valid.43
This faculty of rules is the very "lawgiver of nature". While
sensibility provides us with a collection of chaotic forms only the
human understanding can give the rules necessary for a unified view
of reality. These rules, says Kant, are by no means external to us,
being the a priori product of our understanding. "They are not
borrowed from experience; on the contrary, they have to confer upon
appearance their conformity to law, and so to make experience
possible."'" There can be no synthetic unity of the manifold of
appearances outside of this operation. Indeed this whole section of
the Transcendental Deduction might well be seen as the Kantian
equivalent to a creation narrative, where epistemological order is
established out of the chaos of intuition.
That Kant was aware of the radical nature of his claim here seems
obvious from the way in which he concludes this section by
attempting to pre-empt the expected criticisms:
However exaggerated and absurd it may sound, to say
that the understanding is itself the source of the
laws of nature, and so of its formal unity, such an
assertion is none the less correct, and is in
keeping with the object to which it refers, namely,
experience. Certainly, empirical laws, as such, can
never derive their origin from pure understanding.
That is as little possible as to understand
completely the inexhaustible multiplicity of
appearances merely by reference to the pure form of
sensible intuition. But all empirical laws are only
special determinations of the pure laws of
understanding, under which, and according to the
norm of which, they first become possible. Through
them appearances take on an orderly character, just
as these same appearances, despite the differences
of their empirical form, must none the less always
be in harmony with the pure form of sensibility.45
In the Second Edition this line of thought is equally apparent. Here
Kant expands on his use of the "abiding and unchanging 'I'", found
in the first edition treatment of the Transcendental Deduction,
showing his "Cartesian hand" by relating all the "manifold
intuitions" to the Cogito, albeit in its distinctively Kantian non-
substantive manifestation. It is the self-conscious subject which
forms the basis for what Kant calls the "unity of apperception"47,
•
or rather it is the unity of apperception which presupposes the
transcendental self. As in the First Edition this unity of the
manifold of sense experience,
is an affair of the understanding alone, which
itself is nothing but the faculty of combining a
priori, and of bringing the manifold of given
representations under the unity of apperception.46
It is this aspect of Kant's thought which prompts Beck to observe
that
The autonomy of the individual in creating out of
chaos the world in which one is to live is a
characteristic of Kant's teaching as it is of that
of the modern existentialist thinker. 49
Both versions of the "Deduction" assume the universality of the
categories of understanding; that is to say, the possibility of a
seperate and quite different "lawgiver of nature" for every
individual self-consciousness is never entertained by Kant. In the
light of this W. H. Walsh, who is normally particularly charitable
towards Kant, suggests that both he and Hume "...confront the
objection how in such circumstances different individuals can be
said to inhabit a common world. "° Walsh continues, nevertheless, to
attempt to draw an answer to this question from Kant's writings but
is forced to conclude, as regards his reinterpretation, "I cannot
point to a passage in which he states it explicitly, and may even be
over-charitable in suggesting that he toyed with it." 6 ' We must say
of Kant therefore that, following the western philosophical
tradition since Plato, he assumes both the universality of truth -
all truth is one - and concomitantly the universality of human
knowing. This assumption functions for Kant as a Transcendental
presupposition.
The freedom of the subject.
Although we began this study by stating that we would limit our
analysis to the material leading up to and including the First
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Critique it is important that we consider Kant's distinction between
what he understands as the "standpoint" of the sensible world, and
the "standpoint" of the intelligible world s2 as found in his ethical
writings.
The first of these two standpoints has already been explored above.
It represents the perspective of the First Critique where all that
is accessible to human knowing, including the self-conscious
subject, is accessible only as it appears and not as it is in
itself. However, in subsequent works, such as the Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason Kant
acknowledges the validity of a second standpoint founded upon the
idea of freedom which establishes the human person as not only part
of the sensible manifold but also part of the intellectual or
noumenal world:
Even as regards himself - so far as man is
acquainted with himself by inner sensation - he
cannot claim to know what he is in himself... since
he acquires his concept of self not a priori but
empirically, it is natural that even about himself
he should get information through sense - that is,
through inner sense - and consequently only through
the mere appearance of his own nature and through
the way in which his consciousness is affected.s3
So far this is in agreement with what we find in the "Paralogisms of
Pure Reason" as presented in the First Critiques4. The "I" is not
accessible, in itself. to human understanding, but only as the
perceived unity of human thought. However, Kant continues:
Yet beyond this character of himself as a subject
made up, as it is, of mere appearances, he must
suppose there to be something else which is its
ground - namely, his Ego as this may be constituted
in itself; and thus as regards mere perception and
the capacity for receiving sensations he must count
himself as belonging to the sensible world, but as
regards whatever there may be in him of pure
activity (whatever comes into consciousness, not
through affection of the senses, but immediately) he
must count himself as belonging to the intellectual 
world, of which, however, he knows nothing
further.ss
It is the unconditioned causality of the human will free from the
determination of the sensible world to which Kant can now refer as a
causa noumenon. s6 Freedom, or the autonomy of the will, is to be
regarded as a necessary postulate of practical reason, and
represents the form of human morality.s7
The material content of human morality, by virtue of its necessarily
empirical nature, is ultimately determined by consideration of
consequences such as the greater good or self-satisfaction, or the
betterment of the species.	 This, argues Kant, is an insufficient
basis for universal moral law. To perform our duty, to act as we
ought for the sake of the moral law, and not simply for some desired
end as a consequence of moral activity, demands both that the moral
law itself be unconditioned, and that we - as rational beings - be
free from all determination as regards our compliance with it.
"Ought", argues Kant, implies "can". What the moral law demands of
us we must be free to perform. It is in the light of this freedom,
manifesting itself in the autonomy of the will that we may regard
ourselves as "independent of determination by causes in the sensible
world..."-Be bound only by the laws of reason. Being conditioned by
the empirical world or laws of nature Kant refers to heteronomy,
while determination solely by the rational will be called autonomy.
Reason, Kant maintains, represents a power beyond even the
understanding. The activity of the understanding, while sharing in
reason's spontaneity, can produce of itself only those categories
which are necessary for the unification of sense-data within the one
consciousness. Reason, by comparison, is not dependent upon sense
experience in order to engage thought. Reason, says Kant, exhibits
the character of pure spontaneity59 in that it gives rise to "ideas"
- in other words, unconditioned concepts the highest of which is the
distinction between the sensible and intelligible realms.6°
We need not trouble ourselves here with the further intricacies of
Kant's moral philosophy. What is important for our purposes is his
rather surprising notion of the transcendental or noumenal self.
Has Kant reneged upon his doctrine of the unknowability of the
thing-in-itself as so forcibly argued in the First Critique? I
think not.
There are two important points which need to be constantly borne in
mind when considering Kant's treatment of the transcendental self.
Firstly, Kant does not intend us to understand him as promulgating a
form of metaphysical schizophrenia. There are not two distinct
selves, one operating in the world of sense and bound by the laws of
nature (such as cause and effect), the other existing in some
noumenal reality characterized by the exercise of pure unconditioned
reason.	 Both these aspects of the rational subject "...not merely
can get on perfectly well together but must be conceived as
necessarily combined in the same subject" 61 . Human persons are said
by Kant to conceive of themselves or perceive themselves to be, or
to become aware of themselves in a "double way" 62: that is, they
become conscious of themselves as both contingent natural objects
and also, "qua intelligence", as part of the intelligible world.
The point is that Kant is speaking of differences in perspective.
The human person "has therefore two points of view from which he can
regard himself..."6
The second point that needs to be made - and Kant himself goes to
great lengths to make it - is that individuals' awareness of
themselves as free and thus as part of the intelligible world does
not overturn the epistemic embargo established by the First Critique 
upon theoretical knowledge of that world.
By thinking itself into the intelligible world
practical reason does not overstep its limits in the
least: it would do so only if it sought to intuit or 
feel itself into that world... If practical reason
were also to import an object of the will - that is,
a motive of action - from the intelligible world, it
would overstep its limits and pretend to an
acquaintance with something of which it has no
knowledge. The concept of the intelligible world is
thus only a point of view which reason finds itself
constrained to adopt outside appearances in order to 
conceive itself as practical.G4
Practical reason is thus not a mode of reason by means of which we
might apprehend the transcendental self as if it were some form of
empirical intuition. It is a perspective not that we occupy in the
manner of some epistemological vantage point, but which we must
consider ourselves actually to be qua rational being. This point is
of considerable importance if we are to avoid the misapprehension
that Kant is providing us with a new set of moral categories which
function in relation to inclinations in the same way that the
categories of pure reason function in relation to sense-data. There
is no synthesis between the a priori and empirical in Kant's view of
human ethical activity. As we have already mentioned, absolute and
universal moral law exists as pure form which requires no material
context if it is to maintain its claim to universality.
It is the very formality of what Kant calls the "principle of
volition" or "the principle of the will" which establishes the moral
worth of rational, ethical behaviour.
	
All a posteriori material
motives are to be abandoned in the quest for unconditioned moral
worth:
Where then can this worth be found if we are not to
find it in the will's relation to the effect hoped
for from the action? It can be found nowhere but in
the principle of the will, irrespective of the ends
which can be brought about by such an action; for
between its a priori principle, which is formal, and
its a posteriori motive, which is material, the will .
stands, so to speak, at a parting of the ways; and
since it must be determined by some principle, it
will have to be determined by the formal principle
of volition when an action is done from duty, where,
as we have seen, every material principle is taken
away from it.66
By virtue of the autonomy of the will every individual, as an
unconditioned rational being, must consider him/herself to be the
maker of universal law. This making of universal law in so far as
it does not depend upon any cause other than the rational will as
causa noumenon establishes all rational beings as ends in 
themselves. 66 The notion of rational beings as ends in themselves 
is absolutely central for Kant's understanding of personhood.
All rational beings, claims Kant, must be regarded as ends in 
themselves and never as means. It is in the nature of things to be
conditioned, dependent upon the laws of nature and thus to be
ultimately of relative value. Rational beings, on the other hand,
by virtue of their unconditioned nature as ends and not merely
means, may lay claim to the status of persons. Only rational
beings, possessing autonomy of will whereby they establish universal
moral law, are to be regarded as ends in themselves and as beings of
absolute worth.	 Thus only rational beings may be regarded as
personal in Kant's view.
Now I say that man, and in general every rational
being, exists as an end in himself, not merely as a 
means for arbitrary use by this or that will: ...
Beings whose existence depends, not on our will, but
on nature, have none the less, if they are non-
rational beings, only a relative value as means and
ar(!.. consequently called things. Rational beings,
on the other hand, are called persons because their
nature already marks them out as ends in
themselves.. Persons, therefore, are not merely
subjective ends whose existence as an object of our
actions has a value for us: they are oblective ends 
- that is, things whose existence is in itself an
end... 67
For Kant the attribution of intrinsic worth or dignity to persons as
opposed to merely an arbitrary or relative price stems precisely
from this understanding of the rational being as autonomous law-
maker, and thus as end in itself. That which has a mere price may
be substituted for something of equivalent price. However, to have
dignity is to be beyond all price and equivalence. Only humanity
therefore in its unconditioned mode as law-maker and determiner of
all value can have dignity;
that is, an unconditioned and incomparable worth -
for the appreciation of which, as necessarily given
by a rational being, the word 'reverence' is the
only becoming expression.E.9
The notion of rational beings as ends rather than means further
gives rise to Kant's understanding of the society of persons as a
Kingdom of ends. By "Kingdom" Kant intends "a systematic union of
different rational beings under common laws". 69 A rational being is
a member of this Kingdom when, as a maker of universal law, he also
subjects himself to that law in its following expression;
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity,
whether in your own person or in the person of any
other, never simply as a means, but always at the
same time as an end.7°
Thus the rational being, as end in itself and consequently as
Person, must regard all other rational beings similarly as ends, as
autonomous law-makers. We must, argues Kant, "reverence" each
individual and ascribe to them the "dignity" and "worth" which is
intrinsically theirs by virtue of their personhood, this personhood
being constituted by their consciousness of themselves as free moral
law-makers - in other words, as transcendental selves.
For Kant relationality would appear to amount then to the formal
recognition of human dignity; that is to say, of the other as being
of intrinsic worth. We must hold in the highest esteem, we must
"reverence" the other who, qua rational being, must be acknowledged
as possessing the same autonomy of the will and therefore as being
part of the same intelligible world as that which we are conscious
ourselves of occupying. Cassirer expresses it this way:
all rational beings stand under the law so that
in constituting their personhood, they are in
relation with the moral individuality of all others,
and so that they also demand the fundamental worth
which they thus grant themselves from every other
subject and acknowledge it in all other
subjects...7'
Whether such a formal description of human sociality in terms of an
acknowledgement of the intrinsic dignity of the individual person, is
- 62-
at all adequate will be considered in the second part of the
conclusion to this chapter. Suffice it to say here that the
reduction of the basis and nature of human relationality to the
level of mere principles would seem to be little more than that, a
reduction. We turn now to our concluding remarks.
Conclusion.
It must be said at the very outset of our critical remarks that
whatever the shortcomings of Kant's understanding of human
relationality,	 his fundamental concern with this issue is
undeniable. For Kant the fact of the subject's relationship to the
object is clearly necessary. The external world, in all its variety
and complexity, is intimately bound up with the thinking subject
which gives it form and order. Thus whatever I, as subject,
encounter in the world as object, or other, I am immediately and
necessarily related to as the transcendental categories of thought
working upon the sensible intuitions I receive make that object an
appearance for me. Thus the importance of the normative status of
relationality, which we spoke of in chapter two under the heading of
the first field of inquiry into coadunacy, is clearly acknowledged
by Kant. Nevertheless, and as we discovered from the First 
Critique, it is precisely this cognitive power of the subject to
construct a representation of the other, with which it subsequently
engages, rather than relating to the other as it actually is, which
must give us cause for critical concern here. Furthermore, Kant's
attempt, in his ethical writings, to develop his understanding of
self/other relationality in terms of respect and dignity, while not
being without value, will be seen to be severely limited and
ultimately to be an inadequate or at least insufficient expression
of human relationality in all its fulness.
Taking the substance of the Critique of Pure Reason first, there
appear to be two fundamental problems arising out of the Kantian
epistemology, as it bears upon the possibility of human
relationality.
Firstly, despite Kant's clear belief in the existence of the "thing-
in-itself" the transcendental unity of apperception demands that the
object be always obJect in relation to subJect. In conection with
this J.Brown makes the very strong claim that in the Kantian
epistemology the "Object, as the thing-known, as appearance to
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Subject or mind, the unknowable noumenon has undergone modification
by the nature and activity of the subject." 72 It has to be said that
while there is a useful point being made here this assessment of
Kant's understanding of the relationship between subject and object
is not altogether accurate and for that reason can be misleading.
While we would certainly want to agree with Brown's contention that
the object as appearance represents a modified experience of the
other relative to what it is in-itself, we must stop short of
making the wholely different claim that this very object-in-itself
as unknowable noumenon is similarly modified.
In so far as Kant appears to make no distinction between the
subject's apprehension of things and its apprehension of other 
sublects - to use Buber's terminology between I-It and I-Thou
relations - other selves must, along with all other objects, submit
to the synthesising structures of the mind in order to become
apprehensible, qua knowledge, for the subject. This would appear to
be the only way in which the reality of the other self might impinge
upon the subject that is, at least in part, as constituted and
modified by that subject. The possibility of engaging with the other 
self-in-itself is simply beyond the constitutive capacity of the
categories of human thought. We must take care therefore not to fall
into Brown's error which attempts to conflate the subject's construal 
of the other as an appearance for itself, which Kant clearly seems
to teach, with the actual modification of the inaccessible noumenal
other. Kant makes this exact point when he writes:
I am not... in a position to perceive external
things, but can only infer their existence from my
inner perception, taking the inner perception as the
effect of which something external is the proximate
cause.73
Although Kant would certainly wish to affirm the existence of the
thing-in-itself 74, and thus by implication the other self-in-itself,
there is serious doubt as to whether he allows for a true knowledge
of the other as distinctively other rather than with its
determination by the subject as appearance. There is a very real
question which needs to be asked concerning the relationship between
the other for the subject and the other qua other. Clearly there is
no ground in Kant for arguing for their equivalence.
John Macmurray regards the problem that Kantian epistemology has
with the other qua other and the subject's apprehension of it as
characteristic of post-Cartesian thought. He observes of the
critical philosophy that it
fails to do justice to, and even to allow for the
possibility of our knowledge of one another; and
this failure arises because its formal conception of
knowledge excludes this possibility by postulating
the 'I think' as the primary presupposition of all
experience.7e
Gordon Kaufman makes a similar point when he suggests that there is
a fundamental difference between our knowledge of "things" and our
knowledge of persons. Things, argues Kaufman, are indeed readily
accessible to examination and determination by the subject while
knowledge of persons, "is derived from their acts of revealing or 
unveiling themselves to us when they communicate with us."76
Although the body may well be regarded as an "object" for the
subject this is not so for the other as communicating other:
Our encounter with another self in the process of
communication is thus an encounter with a reality
that is in a certain sense beyond our direct reach
and observation. We could not know this reality did
he not choose to reveal himself to us from beyond.
For this reason the other self is always mystery in
some significant sense, always unknown ... always
transcendent of our world.77
It is the critical tradition's insistence that only the realm of
sense exerience may be considered a legitimate source for human
knowledge and its failure to distinsuish between objects and other
subjects which renders it incapable of dealing with the "mystery" of
the other-self other than by, as Levinas observes, reducing the
"other-self" simply to a manifestation of "my-self". 7'
The second problem that ought to concern us here is closely
connected to the first, albeit of a more immediate nature. It would
appear that not only does Kant exhibit a difficulty in accounting
for the subject's encounter with other selves, free from prior
determination by that subject, but, as we shall see, there is also
considerable ambiguity in his thinking as regards the exact nature
of the subject itself.
In some instances there is evidence to suggest that Kant accepted
the existence of a noumenal self, unknowable but nonetheless an
actual thing-in-itself;
If then...we admit that we know objects only in so
far as we are externally affected, we must also
recognise, as regards inner sense, that by means of
it we intuit ourselves only as we are inwardly
affected by ourselves, in other words, that, so far
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as inner intuition is concerned, we know our own
subject only as appearance, not as it is in
itself.79
However, there is clear indication that Kant rejected the notion of
a substantial self in favour of an understanding of the self as a
necessary postulate for the unity of apperception in other words for
the self as active. The self, maintains Kant, is not merely
unknowable but is in a very real sense the presupposition of unified
experience:
Self-consciousness in general is therefore the
representation of that which is the condition of all
unity, and itself is unconditioned. We can thus say
of the thinking 'I' (the soul) which regards itself
as substance, as simple, as numerically identical at
all times, as the correlate of all existence, from
which all other existence must be inferred, that it
does not know itself through the categories, but
knows the categories, and through them all objects,
In the absolute unity of apperception, and so
through Itself.. .there is nothing more natural and
more misleading than the illusion which leads us to
regard the unity in the synthesis of thought as a
perceived unity in the subject of those thoughts. 80
Whether or not we can come to any final conclusions concerning the
actual existence of the Kantian noumenal self one thing is certain.
Despite the necessity of positing such a self as a condition for the
unity of human experience, there is no sense in which Kant might
allow this self to be known and this unknowability of the self
poses a number of important questions as regards the nature of human
relationality.
If selves are ultimately unknowable in the sense of not being
susceptible to the catgegories of rational thought, then in what way
does Kant permit distinct selves to experience each other? The
answer lies in our previous recognition of the Kantian self as
active rather than substantive. The Kantian self, as we have
already noted, is to be identified with the unity of thought, the
activity in which all things are brought into synthetic unity for
mind.	 Furthermore, Kant makes it perfectly clear in his ethical
writings that the activity of the self is characterized by freedom 
in that it is in no way determined by externality. The subject
encounters the objective world and acts upon it as autonomous
individual rationality, constructing a representation of that world
by which means it is related to it.	 Thus we find that
subject/object relationality is characterized in Kant by the free
exercise of cognitive power exercised by the autonomous individual
subject. Thus while Kant presents us with a picture of how the
problematic of relationality is overcome, our second field of
inquiry into coadunacy as expressed in chapter two, the empowering
to unity, our third field of inquiry, appears as a function of the
prioritization of the subject.
So, what is it that takes place during an encounter between two
distinct subjects, two people? The noumenal 'selves' involved in
such an encounter are beyond the apprehension of either party. Each
subject must render the other an object, at least in part, of its
own construction. It would appear impossible for the Kantian other,
as an unknowable unifying activity, to commit itself to an act of
self-revelation to the other in so far as as such a self is never
properly available in-it-self but only as a representative construct
initiated by the apprehending power of the autonomous subject. As
J.Brown points out, "The synthetic unity of apprehension involves
being in a perspective for mind".91
We must conclude therefore that despite his concern to indicate the
natural relatedness of subject and object, self and other, Kant
tends to over emphasise the power of the autonomous subject who is
always regarded as acting upon the other and construing the other
for self. Consequently the other qua other, while clearly providing
the necessary sensual data for the rational subject's activity of
synthetic representation, is ultimately and in-it-self left beyond
relationality. It is only as a construct of the self that the other
relates to the self. It is clear to see how this notion of the self
as constantly exercising power over the other so as to assimilate
that other for mind might ultimaUly manifest itself in the form of
Hegel's understanding of the Master/Slave struggle which we shall
consider in more detail in the following chapter.
While Kant's treatment of the transcendental self in his ethical
writings certainly establishes a distinction between persons and
things and while it further establishes the basis and nature of the
community of persons as a Kingdom of ends, it can hardly be regarded
as providing a full and sufficient account of human relationality.
Kant's ethical writings are in full accord with his denial, in the
First Critique, of any actual knowledge of the self - or of the
other as self - except as an appearance constituted by the subject.
Even though the transcendental self must be assumed as a postulate 
of practical reason it certainly cannot be known.	 The essential
self remains, for Kant, epistemically mysterious. 	 There is no
perspective that we may occupy which might render the intelligible 
self an object of intuition. To understand practical reason as
providing such knowledge is a misapprehension that Kant is at pains
to avoid.
As we have seen, what is ultimately constitutive of personhotd is,
for Kant, the nature of rational beings as ends in themselves.92
Concomitantly, the community of such persons is formed out of the
individual person's respect or "reverence" for the other as an
autonomous law-maker who ought never to be treated as a mere means,
but always as an unconditioned end.
There are three things which need to be said here concerning Kant's
treatment of persons and the basis for their forming a society.
Firstly, there would appear to be no existential referent to Kant's
noumenal self. In other words the distinction which Kant
establishes between the phenomenal and noumenal self has the effect
of disengaging the self-in-itself from all inclinations, desires,
passions and motivations which go to make up actual human existence.
R.F.A.Hoernle makes this point when he observes that Kant
had inherited the tradition of treating a priori 
propositions as devoid of existential reference...
the absolute value of a will determined to action by
no other motive than pure respect for the moral law,
is an a priori proposition... It is one of a set of
a priori propositions which together make up the
"rational part", or the "metaphysic" of morals. 	 To
this set of propositions, considered on this
abstract a priori plane, the question whether they
apply to, or are true of, any actually existent
beings is irrelevant.e3
This leads on to our second point. Is it really adequate to define
personhood solely in terms of the rational being as unconditional
end? Clearly we would want to affirm Kant's attribution of unique
value and dignity to human persons as distinct from things.
Nevertheless personhood cannot be reduced simply to the level of the
formal principle of the autonomy of the will. As we have already
noted above, the a priori principle of the freedom of the rational
being lacks any existential referent. In other words, it does not
allow us to engage with real people as they are experienced.
Furthermore, the notion of personhood as constituted by its
character as end rather than means does not permit the possibility
of a person rendering him/herself a means through an act of self-
abandonment to the other. Self-sacrifice must surely involve, to
some extent at least, the self becoming a means and this, in Kant's
view, is to negate one's personhood.
Finally, if the notion of person as end is found to be too formal an
understanding of the individual self, then the notion of human
community as a Kingdom of ends must be open to a similar criticism.
To have "reverence" for or to acknowledge the "dignity" of a person
while clearly a necessary presupposition for human relationality
cannot be viewed as an adequate or sufficent account of the
complexities of interpersonal relationship. The language of dignity
and respect may well be of value in describing the preliminary and
formal stages of our engagement with the other as initially
strangers to us but its adequacy as a tool for describing the sort
of personal commitment which we experience towards a loved one, for
example, must be highly questionable. Recognition of worth is far
too formal a notion to account for human relationality in all its
fullness. Furthermore, there would appear to be at least grounds
for suspecting that for Kant it is the moral law that is the real
object of respect, while the actual person, with all their
existential "inclinations", is caught up in this attitude of
reverence only in a secondary manner. As the quotation from Hoernle
above has already implied, it is the a priori proposition as regards
the value of the unconditioned will which is the real object of
reverence, the actually existent being is "irrelevant". J.Baillie
makes this very point when he writes:
...where Kant erred, and where his eighteenth-
century education was toomuch for him, was in his
analysis of this experience [the experience of the
Unconditioned] into mere respect for a law...The
reduction of the spiritual life of mankind to the
mere respectful acceptance of a formula was, in
fact, the last absurdity of the eighteenth
century.'
Clearly Kant's failure to do adequate justice to human beings as
experienced both self-consciously and as discrete others, while
concentrating his attention upon abstract rational principles, must
severely limit his contribution to the debate concerning the
relationship between the self and the other. Simply to regard the
existential reality of the human person, in terms of conditioned
inclination, as unimportant both to the constitution of that person
and to their potential for communion with others is to abstract so
far from our actual experience of self and other as to be of dubious
value. Seeing this attitude in tandem with Kant's understanding of
the immediate subject's cognative power to construe the other with
whom it relates, a view which places interpersonal relationality
firmly in the power of the autonomous rational subject, must give us
cause to question the actual significance Kant allows to the other
as an equal partner in the process of self/other relationality..
We shall turn now to the development of Kantian critical thought in
the form of the German Idealism of Fichte and Hegel where the
questionable significance of the other identified in the thinking of
Kant is also to be found.
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CHAPTER FOUR EGO AND SPIRIT: RELATIONALITY IN FICHTE AND HEGEL.
We have considered in previous chapters, the possible shape of a
Christian theological notion of coadunacy, something that we shall
develop in greater detail in our final two chapters, and the
incipient totalism of- the Kantian critical tradition in its
establishing of the rational self as empowered over the other in the
act of construing the other as appearance. In this chapter we shall
seek to trace these totalistic tendencies as they were
subsequently developed by both Fichte and Hegel. This will be done
In an attempt to demonstrate a certain degree of logical
inevitability concerning the detrimental or at the very least
limiting nature of this totalism with respect to self/other
relations and thus its fundamental opposition to a Christian
understanding of coadunacy. We shall proceed now with our
examination of Fichte and Hegel and in particular with their notions
of ego and spirit respectively. As has already been said, what we
hope to show here is the way in which totalism and the tendency
towards the absolutizing of the thinking subject, that are incipient
in Kant, were developed by the aforementioned thinkers into actual
philosophical doctrines. 	 The point of this exercise is ultimately
to reveal the necessarily damaging notioa of totalism that issues
out of the work of Fichte and Hegel. In so far as fAe. Germw.
Idealist tradition has its roots in Kant this chapter must perforce
be read in the light of our earlier chapter on Kant himself.
Clearly both Fichte and Hegel are fundamentally concerned with our
three basic themes of coadunacy. Indeed the tripartite movement of
the dialectic, present in both thinkers, may be regarded as an
expression of their concern for the normality of unity, the problem 
of particularity and the ideal of unity. J.E.Grumley makes the point
that much of Hegel's work focuses upon the problem of 'division' or
the problem of i diremption'(Trennung).' In one of his earliest works
Hegel has this to say concerning the nature of philosophy:
Division (Entzweiung) is the source of the need for
philosophy, and as the culture (Bildung) of the age,
the unfree given side of the structure. In our
culture, that which is an appearance of the Absolute
has isolated itself from the Absolute, and
determined itself as independent. At the same time,
however, the appearance can not deny its origin, and
must therefore proceed to form the multiplicity of
determinations into a whole.2
Here, and in his own way, Hegel is affirming as of utmost importance
the themes of normality, problematicity and unity that we have
identified as the basic fields of inquiry into the notion of
coadunacy. 3 However, before we consider the work of Hegel we shall
turn now to the work of J.G.Fichte.
1. Fichte and the notion of Ego 
It would not be too great an over-simplification to claim that post-
Kantian idealism arose out of the ashes of the doctrine of the
noumenon. Although Kant required the notion of the thing-in-itself
to account for human sensations, he denied the possibility of direct
knowledge of it, arguing that noumena were beyond the application of
the categories of human understanding. It was quickly pointed out
by followers of Kant, such as Fichte, that causality, being one of
the categories the sole province of which was the phenomenal sphere,
was inapplicable to things-in-themselves, and thus the one thing
Kant claimed to know about the noumenal realm, that it caused
sensations, was itself inadmissible according to the canons of the
First Critique.
Although arguing strenuously that his system was continuous with
that of Kant understood aright, Fichte rejected the notion of the
thing-in-itself as a product of dogmatism, the obverse of idealism,
and as such as deterministic, materialistic and a misunderstanding
of Kant's true thought. It is "a pure invention and has no reality
whatsoever. It does not occur in experience, 'U
Leaving aside the question of the legitimacy of Fichte's claim to be
following Kant, which even on a charitable reading of his work must
be viewed with the greatest of suspicion, it is undeniable that
Fichte represents a logical development of the Kantian system, along
one of its possible tracks, that is, the route of the "I-think".
Having abandoned the concept of the noumena Fichte was left only the
cogito or, as he referred to it, the Ego with which to work. He
opens his first Introduction to The Science of Knowledge, ignoring
the first two pages of preface, with the following inJunction:
Attend to yourself: turn your attention away from
everything that surrounds you and towards your inner
life; this is the first demand that philosophy
makes of its disciples. Our concern is not with
anything that lies outside you, but only with
yourself.6.
While a full discussion of Fichte's system falls outside the scope
of this present work it is of great importance that we come to
understand his concept of the ego or the self. For it is precisely
in this notion of the ego, das ich that Fichte transforms Kantian
epistemology into a metaphysic with ontological significance.
Fichte's concern with the free moral subject prompts him to assert
that while the choice between dogmatism and idealism is dependent
upon the inclination and interest of the individual thinker, the
mature philosopher who is aware of his freedom as an agent and moral
subject will inevitably be drawn to the idealist system. The
immature thinker will, on the other hand, tend towards determinism
and materialism, concentrating on the not-self rather than the self.
Thus, while for the idealist "the only positive thing is
freedom..." 7, "The majority of men" who are wedded to dogmatism,
"could sooner be brought to believe themselves a piece of lava in
the moon than to take themselves for a self". 9 It is the difference
between those whose concern is the thing-in-itself and those whose
concern is with the self-in-itself.9
But if we are to dispense with the externality of the thing-in-
itself, from whence do we derive our experience of the world, that
which is not self? For an answer to this question we must turn to
consider Fichte's basic notion of self-consciousness or ego.
The first step towards an understanding of Fichte's fundamental
philosophical principle takes us back to the quotation from the
first introduction to The Science of Knowledge, where Fichte calls
upon us to turn our attention towards our inner life. '° We must
engage in a process which seeks to look beyond the objective self to
the pure ego. While such an endeavour is doomed to failure, it is
in the failure of our attempts to objectify the ego that we become
aware of it as the very condition of objective thought." Whenever
we attempt to think, the self, the pure ego is always beyond that
objectification as the act of consciousness. The non-
objectifiability of the pure ego does not mean that we can have no
real awareness of it. Fichte speaks of "intellectual intuition"
which gives rise to an awareness of the self:
It is the immediate consciousness that I act, and
what I enact: it is that whereby I know something
because I do it.'"-
This intuiting of the self is a uniquely personal experience which
cannot be reduced to proofs and concepts, but must be discovered by
each person for themselves. Nor is it in any way an exotic or
esoteric procedure, for it arises out of the mundane activities of
everyday life.
Everyone, to be sure, can be shown, in his own
admitted
	 experience,	 that	 this	 intellectual
intuition occurs at every moment of his
consciousness. I cannot take a step, move a hand or
foot, without an intellectual intuition of my self-
consciousness in these acts;... 13
It is this awareness of ourselves as agents that is important for
Fichte. He is not concerned with the content of any given action
but simply the awareness of ourselves as the performers of it. This
for Fichte is the crux of the matter. Far from attempting to put
forward a doctrine of the substantiality of the ego, which would
show it to be objectified and thus reduced to the level of a
dogmatic concept, Fichte speaks of the "self-active self". 14 The
self is not ossified within the constructing definition of a static
thing, but is to be regarded as totally free, as activity constantly
determining and never determined:
Intellectual intuition is the only firm standpoint
for all philosophy.	 From thence we can explain
everything that occurs in consciousness; 	 and
moreover, only from thence. Without self-
consciousness there is no consciousness whatever;
but self-consciousness is possible -only in the
manner indicated: I am simply active... I ought in
my thinking to set out from the pure self, and to
think of the latter as absolutely self-active; not
as determined by things but as determining them. 's
Thus pure or transcendental ego must not be mistaken for an entity,
existing behind consciousness, which engages in activity. The ego
is activity.
Having established the transcendental ego as the fundamental
principle of his philosophy Fichte moves on to the next stage in the
development of his idealist metaphysics. It is important to bear in
mind at this point that it is with metaphysics that Fichte is
concerned, and that not in the sense that Kant understood it.
Fichte is not engaged in a mere analysis of the nature of
consciousness, but seeks to derive the whole of objective reality,
the not-I, including other selves, from the transcendental ego. The
obverse of this procedure sees existence as fundamental and, despite
attempts by the dogmatists to hide behind idealist language in
speaking of existence for us, this is simply paying lip service to
Idealism proper. ' s "We cannot abstract from the self", says Fichte.
We are that which thinks therein, and hence...
nothing could ever come to exist independntly of
us for everything is necessarily related to our
thinking. 17
It is the active subject that is prior to all things; the natural
world is concomitantly subordinate to it. Indeed, it would be true
to say that for Fichte, the natural world is nothing more than a
manifestation, at an empirical level, of the activity which
constitutes the transcendental ego.
It would suit our purposes very well to join some of Fichte's
original audience in labelling him as an extreme solipsist. His
concentration upon the ego and the muted nature of his metaphysical
speculation in The Science of Knowledge would, and did, naturally
lead his readers to the conclusion that Fichte was concerned with
deriving all of reality from the individual self, perhaps even from
Fichte himself. Fichte strongly rejected this interpretation of his
work as a massive misrepresentation, and while it would be tempting
to criticise him on the grounds of his alleged solipsism we must
take seriously his claims that by the term ego he intended his
readers to understand absolute consciousness rather than any
specific individual human consciousness.
_
However, despite Fichte's insistence upon the supra-individual
nature of the absolute ego, he is by no means immune from the
accusation of solipsism, or at the very least, a form of totalism,
in the form of the absolutising of the subject, which grounds
reality ultimately within human consciousness. Let us now consider
how it is that Fichte's idealism can be said to lead to the
subordination of reality to the human consciousness. There appear
to be three basic areas which need to be considered in this
connection. Firstly, we need to understand how absolute
consciousness, which neither exists nor is conscious for itself,
achieves consciousness and existence through human intuition.
Secondly we will consider how the feeling which constitutes human
consciousness, by virtue of its harmony with the absolute ego,
represents an infallible guide to our moral duty. Finally, and as a
concomitant of the first two points, we shall assess Fichte's claim
that the created order is nothing more than a stage for the activity
of our moral life, an obstacle posited for the development of the
absolute ego.
Consciousness and the Absolute Ego.
Fichte makes it quite clear in his treatment of the absolute ego
that while it is the ground of consciousness, it is not itself
conscious. The reason for this, says Fichte, is that for true
consciousness to arise there must exist some manner of opposition.
Without opposition the ego remains a pure activity. Consequently it
is necessary for the ego to posit the non-ego, objective reality
within itself in order to bring itself to consciousness. In other
words, the unlimited absolute ego must posit that which is not
itself in order to identify itself by dfferentiation. Thus the ego
encounters the not-ego, "clashes" with it, as Fichte puts it, and is
forced to recoil back upon itself initiating its own self
consciousness.
It (the ego or self) is also, accordingly, no
consciousness, not even a consciousness of self; and
simply because no consciousness comes about through
this mere act, we may indeed infer further to
another act, whereby a not-self arises for us; only
so can we make progress in our philosophical
argument, and derive as required the system of
experience.19
While the ego and the not-ego represent the first and second
principles of the science of knowledge, Fichte goes on to introduce
an important third principle which has to do -with the form of the
opposition between the first and second principles. Fichte quite
rightly points out that the positing of the not-self from within the
self must logically result in total self-negation.
	
The question
thus arises, how can the self or ego come to consciousness through
opposition to the not-ego without nullifying itself? Fichte
resolves this problem by viewing the opposition between the two
principles as one of limitation rather than "mutual elimination".20
The process of limiting, says Fichte, involves only partial negation
and concomitantly implies that, "Both self and not-self are posited
as divisible", 2 ' The ego posits within itself a limited ego and a
limited non-ego which "clash" 22 with each other, driving the ego
forwards towards a greater awareness of itself. It is this
opposition of limited ego to limited not-ego which forms the human
finite consciousness. 23
In other words, it is only in so far as the finite human
consciousness is involved in continual opposition to the natural
order, that is the not-ego, that the absolute ego comes to and
continues to develop in consciousness. Patrick Gardiner accurately
expresses this vital aspect of Fichte's system when he writes:
the spiritual character of reality in no way
implied that it should be regarded as a seamless or
harmonious whole: its inner 'striving' essence
entailed conflict and division, such division being,
so to speak, self-generated and involving it in a
continual struggle to overcome constraints and
obstacles that had their source in its own
primordial activity. Human beings were the vehicles
of this process and, as such, could fulfil
themselves only by pitting themselves against a
resistant natural world where ultimate function was
to offer them the opportunity for realising their
potentialities as free self-determining being. 24
It is at this point that Fichte's metaphysical idealism merges with
his ethical idealism and we shall be considering this important
aspect of his thought shortly.
It is important to note here that with the positing of the not-ego
Fichte had no intention of reinstating the notion of the thing-in-
itself. The not-ego is entirely conditional, it exists only for
consciousness and, as Fichte tells us in the introduction to his
treatment of the "second principle", in deriving it, "we proceed
from a fact of empirical consciousness. 1125
In this connection Fichte was required once again to reject an
interpretation of his work which understood him to be attributing
the creation of the not-ego or natural order to the individual
finite self, claiming that it is with the absolute self that he is
concerned. Despite Fichte's strenuous rejection of a subjectivist
Interpretation of his work, even granting that when he speaks of the
self or ego he is referring to an absolute rather than an individual
human self, he cannot ultimately avoid the allegation that for him
the activity of the individual self is always prior. It is the self
rather than any form of cooperation between self and other that is
the operator.
As we have already noted, the absolute ego is not in itself
conscious, consciousness only being possible as the result of
opposition between the two principles and not as inherent to the one
unconditioned absolute. Consciousness for the absolute is derived
from, or at least through, finite human consciousness alone. As for
the material world, the not-self which Fichte claims is intuited by
the absolute self he also claims - and this is essential to his
system if it is to remain truly idealist - that the material world
is only real for consciousness. In the light of his notion of the
absolute as not conscious in itself, this must surely imply human
consciousness.
We are thus left with two potentially alarming notions. Firstly
that the absolute self is dependent for its conscious development
upon the continual struggle between human beings and the natural
world, and pecondly that the material world is, in some sense,
merely the product of human consciousness. The logical implication
of these two notions is that there exists a metaphysical mandate for
human domination and aggression towards the material world which is,
after all, subordinate to the human consciousness. Fichte develops
this line of reasoning further as he seeks to highlight the ethical
significance of these principles and it is to these ethical
considerations that we now turn.
The Natural Order as Moral Stage 
As we have seen, for Fichte the absolute self strives towards self-
consciousness via the activity of finite selves within the natural
world and this activity, continues Fichte, is always moral activity.
His rejection of deterministic dogmatism" went hand in hand with
his characteristically Kantian concern with the freedom of the
subject. To say that we are self-conscious beings is to say,
according to Fichte, that we are first and foremost centres of
activity. It is as agents that we interpret the natural world, "we
do not act because we know, but we know because we are called upon
to act - the practical reason is the root of all reason."27
For this reason Fichte is adamant that the natural world is "ours"
in a unique sense. The world is the only available stage upon which
we may exercise our moral vocation, there is no neutrality or
external autonomy attached to the natural world, it is no more or
less than the field of our agency. Indeed, as we saw previously,
the positing of the world, or not-self, was vital for Fichte's
system as it is the not-self which constitutes the abstract against
which the active subject strives; without it the subject could not
be said to act and would fail both to fulfil its moral duties and to
continue as conscious.
Once again we must remind ourselves that the not-self or natural
world is not the Kantian thing-in-itself, it is posited or assumed
as the necessary condition of moral agency. Fichte is quite
unambiguous at this point, that "we are compelled to believe that we
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act, and that we ought to act in a certain manner, we are compelled
to assume a certain sphere for this action." 29 In this Fichte is
clearly remaining true to his Kantian ethical heritage.
Thus we find that just as Fichte's system provides a metaphysical
mandate for opposition towards the natural world, so too does he
establish ethical grounds for such an attitude. Not only that, but
in his focusing upon the primary importance of human moral activity,
he is open to the allegation that he reduces the entire natural
world to a function of human consciousness, which is in turn a
product of human agency:
the essence of transcendental idealism is
general, and of its presentation in the Science of
Knowledge in particular, consists in the fact that
the concept of existence is by no means regarded as
a primary and original concept, but is viewed merely
as derivative, as a concept derived, at that,
through opposition to activity, and hence as a
merely negative concept. To the idealist, the only
positive thing is freedom; existence, for him, is a
mere negation of the latter.29
The external world is thus viewed as possessing no innate value.
Indeed it can only be said to exist while we pit ourselves against
it. There is no conception in Fichte's thought of human beings as
part of the natural world, or as having any responsibility towards
it. It is there simply to be conquered and overcome. Yet how are
we to act in this world? In what way do we choose one action over
another, and how are we to be sure that we are fulfilling our moral
duty? It is to these questions that we shall now turn.
Consciousness and Moral Duty 
Following Kant, Fichte wished to establish a foundation for our
ethical awareness which is both absolute and available to all
irrespective of intellect. He was also concerned that such a
foundation should not be identified with any manner of external
authority. Fichte finally focused upon the notion of conscience as
the basis for moral law, the phrase "Act according to your
conscience" being his fundamental moral imperative. He tells us in
The Science of Knowledge that consciousness of the moral law
...which	 itself	 is	 doubtless	 an	 immediate
consciousness derived from no other, forms the basis
for the intuition of self-activity and freedom. I
am given to myself, by myself, as something that is
to be active in a certain fashion, and am thereby
given to myself as active in general ... Only
through this medium of the moral law do I behold
myself. 3°
As in all of Fichte's work, it is the practical dimension which
takes precedence here. Conscience is described as a feeling
(GefUhl), an immediate experience of what our duty is. This feeling
has its roots in the harmony which exists between us as finite
empirical selves and the absolute self or ego.
Thus conscience is an infallible guide to our moral duty both
metaphysically, through our harmony with the absolute, and also by
definition, in so far as Fichte defines conscience as the immediate
awareness of our moral duty. Our feeling of conscience can under no
circumstances mislead us, we may be responsible for obscuring
conscience so that its application to certain actions may no longer
be apparent, but conscience itself is always infallible. Indeed
Fichte will not even allow that an individual, whose awareness of
his duty is not obscured, might choose to abandon said duty and
refuse to implement the action it demands: 	 "such a maxim would be
diabolical; but the concept of the devil is self-contradictory". 3,
In Fichte's ethical idealism we see the practical outworking of his
notion of the absolute ego as free, unlimited activity. This
reality-grounding activity is manifested finitely within similarly
free human moral agency.
	 Patrick Gardiner expresses the import of
Fichte's position quite clearly when he writes:
In practice, this meant that the agent's motivation
should be governed by laws which he, as a self-
conscious subject, imposed upon himself and made the
ground of his conduct. But conduct so activated
was, for Fichte, nothing less than moral conduct;
It was only when what was done was performed simply
on the basis of 'an immediate consciousness of our
determinate duty' that we fulfilled our true
vocation as agents in the world. Thus the practical
conclusion of Fichte's metaphysic was a form of
ethical idealism, designed to confirm the reliance
of the ordinary person upon the direct deliverances
of his conscience.32
There can be little doubting the radical subjectivism, in terms of
the Kantian autonomous will, inherent in Fichte's ethical thinking,
where the dictates of one's conscience are absolutized into moral
Imperatives. Indeed his only concession to the fact of the
multiplicity of individual consciences is in his adoption of a
Rousseauean social contract theory contained in his consideration of
the concept of rights.
	 The notion of rights, says Fichte, only
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carries meaning in the context of a society, for it is only possible
to speak of my right to do or have something in the face of others
who may deny me that right. The concept of rights is a limiting
concept, it limits the potentially limitless freedom possessed by
each individual.	 In other words, the freedom of the individual is
limited by the freedom of the rest of society. Ultimately, says
Fichte, the totality of individual wills to freedom form one general
will when the constituent wills are equalized. It is this general
will, backed by an executive empowered to coerce conformity to the
contract, which forms the state.
In the light of our examination of Fichte, we are now in a position
to consider the essential anti-coadunate totalism inherent within
his thought, and hopefully to point out the potentially dangerous
excesses to which such a system of thought may lead.
As we shall see Fichte's totalism can be regarded as operating at
two fundamental levels, the metaphysical and the empirical. In the
first instance there is little doubting the fact that for Fichte
human beings are the finite manifestation of the absolute self.
Indeed the whole of human reality, both conscious and material, is
posited purely and simply to bring the absolute to consciousness.
The logical consequence of such a view is the absolutizing of the
self.	 Further, the natural world is merely a tool, a condition of
consciousness and obstacle or challenge to be overcome. Thus
humanity, rather than being called upon to live responsibly and
harmoniously within a created natural world which is its proper
context, is encouraged to constantly place itself in opposition to
that world, to fight against the natural order. It is only in this
way that we remain truly conscious and concomitantly that the
absolute is able to derive said consciousness from its finite
expression in human beings. 	 Ultimately the whole realm of human
life and experience is reduced to an empirical means to a
metaphysical end.	 We are	 thus ultimately functions of the
absolute.
At the empirical level of human activity we have already noticed
that for Fichte, the natural world is merely the necessary condition
or context for moral action. Indeed our world is exactly that; that
is to say, the natural order is a product of consciousness and as
the absolute is not conscious in itself, it is the product of human
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consciousness.	 We posit a world for ourselves, a world to be
overcome via the execution of our ethical duty. For Fichte our
ethical duty is vouchsafed to us by our infallible conscience, such
that we are constantly made aware of our individual moral
obligation. The suggestion that there might exist a moral
Imperative which is external to the free subject is, to Fichte, an
expression of gross dogmatic determinism.
,
Thus, at a finite level, we witness the same totalism of the self as
was evident at the level of the absolute self. External reality and
the foundation for ethical activity both reside within the conscious
self.	 There is no mistaking Fichte on this point, despite his
attempts to defend himself against the charge of solipsism. He is
quite unequivocally subjectivist in his derivation of both the world
and moral law from human consciousness. The natural order cannot be
derived from an absolute that is, in essence, not conscious but
active, nor can moral duty be derived from any other source than the
free individual self's feeling of conscience. Such a view must
inevitably encourage an attitude of radical individualism, where all
externality is subordinate to the self whose behaviour is controlled
by laws derived from that very self as a manifestation of the ego's
"absolute self-activity".
As we have mentioned, Fichte attempts to avoid the totalism of the
Individual self, via his social contract theory of rights. However
this does little more than transfer such a totalism from the
Individual self or will to the general will or state. Further, it
serves to confirm our assessment of Fichtean man as the radical
individual, totally self-determining and unrestrained, who can only
function alongside other similar individuals with the aid of a
constraining social executive.
The totalism of the general will or state is the logical result of
Fichte's idealism. The derivation of the first principle of the
science of knowledge from our immediate awareness of self via
intellectual intuition" 33 renders its validity, and thus the
validity of the entire system, self-evident. 	 It is thus not
surprising to find that for Fichte, the only true rational state is
the one founded upon his own philosophy. Indeed, he went further
arguing that such a state, with its system of rights, would never be
truly stable while in isolation and he thus looked forward to world-
wide acceptance of his ethical idealism.
It is not within the scope of this thesis to consider the influence
of Fichte's thinking upon the excesses of the Third Reich. However
it is not difficult to see how such a Reich might utilize Fichte's
work. By absolutizing the general will, the state, by virtue of its
being a contracturally limited finite manifestation of the absolute
will, there exists a metaphysical mandate for both enforced
conformity to the state and also totalitarian expansionism directed
at those functioning outside of the authentic rational state. By
investing the German nation with this mandate Fichte must be seen as
contributing to the foundational ideology of Nazism.34
Fichte, following in the footsteps of Kant, exhibits a similar
attitude towards military expansionism as did the neo-Kantians. He
maintains in his Grundzuge, that "It is the natural tendency of
every civilized state to widen its borders on every side and to take
up all available territory into its own civic unity." R. H. Murray has
highlighted the way in which Fichte took the law-giver of Rousseau
and turned him into Nietzsche's Ubermensch.
Anticipating both Carlyle and Nietzsche, Fichte
writes: 'To compel man to adopt the rightful form of
government, to impose Right on them by force, is not
only the right, but the sacred duty of every man who
has both the insight and the power to do so. There
may even be circumstances in which the single man
has this right' - a Herr Hitler, for instance -
'against the whole of mankind; for, as against him
and Right, there is no man who has either rights or
liberty. He may compel them to Right that being an
absolutely definite conception, valid for all men
alike; a conception which they all ought to have and
which they all will have as soon as they raise
themselves to his level of intelligence, and which,
in the meantime, thanks to the grace of God working
in him, he holds in the name of all and as their
representative. The truth of this conception he must
take • upon his own conscience.	 He, we may say, is
the compulsive power, ordained of God.'3s
In his Address to the German Nation Fichte exhorts the German people
to unify in the face of Napoleon, to become the custodians of the
Right and to promulgate it via their patriotic zeal. Continuing
along these lines we find him exhorting the virtues of the dictator.
The Staatslehre claims that only such a Hero may save men from their
own follies:
The only check assumed by the hero or dictator is
the tender mercies of his own conscience... the
dictator is the very man to coerce warring wills
into one, and so hasten the progress of mankind.
Force and right, according to Joubert, are the
governors of this world; force till right is ready -
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is force en attendant le droit. Fichte remembered
force, and forgot right.36
Yet Fichte's endowing of the German people with such a cultural
mission is of secondary importance to us at this stage. The point
we are attempting to make is that Fichte's philosophical idealism,
by virtue of its inevitable totalism, is completely inimical to
the notion of coadunacy which we see as essential to the Christian
view of humanity and its relationship with God, the environment and
itself. While coadunacy involves humanity in an intimate
relationship with a God who remains other, Fichte's idealism, as we
have seen, identifies us with the absolute in so far as the absolute
comes to consciousness through finite human consciousness. Whereas
coadunate existence involves us in a world which is an essential,
albeit external, part of our own identity and for which we are
responsible, Fichte would have us constantly at odds with nature in
a never-ending striving towards domination. Finally, where the
notion of coadunacy regards humanity as a corporate entity which
nevertheless involves both the self and the other in reciprocal
interrelationship, Fichte sees all selves as ultimately free and
self-determining, forming a society only through artificial
limitations and the threat of coercion manifesting itself in
contractual form.
This damaging totalism, incipient in Kant and explicit in Fichte,
achieves its greatest level of sophistication in the work of Hegel,
to whom we shall now turn.
2. Hegelian Totalism
It is of course a commonplace to bemoan the seemingly impossible
task of mastering the encyclopaedic breadth and complexity of
Hegel's thought, coupled as it is with his all but impenetrable
literary style. Thankfully it is not the purpose of this work to
explore the depths of Hegelian thought. Rather it is our purpose to
examine the place provided in that system of thought for the
significance of the other.
As our concern within this thesis is with the notion of coadunacy,
as defined previously, we shall concentrate our analysis on Hegel's
understanding of the relation between the self and the other and the
self and its world. However, having said this, any attempt to
master an aspect of Hegel's thinking without first having gone
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through his logic is a forlorn hope. Logic is not simply the formal
structure of his thought but constitutes a metaphysic which is the
very structure of reality. Indeed, it is only because it is the
latter that it can be said to be the former. This is precisely what
Hegel means when he claims that the real is rational and the
rat ional	 ,CleArt the Hegelian logic is in fact a metaphysic.3e
Logic 
The nature of Logic for Hegel is of crucial importance as regards
our concern with self/other relationality for it is Logic in its
dialectical movement which characterises the relationship between
the one and the other which is ultimatly determinative for what a
thing truly is in itself. Logic is the inner dynamic of a thing
whereby it comes to itself through a process of self negation which
issues out of its confrontation with its other. But we are ahead of
ourselves here. What is now called for is an examination of Hegel's
understanding of the logically necessary relationship which exists
between the one and its other such that we might come to an
understanding of the status of the other in this engagement. To this
end we must now turn to a detailed examination of the nature of
Hegel's logic as developed particularly in the first part of his
Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences.
Hegel's notion of dialectic is one of daunting complexity. Simply
put it involves the three familiar moments of the thesis, antithesis
and synthesis, which represent a movement towards the Absolute Idea.
The thesis and antithesis represent, to an extent, a development of
the Kantian antinomies, that is, apparently contradictory and yet
equally valid states of affairs. 37	Both sets of affairs have a
legitimate claim to being absolute, says Hegel. A true
understanding of the nature of reality as dialectically structured
does not stop at such contradictions but looks beyond them to a
synthesis of the two terms into one whole that is being-for-self.
All that we have just said in fact tells us very little as regards
the actual nature of reality as a dialectical process. If we hope to
get anywhere with our understanding of Hegel and the dialectic then
we must grasp the logic of dialectic.
Logic, which for Hegel is the preliminary concern of the
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, is nothing less than
the science of the pure Idea, Idea being the abstract medium of 
Thought.	 It is to be distinguished from the classical logic of
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Aristotle and the schoolmen whose concern was with the formal
structures of thought as derived from experience 40 and also from the
attempts of Kant's critical philosophy to examine the nature of
cognition as rooted also in sense experience.'" Logic, in other
words, is concerned not with the mere form and content of thought
but with thought as it is an end for itself;
	 that is, as absolute 
Idea and not simply as objects of consciousness.
	 Logic seeks to
apprehend pure notions, in disassociation from mental images and
familiar conceptual structures. The realm of pure thought, which
the science of Logic attempts to navigate us through, is totally
self-referential, "...the fact is that in a notion there is nothing
further to be thought than the notion itself."6-2
Thought, says Hegel, far from being mere thought subordinated to the
dictates of empirical phenomena, is the only way in which absolute
truth may be approached. Indeed, contrary to popular belief, the
rational - rather than producing nothing more than fanciful
chimeras4G - expresses the fundamental reality of things."
Philosophical reflection, properly construed, should not lead us in
the direction of the critical philosophy which teaches the
fundamental difference between the products of our own thought and
things in themselves, but rather it ought to show up the nature of
objects in their ultimate relativity, while all the time still
maintaining their validity as isolated predicates.4G
It is this revelation of relativity inherent among particular
phenomena which drives us towards what Hegel sees as the "natural
belief of man" that thought is coincident with things. The world of
things is merely an aggregate of isolates prior to the act of
reflection which alters the way in which things are made present to
us, causing us to abandon the outward manifestation in search of the
inward universa1. 4G While outward forms are individual, isolated
and ultimately transitory, the universal is the infinite and true
essence of things. It is for this reason that, in contradistinction
to Kant, Hegel claims that "...the theme of Logic is in general the
supersensible world".47
It is at this point that we encounter the very root of Hegel's
idealism, for this universal which the science of Logic is committed
to examining, is available only for the mind:
The universal does not exist externally to the
outward eye as a universal. The kind as kind cannot
be perceived: the laws of the celestial motions are
not written on the sky. The universal is neither
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seen nor heard, its existence is only for the
mind.4s
In other words, when speaking of animals, for example, while we may
point out particular animals such as dogs or cats, we cannot point
towards a universal animality, animal qua animal, in the same way.
"Animal qua animal", says Hegel, "does not exist". 49
 However, it is
precisely this animality, this universal which is real only for the
mind, that constitutes the "permanent inward nature" of particular
animals. Without this universal a particular thing loses its
esssence and is no longer identifiable as animal. s° It is because
of this that Hegel can make the claim that "'Reason is in the
world'; which means that Reason is the soul of the world it
inhabits". 51
Thus it is thought alone which constitutes the mode of apprehending
the universal, the soul of the world. It is both the "constitutive
substance of external things" and also the "universal substance of
what is spiritual". s2 It is the reconciliation of these two aspects
of thought, "the self-conscious reason with the reason which is in
the world" that forms the proper goal of philosophical science.ss
Thought, says Hegel, is the object of mind and the exertion of
thought is an act of mind or, more accurately, an act of py mind.
For Hegel it is of the very essence of our claim to freedom that we
be understood as thinking for ourselves. ss It is the universality
of thought, unconstrained by the external transitory phenomena, in
its abstract state of self-reference, which constitutes our freedom,
Thus Hegel can make the claim that:
The real nature of objects is brought to light in
reflection;	 but it is no less true that this
exertion of thought is my act. If this be so, the
real nature is a product of my mind, in its
character of thinking subject - generated by me in
my simple universality, self-collected and removed
from extraneous influences - in one word, in my
Freedom... To think is in fact ipso facto to be
free, for thought as the action of the universal is
an abstract relating of self to self...ss
Freedom demands abstraction from all that is other than ourselves.
In the presence of that which is not-self we are no longer free.
Man is free because he thinks and through his thinking he becomes
aware of his universality. Animals, says Hegel, are in a manner of
speaking universal, in their animality, but do not apprehend
themselves as universal for they never proceed further than their
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sensory experience of isolates. In other words it is not from the
side of nature that the universal makes itself present for
consciousness. If this were so then simple sensory experience would
be sufficient to bring all with the appropriate sense organs,
animals as well as humans, to conscious universality. 57 Rather it
is man as a king who thinks that rendering himself an "I", first in
particularity and then in universality as "being-for-self". Such an
"I" is "thought as a thinker" sc4
 in which everything is taken up for
me. Hegel defines it as a "vacuum" or "receptacle" for a "whole
world of conceptions", 59
 In this receptacle, which is thought in
the activity of thinking, all particularity is both put aside and
yet remains a constant potential. In such a way the I is the
universal which contains within itself the totality of everything.
Logic is thus the study of this pure thought, the "I" which is
thought as thinker.
	 Its concern is only with independent thought
and its products, that which it brings into existence. It is for
this reason, and here we return to our original point, that Hegel
can say: "Logic therefore coincides with Metaphysics, the science of 
things set and held in thoughts - thoughts accredited able to
express the essential reality of things." 6° The synthesis of
Absolute Being and its antithesis Absolute Not-Being is Absolute 
Becoming. Thus the Absolute is
...the process of its own becoming, the circle which
presupposes its end as its purpose and has its end
as its beginning. It becomes concrete or actual
only by its development and through its end.61
It is this teleological process of the dialectic ultimately
resulting in self-thinking thought, which constitutes the Absolute,
the whole of reality. In the light of this it is essential that we
do not conceive of the Absolute as some manner of transcendent
reality which merely manifests or expresses itself within the
universe, in so far as it is the universe; 	 it is its own self-
manifestation.
The Absolute is both subject and object, it is self-thinking thought
that which unifies all things within itself. In other words, it is
what Hegel calls Spirit.
In so far as the Absolute is the totality of reality, true
philosophy must be regarded as the totality of truth, the Absolute
actualized in conceptual form. In other words, for Hegel philosophy
is the Absolute's knowledge of itself and not merely some external
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representation of the Absolute. Only via speculative reason
(Vernunft), as opposed to mere understanding, can the human mind
accommodate the process of dialectic which unites apparently
contradictory concepts within the synthesis of unity in difference.
L Being 
The Absolute, says Hegel, in its logically prior form is pure Being.
Thus the first of Hegel's three subdivisions of logic is the
Doctrine of Being. Pure being, rather than being the ultimate
and final determinant, as traditional ontology would have us
believe, is on the contrary totally indeterminate. It is "utter
emptiness and instability besides", 6.3 as the beginning of the
dialectical movement towards the self-awareness of the absolute
being is merely thought without determination, that is, without an
other:
When thinking is to begin, we have nothing but
thought in its merest indeterminateness: for we
cannot determine unless there is both one and
another;	 and in the beginning there is yet no
other. The indeterminate, as we here have it, is
the blank we begin with, not a featurelessness
reached by abstractness, not the elimination of all
character, but the original featurelessness which
precedes all definite character and is the very
first of all. And this we call Being.
Being, in other words, is an empty "is" and thus, argues Hegel, it
passes apparently paradoxically, into its opposite, that is,
Nothing. GB
 To say that being is empty and indeterminate, without
form and content, is to say that it is also nothing. 	 Thus the
Absolute itself may be defined as both Being and Nothing or Not-
being.	 It is the movement of the empty abstractions of Being into
nothing, and Nothing into Being in an endless process of reciprocal
cancellation which gives way to the unity of Becoming. Being and
Nothing are, says Hegel, merely "Vanishing factors" whose process of
changing into each other is the restlessness of Becoming.
Becoming is the first concrete thought,	 and
therefore the first notion: whereas Being and Naught
are empty abstractions.	 The notion of Being,
therefore, of which we sometimes speak, must mean
Becoming; not the mere point of Being, which is
empty Nothing any more than Nothing, which is empty
Being. In Being then we have Nothing and in Nothing
Being; but this Being which does not lose itself in
Nothing is Becoming... Becoming is only the explicit
statement of what Being is in its truth. 66
In other words, to make use of a familiar phrase, the Absolute's
Being is in Becoming.
This primary form of the dialectic is of considerable importance for
our understanding of the status of the other for Hegel. Here pure
universal Being, by positing its negative, Nothing, partakes of
particularity via a relationship with its other. However, this
process of self-othering is clearly just that, a process, and one
which ultimately sublates the other in its movement towards
individuality.	 This is the all important structure of the Hegelian
logic, the movement of the Universal through the Particular to the
Individual. These three movements correspond to the three sections
of Hegel's Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, The Logic,
The Philosophy of Nature and The Philosophy of Mind.
The other, the moment of particularity, is always the middle term
between empty universality and self-conscious Spirit, it is the
process of return and sublation. 67
 It is here that we see the
absorption of the other into the totality of the self, for the other
is only ever the reflection of the self; the self posited as its own
negative, but a negative that is in itself a fundamental process of
return to the self.	 We need to keep this notion of the self-
othering of the Idea particularly in mind when we consider the
second subdivision of the logic - that is, the doctrine of Essence -
and also when we consider Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, which
represents the second part of his Encyclopaedia and thus the
essential manifestation of the particularity of the other. It is in
this second moment of the dialectic that we find the very
particularity of the other qua other being negated as it collapses
into the universal self, on its way towards self-consciousness as
Individual subject. The other for Hegel is nothing but a dead
thing, a "corpse" as he refers to Nature ", outside of its necessary
character as a return to self, to the Idea consummated as Spirit.
We shall return to this later on in this chapter.
The "utter restlessness" 69
 of Becoming is also destined to vanish
just as its constituents, Being and Nothing, are ultimately consumed
in Becoming. There must, says Hegel, be a result to Becoming,
"Becoming implies that somewhat comes out of it" 7° and that somewhat
Is Determinate Being, in other words becoming which has become. In
the final section of the First Subdivision of Logic Hegel defines
Determinate Being in terms of the triad of Quality, Quantity and
Measure.	 These three represent particular modes of Being, which is
no longer empty.	 We shall not dwell long over these categories as
they are only of passing interest to our overall concern.
The category of Quality is that which makes an "is" what it is. It
has to do with the immediate mode of Being, unlike Quantity, which
Is a mode of Being, a differentiation, and external to itself.71
Hegel speaks of elementary bodies in Nature, such as oxygen and
nitrogen, as "existing qualities" 72 and similarly, albeit in a
subordinate way, character is regarded as a quality of mind.
Quality then, as the determinateness of being or rather, as Hegel
puts it, "determinateness which is" 73 may rightfully be called
Reality, insofar as it passes from its abstract indeterminacy, which
is inner and subjective, into particularity or being-there-and-
then.74
As we have already mentioned Quantity is the external, indifferent
mode of Being, such that when a thing is altered by becoming greater
or less, it still remains the same thing. To use one of Hegel's
examples, making a house bigger or smaller does nothing to the
nature of the house qua house, it is still a house no matter how big
or small it is. However, having said this, there comes a point
where changes in quantity do begin to alter quality. The resolution
of the categories of Quality and Quantity ultimately comes in the
synthesis of Measure which is defined as "the qualitative
quantue 75, that is, a quantum determined by the quality or
character of a thing.	 Thus quality and quantity are implicit in
each other.
In measure quality and quantity originally confront
each other, like some and other ... In the process
of measure, therefore, these two pass into each
other: each of them becomes what it is implicitly:
and thus we get Being thrown into abeyance and
absorbed,	 with	 its	 several	 characteristics
negatived. Such Being is Essence.76
It is as the immediacy of Being passes over into self-mediation via
a process of self-negation, thus cancelling its immediacy that we
encounter Essence. The transitory nature of the immediate, which
ordinary consciousness studies as being, becomes clear in the light
of the dialect to which Essence is the result. For while "in Being
everything is immediate, in Essence everything is relative." 77
 That
is while Being is always by or for itself Essence is always in
relation, indeed it can be said to be Being in relation. It is this
doctrine of Essence which constitutes the second subdivision of 
Logic 
ii. Essence 
The reality of Essence is revealed, says Hegel, to the "standpoint
of 'Reflection" 79
 that is to say that once the immediacy of Being
is revealed as transitory, a "mere seeming" 9° continued reflection
penetrates behind this appearance to permanent Essence. Being; says
Hegel, looks in upon itself and sees itself as reflected Essence.
In this way Being and thus Essence may be defined as self-
relatedness.' It is this self-relatedness which constitutes the
form of Identity and this will become particularly important when,
in a subsequent section, we consider self-consciousness, for Hegel
tells us that not only is it "identity as self-consciousness" which
"distinguishes man from nature, particularly from the brutes.. " but
also that "The true knowledge of God ... begins when we know him as
identity - as absolute identity".
The categories of Reflection, as Hegel calls them, are pairs of
correlatives intrinsic to Essence. These categories always
represent an inner and an outer', such as Essence and Existence,
Force and its expression, substence and accidents, cause and effect,
Necessity and Freedom.	 Thus under the reflective gaze Being
breaks down into its constituent categories. However, to leave
Being in this state of distinct inner essence and outward appearance
would be to reintroduce the Kantian thing-in-itself, to divorce the
appearance of a thing from its hidden actuality. Thus, as we might
expect, Hegel resolves these two moments in a synthetic third
moment, this third moment he calls Actuality. "Actuality is the
unity, become immediate, of essence with existence, or of inward
with outward". Els Thus Actuality is essence existing as itself. It
is identity-in-difference.
Notion 
The third and final subdivision of logic is the doctrine of the
Notion. The Notion is, of course, the synthetic third moment of the
dialectic involving Being and Essence. In the Notion the immediacy
of Being and the mediacy of Essence pass into self-mediation. In the
process of self-mediation a thing passes into another, its opposite,
while always remaining itself. For this reason, says Hegel, the
movement of the Notion is neither a transition into another nor is
It a reflection on another. It is Development:
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Transition into something else is the dialectical
process within the range of Being: reflection
(bringing something else into light), in the range
of Essence.	 The movement of the Notion is
development: by which that only is explicit which is
already implicitly present... The truth of the
hypothesis ... lies in its perceiving that in the
process of development the notion keeps to itself
and only gives rise to alteration of form, without
making any addition in point of content.86
The doctrine of the Notion possesses its own triadic structure, or
rather movement, comprising of the subjective or formal notion, the
Objectivity or Notion invested with immediacy and the synthetic
resolution of these two terms in the Idea of absolute truth.°7
While pointing out that the concept of Notion occupies a far higher
place in speculative logic than does its counterpart in traditional
formal logic, which sees notion as merely an empty form of thought,
Hegel nonetheless recognises a fundamental similarity between the
two understandings of notion. The similarity lies in our experience
of deducing a specific content from a notion and tracing particular
contents back to their notion. This, says Hegel, is the very nature
of notion, to contain within itself all its specific contents and
developments like a seed which contains, ideally, the whole plant,
like the mind, as described by Plato, which contains innate ideas
and indeed as God who includes within himself as Spirit his other,
the Son.°9
The subjective term in the dialectical progress of the Notion
towards absolute Idea initiates a movement from categories such as
causality or measure, encountered previously, whose concern was
primarily with the objective sphere, towards the abstract categories
of thought. We are no longer uniquely concerned with immediate and
independent Being but with, to quote the first subheading of the
triad that constitutes the subjective Notion, "The Notion as
Notion, that is, with thought as conscious of itself. J.N.Findlay
puts it in this way:
the notions we deal with will be subjectively as
well as objectively oriented: they will be notions
of notions, explicitly relating what they deal with
to the central, co-ordinating life of thought.
Hitherto, we may say, we have been employing
notions, but not thinking of them as notions... We
have also, in the past, been more concerned with
particular thought-determinations than with the
universal that ran through them all: we have
operated with thoughts rather than considered what
it was to be a thought.s°
In other words,	 the Notion,	 insofar as it is pure self-
consciousness, may be identified with the I. We see this mirrored
in the very nature of philosophical science where the aim is to
"arrive at the notion of its notion" 91 and this by way of the free
act of thought by which "it occupies a point of view, in which it is
for its own self, and this gives itself an object of its own
production". 9 -2 Indeed we see the Notion as the self-referential I
prefigured in the doctrine of Being where Hegel speaks of Being-for-
self. Being-for-self partakes of the category of ideality93 while
the Notion is absolute idealism. 94 Being-for-self resides in the
PS but is immediate, while the Notion being perfect freedom
mediates self to self and thus is the I which contains all previous
terms in itself. 9E
To say that the Notion is abstract and universal is by no means to
deny its concreteness. The very fact of it being the unity of Being
and Essence makes it "concrete out and out". 97 The Notion is indeed
abstract, if by that we mean it is not open to the senses, but this
abstraction does not, contrary to traditional belief, imply the
Notion is merely empty rational form, for the dialectic has overcome
the false dichotomy of form and content, such that Notion is "an
infinite creature form, which includes ... the fullness of all
content",
Thus the universality of the Notion is not to be confused with some
common denominator such that it is identifiable as the aggregate of
a number of elements having certain features in common. If this
were the case the Notion would constitute something distinctly other
than these several elements which share it as a universal. In
theological terms it would be equivalent to considering the trinity
as distinct from Father, Son and Spirit, a tertium quid.
In the light of these observations it seems clear that while for
traditional formal logic the Notion represents the first term in a
syllogistic triad, that is the empty universal, for example "All men
are mortal", for speculative logic the Notion contains all three
terms or moments. Thus Hegel finds within the subjective Notion not
merely universality but also particularity or judgment and
individuality or the syllogism. s9 Thus Notion not only contains
universal categories such as man and mortality, for example, but
also the possibility of a particular genus and a definite individual
partaking of such categories, for example, Caius. 10° The bringing
together of the first two terms in the synthetic unity of
individuality is the notional equivalent to the unity of existence
or appearance and essence in actuality. Indeed Hegel tells us that,
"Individual and actual are the same thing" 10' but whereas actuality
is still rooted in immediacy the notion is self-mediating, involved
in self-development rather than, as Hegel puts it, merely potential
effectiveness, such as cause seeking to effect something other. 102
Having made the point that the universal, in Hegel's view, is not
merely an empty category or common factor but is concrete in its
universality we must be wary lest we interpret this as implying that
every specific individual may be deduced from its Notion. We are
not, in other words, able to extract the distinct person, Caius, or
even his particular species, from the universal Notion of "man".
Rather what Hegel appears to hold is that the universal is made
specific in particular instances and it is this specification which
validates the Notion as universal:
It is a mistake to imagine that the objects which
form the content of our mental ideas come first and
that our subjective agency then supervenes, and by
the aforesaid operation of abstraction, and by
colligating the points possessed in common by the
objects, frames notions of them. Rather the notion
is the genuine first; and things are what they are
through the action of the notion, immanent in them,
and revealing itself in them.1°
Although Hegel introduces subjectivity into his concept of the
notion this does not mean that objectivity has been passed by. The
second part of the dialectic of Notion involves the Notion in its
own self-objectification. It is in what Hegel calls the Dislunctive 
syllogism, which equates with individuality, the third moment of the
Notion, that the Notion realizes itself in its objectivity. 104 The
subjective Notion, as we have already found, is not some empty
mental category waiting to be filled by external objective
phenomena, but rather breaks through into objectivity as the
universal is mediated to the individual via the particularisation of
a species of genus.
Hegel himself admits that this fundamental transition from
subjectivity to objectivity, which after all must be the ultimate
test of idealism, does "appear strange" at first glance. 1°5
Unfortunately Hegel does not see this strangeness as imposing any
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"obligation to seek to make the transition plausible to the image-
loving conception". 1C Instead he directs us back to the transition
to actuality in the dialectic of Essence as the imperfect precursor
to the Notion's transition to objectivity. However, the Notion does
not achieve true objectivity, that is, Notion in-and-for-itself
except via a dialectical movement. This movement begins with
objects as undifferentiated isolates possessing no affinity with
each other, in other words, Mechanism'° 7 and moves on to the
tendency of objects towards differentiation such that they are "what
they are only by their relation to each other" lae, what Hegel calls
chemism which has to do with the quality of an object, °'
The final resolution is found in Teleology which, put crudely, is an
object's appetite for its end. "° The satisfaction of this
appetite, the conformity of the object with its design, is mediated
through the middle term of Means; 	 that is, "objectivity made
directly subservient to purpose". 11 This is what Hegel means by
the somewhat anthropomorphic phrase the cunning of reason. 112
 For
the End to maintain its distinctiveness from the object, it utilizes
the mechanical and chemical processes, allowing objects to relate to
one another as they will, oblivious to the ultimate Ends to which
they are related;
Reason is as cunning as it is powerful. Cunning may
be said to lie in the intermediate action which,
while it permits the objects to follow their own
bent and act upon one another till they waste away,
and does not itself directly interfere in the
process, is nevertheless only working out its own
aims."
In theological terms, says Hegel, this cunning of reason corresponds
to Divine Providence, in that while God allows humanity to act in
whatever way pleases them most, yet the ultimate result of human
behaviour is the accomplishment of the divine will and purpose.
Indeed, Hegel goes as far as to say that the resulting divine plan
"differs decidedly" from the ends envisaged by those involved in its
resolution."4
However, this is yet an external and finite teleology in that each
End itself becomes the means of a higher End, "The End achieved
consequently is only an object, which again becomes a Means or
material for other Ends, and so on for ever". h1
It is at this point that we see Hegel making his final move towards
the breaking down of the subject/object distinction.
	 The
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Independence of the object in the face of its End must be dissolved,
"the show of that independence", says Hegel, must be got rid of."
The Notion as End, says Hegel, is in fact the very inner nature of
the object, such that "objectivity is as it were, only a
covering under which the notion lies concealed."" 7 Truly infinite
End involves the removal of the appearance of otherness, such that
the Notion becomes its own End, in other words it becomes truth. It
is this unity of form and content, subject and object in the self-
actualizing process of the Notion towards its becoming its own
result which is what Hegel calls the Idea.
The Idea is the final destination of the Hegelian destination, the
Idea and the Absolute are one and the same:
The Idea is truth in itself and for itself - the
absolute unity of the notion of objectivity. Its
'Ideal' content is nothing but the notion in its
detailed terms: its 'real' content is only the
exhibition which the notion gives itself in the form
of external existence ... The definition, which
declares the Absolute to be the Idea, is itself
absolute."8
The Idea is truth in so far as it is the correspondence of things
with their notion; it is mind in that in its "developed and genuine
actuality" it is subject, and it is Absolute in that it is totality
of all things;
In the Idea we have nothing to do with external
things ... everything actual, in so far as it is
true, is the Idea, ... Every individual being is
some one aspect of the Idea."9
The process of the Idea can be traced, not surprisingly, through
three stages:	 immediacy, knowledge and finally the Absolute Idea.
The immediate idea, says Hegel, is Life, that is, the notion as soul
realizing itself in the externality of the body. It is Life which
resolves first the disjunction between soul and body and then
between living being and inorganic nature. 	 However in death
objectivity reclaims the organic body. Only through the
universality of kind is the objectification of death defeated. 120
It is in this knowing of itself as kind that the idea abandons its
Immediacy and moves onward to free self-subsistence. Similarly in
cognition, which is the idea in the medium of universality, the idea
as subject comes to the external immediacy of the world and brings
about an identification of the two poles within itself. 	 It is this
process of cognition which permits the thinking self to have
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confidence in its knowledge of reality in distinction from the
critical philosophy which deprives us of any such confidence:
Consequently it is the certitude of the virtual
identity between itself and the objective world.
Reason comes to the world with an absolute faith in
its ability to make the identity actual, and to
raise its certitude to truth,	 121
Hegel continues with a discussion of the nature of the Analytical 
and Synthetic methods 122, the latter being the reverse of the
former. In the synthetic nexus of unanalysed individuality Hegel
identifies Construction, which is the source of the middle terms
which produce the unity of the synthesis, and Demonstration, which
is the necessity of the synthetic nexus. It is this necessity which
goes beyond the simple giveness of externality in its identity as
self-relating notion. In other words, the synthetic content of
cognition is no longer contingent but finds itself to be necessary,
self-determining. Another name for self-determining cognition, says
Hegel, is Will. 12
While intelligence merely proposes to take the world
as it is, Will takes steps to make the world what it
ought to be. Will looks upon the immediate and
given present not as solid being, but as mere
semblance without reality. 12
It is here that we have the resolution of the theoretical and
practical idea in the harmonious process constituted by the identity
of the "is" with the "ought to be" towards the Good, that is the
ultimate End of the world. 12S
It is this final synthesis of "is" and "ought" which completes the
movement towards the Absolute Idea. It is important at this final
point to be aware that the Absolute Idea is not merely this end
point as if we might kick away the rest of the logical ladder. The
Absolute Idea is the whole process leading up to and including the
final resolution of theoretical and practical, subject and object.
It is all three terms of Being, Essence and Notion;
To speak of the absolute idea may suggest the
conception that we are at length reaching the right
thing and the sum of the whole matter. It is
certainly possible to indulge in a vast amount of
senseless declamation about the idea. But its true
content is only the whole system of which we have
been hitherto studying the development. 12
In other words Hegel's concern is ultimately with the journey from
points A to B rather than with the starting and finishing points in
themselves.
Thus we see that the dialectical process is not simply a logical
procedure aimed at giving us a better understanding of reality, it
Is expressive of the very essence of reality. Reality is the
dialectical process and the process in totality is the Absolute
Spirit. Because Absolute Spirit comes to consciousness via finite
human spirit, the whole of human history is seen by Hegel as being,
In fact, the development of the consciousness of Absolute Spirit.
The Philosophy of Nature.
While we have already examined the broad categories of the movement
from the universal through the particular into individuality, as
contained in Hegel's Logic, an examination of the way in which this
movement is seen to manifest itself in the realm of nature is of
considerable illustrative value.
The Philosophy of Nature constitutes the second part of Hegel's
Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences and as such represents,
in the overall scheme of the dialectic, the movement of the Idea
into particularity - that is, into otherness.
Nature has presented itself as the Idea in the form
of otherness. Since therefore the Idea is the
negative of itself, or is external to itself, Nature
is not merely external in relation to this Idea (and
to its subjective existence Spirit); the truth is
rather that externality constitutes the specific
character in which Nature, as Nature, exists. 127
Hegel expresses this self-othering of the Idea in theological terms
when he identifies the incarnate son of God (as opposed to the
eternal Son) with Nature's otherness, "Nature is the son of God, but
not as the Son, but as abiding in otherness - the divine Idea as
held fast for a moment outside the divine love."1-29
The divine Idea, claims Hegel, only truly comes to itself in full
self-consciousness through the sublating of its otherness. Nature is
merely the corpse of the understanding until it is understood as
being the Idea in the process of becoming Spirit. The son of God in
his return to the Godhead brings about the completion of the divine
procession towards absolute spirit and Hegel maintains that "The
Philosophy of Nature itself belongs to this path of return...".'29
It is this characteristic of the other as essentially a process of
return and sublation that is of concern to us here. 	 Hegel's
Philosophy of Nature charts the course of this return; the coming
to awareness, to individual consciousness, of the Idea as it emerges
from static universality via external particularity into its true
being-for-self as absolute Spirit.	 J.N.Findlay makes the important
point that,	 "In Hegel's theory of Nature ... one sees the
philosopher's principles at work, casting their slant upon our talk
and thought about the world around us." 3° Conversely, and if
Findlay is right in this claim as we believe him to be, an
examination of some of Hegel's "thoughts about the world around us"
ought to highlight and illustrate "the philosopher's principles at
work".
While in the grand scheme of the dialectic the philosophy of nature
occupies the mediating role of particularity standing between
unconscious universality and conscious individuality, within this
movement of the self-othering of the Idea in Nature can be seen, at
various levels, the process of dialectic in microcosm, so to speak.
Thus, the philosophy of nature is divided up into the triad of
Mechanics, Physics and Organics, each of which is trisected as much
as a further five times in the case of the Organics.
It is unnecessary for our purposes to conduct a detailed examination
of Hegel's philosophy of nature from beginning to end, as much of
its substance involves a highly specific and somewhat eccentric
exposition of the physical and biological sciences. What is of
value to us here are the examples of the sublation of particularity
which characterises the very essence of Nature, and which Hegel sees
as manifesting itself at every level of the Natural order. We shall
turn now to a consideration of some of the key instances of Nature's
sublation of itself in the hope that this might further illustrate
our perception of Hegel's negation of the other qua_ other in the
totality of the self.
Hegel understands Nature as the Notion "positing... what it is in
Itself". In this way the Notion externalizes itself "...as an
utterance or expression, a coming forth, a setting forth, a coming-
out-of-itself, in so far as the subjectivity of the Notion is lost
in the mutual outsideness of its determinations". 11 We are already
familiar with this movement from our treatment of the Logic.	 The
Idea remains universal and unconscious until confronting its other,
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its negative, in an act of self-reflection and self-othering. This
universal and "rigid being-for-self" is understood by Hegel as being
"shut up within oneself, an opaque neutral existence on one's
own". 12 This rigidity is characterized as inert (ruhend) and hard,
having the principle of separate individuality at its heart. This,
says Hegel, "is the mechanical phenomenon of pure rigidity" as
opposed to the true being-for-self which involves the 'self's
relating to another and subsequently sublating that relationship
such that it can become a process of self-relating:
	 ... real
being-for-self is self-relating negativity, the process of fire
which, in consuming an other, consumes itself". Continuing with
this analogy Hegel regards the purely mechanical, rigid being-for-
self as possessing only the potential for combustibility.133
Only through this process of combustion and consumption does the
Idea come to consciousness, to true being-for-self. This is made
particularly clear in the second division of the philosophy of
Nature, the Physics, where light, for example, is described as the
"universal self of matter."'
	 is "pure existent force of
space filling", it is "absolute velocity", "pure materiality",
"being-within-self". Being free from all resistance and all
determination by an other it lacks not Just self-consciousness but
also its true identity as light:
Because... it lacks the infinitude of the return
into self, light is not self-consciousness; it is
only the manifestation of itself, not for itself,
but for another.
Light thus lacks the concrete unity with itself
possessed by self-consciousness as an infinite point
of being-for-self, and is consequently only a
manifestation of Nature, not of spirit... Light as
such is invisible; in pure light nothing is seen...
It is first in the limit that the moment of negation
- and therefore of determination - is found; and it
is in the limit that reality first begins... It is
only after light has distinguished itself as light,
as against darkness, that it manifests itself as
light.136
There are two important points to notice here. Firstly, light as a
pure universal, free from determination by an other, does not truly
possess even its own identity as light. It is in the act of "making
manifest"' 2E.
 that light becomes truly existant. As an affirmation
of the importance of the other this movement in Hegel's logic is of
considerable significance for our own understanding of coadunacy.
The movement from the universal to the particular is a movement from
empty subjectivity to determination by anothe-r and "being-for-
another". Hegel clearly understands the existence of light in this
way, for "To say that $.4 Q-have to consider the existence of light, is
to say that we have to consider the being-for-another of light". 17
However, despite the undeniable significance of the other in Hegel's
treatment of light, we find him concluding that light ultimately
lacks self-consciousness. The reason for this is plain. Self-
consciousness, for Hegel, is only achieved during the transitiol-i
from the second to the third moment of the dialectic;
	 that is, in
the movement from particularity to individuality.
	 This movement
constitutes the return of the self from the particularity of the
other and into the totality of the conscious self. 	 Light, however,
is only being-for-another; 	 it is the Ego that is "pure self
manifestation" - in other words, being-for-self. ''
The Ego as pure "reflection-into-self" is for Hegel a true
expression of spirit. For Ego the externality of the particularised
other is sublated such that the Ego becomes both subject and object,
both self and its other. In so much as light is only for-another 
and not for-itself, as the totality of self and other, then it has
not undergone the process of return to self from externality, which
characterizes Essence, and thus it lacks self-consciousness.
This understanding of consciousness and true being-for-self as
issuing out of the unity of the self and the other receives its most
powerful expression in the Organics where Hegel clearly states:
Life is the union of opposites generally, not merely
of the opposition of Notion and reality. Wherever
inner and outer, cause and effect, end and means,
subjective and objective, etc,, are one and the
same, there is life. 1'9
This is the ultimate entelechy of the dialectical process, the
subsuming of self/other relationality into a single totality. It is
reality's determination by the Notion which guarantees the necessity
of this movement at every level, such that it manifests itself in
astral bodies and biochemistry alike. 	 No area of reality escapes
this determination,	 the process of dialectic is absolutely
irresistible.
It is in the third part of the Philosophy of Nature, the Organics,
that we find some of the clearest explication of Hegel's
understanding of the consummation of the other by the self, the Idea
or in this case "life", in its return-into-self. 	 Predictably the
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process by which life comes to itself as "individual subjectivity a
vitality in is completeness""' falls into three parts. Firstly we
have Geological Nature, whch is the basis of life, rigid being-for-
self. "It is like a skeleton„ which can be regarded as dead
because its members seem still to subsist formally on their
own...".'41
The second stage, that of self-othering, is always charactertzed by
Reflection l42, the particularizing of the subject as other. This is
a process of estrangement where the subject and its object are
distinct. Hegel regards Plant Nature as the organic expression of
this moment of the dialectic. "The plant...does not advance blond a
formal distinguishing of itself from itself, and it can remain only
in formal communion with Itself. 14' In Plant life, argues Hegel, we
observe the unfolding of subjective singularity into "an objective 
organism in the shape of a body articulated into parts which are
separate and distinct". 144 It is this separateness and distinctness
which characterize plant life as "feeble and infantile", a life
which involves only the multiplication of individuality rather than
a true sublat ion of the other. 14S The self-differentiation of a
plant is a differentiation into identical individual parts which,
rather than being taken up into true being for-self, are only
superficially unified in the complete plant as a "basis" (Soden)
rather than "a subjective unity". 14.G Simply encountering the other
Is not enough to give rise to true life and thus we move on to the
third stage of the dialectic as manifested in the organic world,
Animal organism.
If the second, plant stage of the dialectic is categorised by Hegel
as "the Water-Kingdom, the kingdom of neutrality" 47
 then it ought
to come as no surprise to find that the third kingdom, that of
animal organism, is referred to as the "Fire kingdom". 14 The
subjective animal organism is the expression of the Notion as all
consuming, as that which takes up all particularities into the
totality of the Idea, of life as sell-mediating. It is important to
note here that life as true veritable subJectivity 149 is not simply
the end result of this dialectical process - it is this process in
its perpetual and dynamic totality. Life therefore is the very
process of self-othering and the consumption of that other into
unifying subjectivity:
Fire releases itself Centltiat sich) into members,
there is a perpetual passage into product; and this
is perpetually brought back to the unity of
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subjectivity,
	 for the self-subsistence (of the
members] is immediately consumed. 's°
Animality, maintains Hegel, "exhibits the developed determinations 
of the Notion as existent within it"' E.1 , in the form of the
inevitable three moments of universality, particularity and
individuality. In this instance these moments express themselves as
sensibility, which is universal being-within-self; Irritability,
which is the capacity for and reaction to stimulation by another,
and Reproduction which is the return to self from out of external
relationality, the positing of self as singular.1G2
Hegel regards the above-mentioned moments of the dialectic as
corresponding to three basic animal systems, the nervous system, the
circulatory system and - significantly, for our purposes - the
digestive system. While we shall not dwell on the first two of
these systems, corresponding as they do to the now familiar moments
of universality and particularity, the third system does warrant our
further consideration in the light of what it tells us about the
assimilation of the other by the self in Hegel's thinking.
Of the nervous and circulatory system, Hegel has this to say: "The
blood is the endless, unbroken unrest of welling forth, whereas the
nerve is at rest and remains where it is." 13 While sensibility,
the first moment, is in its abstraction "the inert, dead side of the
organism", manifesting itself in bone production, the second
moment expresses itself in the pulsation of the blood as it
particularizes itself in its relationship with externality - the
transformation of food into blood - and its internal relating "as
the source from which everything takes its nutriment."'s
The system of digestion stands as a graphic manifestation of the
overcoming of the external other and its assimilation into the self.
Hegel is quite unambiguous concerning the nature of this process of
consumption which transforms the other into the self of the
consuming individual.
...non-organic nature is seized and ingested as an
individual thing. The individual organism seizes
it, crunches and destroys it as a purely external
structure and transforms it into itself, ... (1) it
infects it with organic lymph, the saliva;	 (2)it
works on it with the neutrality of the alkaline and
acid principles,	 with the animal gastric and
pancreatic juices; (3) lastly, it attacks it with
the bile, the onslaught of the fiery element on the
ingested food.IG
-107-
The language used here is particularly significant as it typifies
the relationship between the individual organism and its external
other as one of coercive power, where the self seeks to overcome the
other by seizing it, destroying it, transforming it, infecting it,
attacking it and subjecting it to onslaught and ingestion. These
are violent words, ones that contain more than an echo of the master
and slave duality contained in the Philosophy of Mind.17
It is this violence towards the other and its ultimate sublation and
transformation into the self which characterizes the movement from
the second to the third moment of the dialectic, and which we find
wholly unsatisfactory as a way of describing human relationality.
Any notion of self-other relationality which necessarily involves
violence being done to either the one or the other must be
considered unacceptable to the Christian tradition. The other must
be engaged with as other, and the resulting relationality must not
involve either the reduction or subsumption of that other into the
self such that the other loses its particularity and uniqueness.
Indeed, we have suggested in our notion of coadunacy, which we will
develop more fully in our concluding chapter, that if either of the
relating parties is to be placed in peril through the act of
relating then the Christian tradition would always have it be the
immediate self. It is the language of sacrificial self-giving and
abandonment that characterizes true Christ-like relationality and
not the violent exercise of sublating power exercised by the self
over the other, as Hegel would have us believe.
The chief moment in digestion is the immediate 
action of life as the power over its non-organic
object which it presupposes as its stimulus only in
so far as it is in itself identical with it, but is,
at the same time, its ideality and being-for-self.
This action is infection and immediate
transformation.'68
The animal organism, argues Hegel, is to be regarded as substance 
while non-organic externality is merely accident. Particularity, he
continues, is simply a form which must be surrendered.'G9
Before we conclude our examination of Hegel's Philosophy of Nature 
there are two points that need to be made. Firstly, all that we
have found in Hegel's explication of the processes of nature must be
seen as holding true for the whole of reality. The determination of
reality by the Notion is all-pervading, and the logic of the
dialectical process follows the same necessary path whether we are
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considering astronomy, chemistry, biology or psychology. Thus the
violent sublation of the other by the self, as found in the
Philosophy of Nature, is to be regarded as essential to the
totalising process of Hegel's dialectic at every level of reality.
"Not until one does violence to Proteus", to particularity, do we
attain to the totality of truth beyond the "sensuous appearance of
Nature".16°
Secondly, and more specific to our treatment of the Philosophy of 
Nature Hegel makes it quite clear that - our first point
notwithstanding - the non-organic nature which he sees as being
constantl3overcome and subsumed by animal nature, is in fact to be
understood as the totality of externality, organic and inorganic
alike:
The animals and plants which the animal consumes,
are, it is true, themselves organic structures, but
for this animal they are relatively its non-organic
nature. What is particular and external has no
enduring existence of its own, but is a nullity as
soon as it comes into contact with a living
being...16'
It would seem from this that whatever I, as an individual organic
being, encounter - that which is external to myself - must become
for me non-organic and transient. Non-organic being is "only a
sublated moment in the organic self" 162
 and as such is to be
identified with that self, never as a distinct other.
Hegel's closing remarks in the Philosophy of Nature sum up quite
succinctly just exactly what it is that he hopes to achieve via his
examination of the process of dialectic as it manifests itself in
the natural world.
The aim of these lectures has been to give a picture
of Nature in order to subdue this Proteus: to find
In this externality only the mirror of ourselves, to
see in Nature a free reflex of spirit: to know God,
not in the contemplation of him as spirit, but in
this his immediate existence. 163
Having considered the structure of Hegel's thought via an
examination of his Logic and having further illustrated it via
reference to the Philosophy of Nature we shall now turn to consider
the essential antipathy which exists between this form of idealism
and the notion of coadunacy as outlined in Chapter 2.
Hegel and Coadunacy.
By way of general introductory comment, prior to taking up a
position critical of Hegel, it is important for us to be aware of
the valuable elements within Hegel's thought. Indeed, there are a
number of points of coincidence between Hegelian Idealism and our
notion of coadunacy. Firstly, Hegel's overriding concern to
dissolve the dualisms established in critical thought in a for.m of a
necessary relationality pertaining between the self and the other,
the internal and external, subject and object, is wholly in keeping
with our concerns with coadunacy. Further more Hegel recognises the
notion of God as trinity as being the fundamental ideal, expressed
in religious form as the unity of the self and the Other. He seems
to express the nature of the divine coadunacy, God, as his own
corporate context quite clearly when he writes concerning the
dialectical movement of the notion,
as it is expressed in the teaching of
Christianity; not merely has God created a world
which confronts him as an other; he has also from
all eternity begotten a Son in whom he as Spirit, is
at home with himself.'"
Likewise, just as God is at home with himself, we are truly at home
with our world, for in breaking down the subject-object dualism
Hegel, as Fichte attempted before him, unifies the disjunction
between appearances and things-in-themselves, making this world
truly our world and rendering the question of an underlying and
inaccessible reality redundant. The world is uniquely personal and
is there only for the subject. In the Philosophy of Mind Hegel
makes this point quite plain when he maintains that
Subjective certainty must not find itself limited by
the object but must acquire true objectivity; and
conversely, the object, on its side, must become
mine not merely in an abstract manner but with
regard to every aspect of its concrete nature.'6s
In a similar way the self without the "other" is merely an abstract
"I", an empty universal. It is only through the other that we truly
encounter ourselves as free, self-conscious and self-determining and
it is only as self-determining that we can be said to possess and
exercise will which, as we have seen, is a manifestation of the
Absolute Idea.'66
Yet despite these strong similarities between the Hegelian concern
with the dissolution of the abstract immediacy of isolates within
the synthetic process and that of coadunacy, there also exists a far
more fundamental dissimilarity.
That Hegel attempts to make mind and thought account for far too
much in its subsumption of all externality is a commonplace
observation.	 Indeed a thorough-going idealism might be said to be
necessarily disposed to such an attempt. However, it is not simply
idealism as such which places Hegel in opposition to the tenets of
coadunacy, but rather the inexorable inevitability of the dialectic,
in particular the transition from the second to the third moments.
It is the inevitable subsumption of the other in the subject's
return to itself, as graphically illustrated in the Philosophy of 
Nature which is the basis of the third moment of synthesis, and
which constitutes a form of totalism inimicable to coadunacy.
While considering the Idealism of Fichte we focused our attention
upon three basic questions concerning his system's opposition to
coadunacy. First we asked whether it was true to say that Fichtean
Idealism ultimately collapses into solipsism; next, whether it
allowed for a created context in which human beings might be placed
and towards which they are responsible; finally whether it
adequately allows for the reality of distinct selves in relation.
While we shall adopt this same line of questioning with Hegel, it
should be clear by now that the all-pervasive structure of Hegel's
logic will often force us to repeat our critique, particularly as
regards the second and third question, inasmuch as the deficiencies
being highlighted are founded upon the same dialectical moment.
Hegelian Subjectivism 
We shall not expend much of our time on this particular question.
As we noted with Fichte, it would suit our thesis very well if we
could identify Hegelian subjectivism ultimately as solipsistic.
However such an accusation simply cannot be sustained. The second
moment of the dialectic allows a movement towards the other. Being
takes on its true nature as Becoming only in relation to its other
which is Nothingness. Similarly, Appearance comes to itself as
Actuality only through the otherness of Essence. 	 For Hegel it is
mediation which brings about the true reality of a thing. In the
sphere of self-consciousness Hegel maintains that the simple
Immediacy of the "I",
must be grasped as the individually determined
Universal which, in its determinateness, in its
difference, relates itself to itself alone.	 This
already implies that the 'I' is immediately negative 
self relation, consequently the unmediated opposite
of its universality which is abstracted from every
determinateness, an individuality which is,
therefore, equally abstract and simple.'67
The "I", says Hegel, can be identified with pure Being which, as we
have seen, is the beginning of the dialectical process and as such
is "the poorest and most abstract". 16e In itself the I is "Absolute
Indifference", being defined as a blank, and featureless 1+1.169
This, if it were all that could be said of consciousness, would
indeed constitute solipsism, but the dialectic is a process away
from the isolated and immediate. 	 True determination requires both
one and another, claims Hegel. In our natural exclusive state we
are merely isolated creatures of appetite motivated by need and
driven by necessity. However in being-for-another the one and the
other recognize each other as free through a mutual struggle which,
at its extreme, places the life of the individual at risk. 170
I am only truly free when the other is also free and
is recognized by me as free. This freedom of one in
the other unites men in an inward manner...
Therefore, men must will to find themselves again in
one another. But this cannot happen so long as they
are imprisoned in their immediacy. 171
Hegel is not here making sociological observations. Indeed he is
not even outlining an ideal state, ideal in the sense of a coun5e1
of perfection. This dialectical movement from individual immediacy
to a mediacy involving the other is part of the very logic of
reality. It is this movement of the dialectic, this Becoming which
takes the place of traditional static ontology for Hegel. Thus the
movement to the other in the second moment of the dialectic is
logically necessary, and thus ontologically necessary. 	 It is not
possible for man, for human consciousness, to by-pass this process,
for in a very real sense man is this process. In the light of the
above, any interpretation of Hegelian thought which seeks to cast it
in a solipsistic mode must be refuted.
As we have intimated above, Hegel's inclusion of the other into what
we might call the self's ontology of Becoming, may be regarded as in
keeping with our coadunate concerns. Similarly his unifying of the
self and inorganic external otherness via the synthesis of inward
essence with outward appearance, forming Actuality, provides us with
a reality from which we are no longer alienated. The world in which
we live, in which we have experiences, is true and actual precisely
because we do live in it. This too is coincident with the notion of
coadunacy which sees the created order as essential to the essence
of human being.
However, the synthesis of phenomena with the thing-in-itself so as
to produce a non-dualistic epistemology is one thing: to extend the
application of the dialectic so that it becomes the inevitable
process of reality towards its ultimate synthesis as totalizing mind
is quite another. It is at this point of synthesis, where the
"one", having come to itself via its opposition to the "other",
returns to itself again, having subsumed the other within itself -
such that the other is real only as the opposite pole of self
relating - that we encounter Hegelian totalism and its antipathy
towards a Christian notion of coadunacy.
As we have suggested in our first two chapters the notion of
coadunacy - while involving the self with the other in an intimate
and essential manner, perhaps analogous to that found in the
trinitarian relations - maintains the integrity of the other as
distinct from the self. In contradistinction to this view, the
Hegelian dialectic is a movement towards a moment of synthesis which
reduces the other to the self, such that the other is merely an
illusory foil produced by the synthetic notion as Idea, as necessary
to its self actualization. Hegel puts it like this:
In the course of its process the Idea creates that
illusion (of the other), by setting an antithesis to
confront it; and its action consists in getting rid
of the illusion which it has created. 	 Only out of
this error does truth arise.	 In this fact lies the
reconciliation with error and with finitude. Error
or other-being, when superseded, is still a
necessary dynamic element of truth: for truth can
only be where it makes itself its own result. 172
When considering this final transition of the Notion to Idea
J.N.Findlay, who is by no means unsympathetic towards Hegel, tells
us that we are:
Facing the central message of Hegelianism: that
'otherness' in all its forms exists only to call
forth the energies, and to intensify the self-
awareness of Spirit. The Objective World, ... must
be seen as no more than the row of ninepins that
self-conscious Spirit must bowl over in order to be
self-conscious Spirit. 17
We see this mediation of the other prefigured in Hegel's exposition
of Essence for which he says "there is no real other4h174,
Hegel and the Natural Order. 
For Hegel it is of the utmost philosophical centrality that thought
and Being be seen as synonymous: 	 "thought is the very thing
itself" 176 .	 It is the totality of Mind and Spirit, which is all to
Hegel. Thus insofar as Nature represents the contradiction to
Absolute Spirit, it is the task of Spirit, as the totality of the
dialectical movement, to achieve victory over this externality by
assimilation, thus initiating a return to itself:
This triumph over externality which belongs to the
Notion of mind, is what we have called the ideality
of mind. Every activity of mind is nothing but a
distinct mode of reducing what is external to the
inwardness which mind itself is, and it is only by
this reduction, by this idealization or
assimilation, of what is external that it becomes
and is mind. 176
It is only via this reduction to inwardness that the extended world
of Nature becomes mind and thus true knowledge or idea. 	 Nature,
says Hegel, must sublate its otherness. 	 As mere externality it is
not Spirit and thus beyond understanding. It is "only the corpse of
the Understanding ... a 'petrified' or 'frozen intelligence'".
Material reality, for Hegel, must undergo a transformation, it must
become thought:
Thus intelligence is explicitly, and on its own part
cognitive: virtually it is the universal - its
product (the thought) is the thing: it is a plain
identity of sujective and objective. It knows that
what is thought, is, and that what is, only is in so
far as it is a thought. 17
In the light of what has already been said concerning Hegel's view
of Nature as a fundamental contradiction to spirit, there can be
little doubt that for him, as we found for Fichte, the natural world
has no independent and intrinsic value, it is merely a transient
moment in the process of Spirits comming to self-consciousness.
Thus, such value as it does have lies in its opposition to Mind
which posits it simply to reassimilate it in a return to itself as
both universal and concrete. Thus, along with Fichte, we have found
Hegel using the language of aggression and violence when speaking
of Spirit's relationship to nature. Nature is to be striven
against, assimilated, overcome and transformed by the triumphant
Spirit.
...instead of leaving Nature as she is, and taking
her as she is in truth, instead of simply perceiving
her, we make her into something quite different. In
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thinking things, we transform them into something
universal. 17
It is difficult to avoid the overwhelming impression that Nature,
for Hegel, performs the same function as it does for Fichte, in that
it is posited in order that Mind, or Spirit, may encounter it as
other and thus further its own development. As F. G. Weiss puts it,
For all its richness and splendor, Nature is, in
Hegel's view, only abstract and inward
(undeveloped), its materiality or externality being
the very antithesis of the order and unity which
mind introduces,	 the mere possibility of that
unity.le°
There is never any question about the ultimacy of Spirit.
	 While
Nature is "spirit	 estranged from itself...
	 a Bacchic god
unrestrained and unmindful of itself" lel ,	 " the negative of the
Idea...	 God's	 first	 born.,..	 Luc ifer... 1 " e2 ,	 Spirit	 is by
definition the very act of unity.
	 In the triadic movement Spirit
posits non-spirit or Nature to facilitate its own development. It
is a necessary experience of self-abandonment for the Spirit, but it
is by no means permanent and Spirit or Mind is always primary,
always the agent. Spirit ultimately reassimilates Nature back into
itself during the third moment of the dialectic. That third moment
is taken up in the totality of Mind which is, at least in its finite
form, human being for as we shall see, man qua man is always mind'e3
and, as Hegel points out, "Man in so far as he is Spirit is not the
creature of nature"1e4..
Thus humanity and Nature, indeed Absolute Spirit and nature, exist
in an antithetical relationship with each other until the latter is
transformed and absorbed back into the former. Nature is "divine"
only when taken up into mind, into the absolute notion
but as it is, the being of Nature does not accord
with its Notion; rather is Nature the unresolved 
contradiction. Its character is positedness, the
negative... Thus Nature has also been spoken of as
the self-degradation of the idea... les
Thus, as we found in Fichte so we find in Hegel, Nature, the
external world, is nothing more than a means to a metaphysical end,
an obstacle course for the Spirit. Nature has no truth, no unity,
no beauty, indeed no reality outside of Spirit. Humanity as Spirit
Is as remote from Nature as is Absolute Spirit.
It is difficult if not impossible to see any point of contact
between Hegel's view of the natural order and the Christian view
which regards humanity as part of a natural world created for their
enjoyment, and for which they are ultimately responsible. For Hegel
externality is not something to be involved in but something to be
overcome and intrnalised. One cannot be said to be at home in the
external order, according to Hegel's understanding, quite the
reverse, the external order is only truly at home when internalised,
when subsumed by the individual self. For this reason it will be
important for us to consider the significance of place and
situatedness in our understanding of coadunacy and this we plan to
do in our concluding chapter.
Hegel's notion of Nature as ultimately alien and contradictory to
humanity as Spirit can, surely, only encourage an attitude of
radical exploitation of the created order, in accordance with the
dialectical imperative which seeks to reduce it to the level of
Mind. The natural realm exercises no claim upon us. In effect
Hegel provides humanity with the same metaphysical license to
manipulate and transform the natural order according to the dictates
of the prevailing culture, free from the constraints of ecological
responsibility and coadunate relationship with our place.
This assimilation of all things by Spirit into a total unity does
not stop with Nature but continues into the personal dimension of
other minds and it is to this issue that we now turn.
The Self and the Other 
As we have noted Hegel's concern with the importance of the Other in
drawing the one or the self away from its isolated immediacy
protects his subjectivism from falling into solipsism. This at least
preliminary concern with the Other is particularly in evidence
during Hegel's account of the dependence of the self-conscious "I"
upon self-conscious Other. In the opening remarks to the
Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind Hegel makes it quite clear
that the injunction to self-knowledge, "know thyself", is not a
mandate for individual self-contemplation, by which he has in mind
"the particular capacities, character, propensities and foibles of
the single self"1a6.
Hegel continues by pointing out that the "I", rather than referring
to a particular individual, is in fact a universal category insofar
as everyone is an "I".197
'I', therefore, is mere being-for-self, in which
everything peculiar or marked is renounced and
buried out of sight;	 it is as it were the ultimate
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and unanalysable point of consciousness ... 'I' is
the vacuum or receptacle for anything and everything
189.
In the Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind we find two important
statements which, when taken together, encapsulate the essence of
Hegelian Idealism and constitute its fundamental antipathy to our
notion of coadunacy. Hegel is quite clear that (a) man's genuine
reality is as mind and (b) that "An out-and-out Other simply does
not exist for mind", 199	 There is no Other for Mind precisely
because it is universal.
	 The "I", says Hegel, "is something
perfectly simple, universal" 9°. Furthermore, and as we have
already noted in the movement of Hegelian Logic, true ideality of
mind is the overcoming of externality in the Notion. 191 Thus Hegel
can make the claim that,
Every activity of mind is nothing but a distinct
mode of reducing what is external to the inwardness
which mind itself is, and it is only by this
reduction, by this idealization or assimilation, of
what is external that it becomes and is mind. 192
As man's true reality is as Mind then it follows that it is in man's
very nature to assimilate and overcome the other. So once again we
encounter the logical inevitability of the dialectic in its
unstoppable progression towards the totality of mind. In this
particular instance Hegel seeks to illustrate his point via his
famous discussion of the relationship between master and slave,
which he sees as being expressive of the confrontation between
individual self-consciousnesses.
In the Logic the Master/slave confrontations appears briefly within
the Third Subdivision of Logic, under the section dealing with the
universality of the Notion.	 Here, Hegel points out that for the
slave the "I" is his master and not himself. He continues by
relating this subsumption of slave into master to Rousseau's Social
Contract where individuals are absorbed into the universal will
which Hegel identifies as the notion of the will. 192
In the Philosophy of Mind we find the master/slave distinction
within Hegel's discussion of self-consciousness as Recognitive.
Recognitive self-consciousness is where my immediate or instinctive
self-consciousness, which lacks reality due to its lack of
distinction, comes into opposition with another independent ego. 124
Once again Hegel utilizes the language of antagonism when giving an
account of this process of recognition. "The process" he says "is a
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battle". It is "a life and death struggle" which results in one
of the combatants merely retaining his individual self-consciousness
while the other gains recognition from the former. It is here, says
Hegel, that we encounter the master and slave status. The conflict
must not be seen simply as an observation on how men have conducted
themselves thus far.	 Such knowledge, if it can be called that, is
merely knowledge of men which information is meaningless.19G
Hegel, when speaking of the fight for recognition, is referring to
"a necessary moment in the development of human spirit". 17 This
expression of the logical necessity of subjugation receives further
amplification when Hegel points out that although in the first
instance the slave surrenders himself to his master, who has thus
achieved realized identity through recognition, the slave ultimately
outstrips his master who is enslaved to a selfish individuality.
The slave thus progresses beyond immediate desire through his
subjugation to the desire of another. This subjugation, says Hegel,
"forms the beginning of true human freedom". 19 For this reason
Hegel can make the following assertion:
This quaking of the single, isolated will, the
feeling of the worthlessness of egoism, the habit of
obedience, is a necessary moment in the education of
all men.	 Without having experienced the discipline
which breaks self-will, no one becomes free,
rational and capable of command. To become free, to
acquire the capacity for self-control, all nations 
must therefore undergo the severe discipline of 
sublugation to a master.19
Thus for Hegel world history is the development of the Spirit as it
subjugates the natural will to universal law which alone is true
freedom.	 As Bertrand Russell observes, Hegel's understanding of
freedom is, to say the least, odd. 2°° Freedom, for Hegel, means
freedom to obey the law and be conformed to it. As we have noted it
is Rousseau's universal will that Hegel sees as expressing the
freedom of law which gives rise to the State. °1
Freedom, which is the substance of mind and thus the very reality of
man, is a process of self-relating whereby mind abstracts itself
from all externality to be at home with itself. 202 Freedom is "the
absence of dependence on an Other"
zo3
 but it is also more than
this;
...It attains actuality not by fleeing from the
Other but by overcoming it. Mind can step out of
its abstract, self-existent universality ... can
posit	 within	 itself	 a	 determinate,	 actual
difference, something other than the simple 'I', ...
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and this relation to the Other is, for mind, not
merely possible but necessary, because it is through
the Other and by the triumph over it, that mind
comes to authenticate itself and to be in fact what
it ought to be according to its Notion, namely, the
ideality of the external, the idea which returns to
itself out of its otherness.2"
This quotation sums up quite clearly the dialectical process
resulting in the mind's return to itself in true authenticity. Here
we see the nature of man as absolute mind which posits the other
"within itself" and returns the other to itself. Just as we saw
with regard to the natural order, the other self-consciousness is no
more than an obstacle for Mind to overcome to facilitate its
development so that it might relate to itself as other. Individual
distinctiveness is swallowed up in the single universal self which
is the self-conscious expression of the Notion as inclusive of its
own telos.
The doctrine of the universal self, man as absolute undifferentiated
mind, is, it must be said, fundamentally at odds with human
experience. We relate to each other as distinct selves, individual
centers of consciousness, albeit sharing a common humanity. We are
certainly not aware of ourselves as regaining an awareness of being
part of one absolute self during the course of our relating to other
persons,	 in the manner of remembering some innate tacit
knowledge. 2°	 This having been said it is certainly possible to
envisage an attempt to construct a society or ideology in accord
with Hegelian principles. Such as society could not fail to give
rise to a mode of human existence radically opposed to the
principles of coadunacy.
Hegel's dismissal of the particularities of human life as "foibles
of the single self" appears to be a rejection of the very basis of
personal existence. Surely it is these very particularities which
make up our lives as distinct, identifiable persons? Indeed Frances
Berenson makes the not unreasonable suggestion that "In Hegel's
philosophy
	 man,	 or	 more	 precisely,	 'person',	 disappears
altogether".2"
For Hegel the Other is equivalent to the category of Means as found
in the discussion of Notion as End. As we noted, the Notion as End
is "free existence" 207 .	 Ultimately Means is found to be intrinsic
to the End and its apparent independence a mere illusion.	 As we
have seen, to say humanity is Mind is to say humanity is free, and
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freedom is for Hegel the logically necessary overcoming of the Other
by the absolutely self-determined via a process of mediation. 2°G In
that respect the Other is always negative.
Freedom as overcoming the Other is quite clearly antithetical to the
Christian tradition and is certainly at odds with the notion of
coadunacy. Indeed, the freedom of Christianity must always be the
freedom of the cross, that is, a sacrificial freedom which does not
seek to triumph over the other but which is prepared to give itself,
to empty itself, as Christ did, in the service of the Other.	 In
defining freedom as freedom to conform to an absolute law, Hegel
makes an important point.	 However while for Hegel the law is the
totalizing process of absolute reason, within the Christian
tradition it is the law of God which is one of self-abandonment
rather than absolute self-determination.
Thus where coadunacy seeks to express the truth of self/other
relations in terms of a sacrificial mutual self-abandonment which
not only gives rise to coinherence, but also maintains and affirms
distinctive otherness, Hegel speaks of an aggressive act of self
which ultimately establishes the totality of the self and the other
as Spirit or Mind.
The Hegelian system is also at odds with Christianity and its
reality as coadunate on the subject of God's triune identity. The
Hegelian Trinity, while expressing quite helpfully at times the
nature of the divine self-reference, has the unfortunate effect of
divinizing human being. Hegel speaks of God as creating a world
"which confronts him as an other" and which is finally overcome by
him and taken up into the totality of the divine Spirit. 209 This
not only involves the divinization of the natural order and finite
consciousness,	 but also dispenses with the distinct persons
constituting the Trinity. This particular Hegelian doctrine
undercuts the very basis of coadunacy which, as we have argued, is
derived from the image of God as persons in community.
It should come as little surprise to us to find Hegel accused of
giving rise - or at least contributing - to some of the worse
excesses of totalitarianism within human history. Although we might
wish to take a cooler line than some of his more vitriolic
critics210
 it is hard to see how a system which teaches the logical
necessity of the domination of the one over the many could avoid
such criticism.
	 Indeed, it is not easy to see how, in the
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practicalities of finite existence, Hegelian totalism prevents
itself from collapsing into a radical particularism, manifesting
itself either in some despot or tyrant, or in an elite group of some
description. Such a despotism would find itself in possession of a
metaphysical mandate, such as we noted in Fichte, for all its
operations as an expression of the development of the absolute.
Indeed Hegel, as we know, does invest the state with considerable
authority, encouraging conflicts between states as a means of
stimulating the development of the Freedom of Spirit as developing
throughout history. Bertrand Russell makes this same point when he
writes of Hegel:
In external relations... the State is an individual,
each State is independent as against others... He
goes on to argue against any sort of League of
Nations by which the independence of separate States
might be limited... Conflicts of States can only be
decided by war ... Their rights have their reality
in their particular wills and the interest of each
State is its highest law.2"
Such a view, argues Russell, quite apart from justifying "every
internal tyranny and every external aggression that can possibly be
imagined", is simply inconsistent with Hegel's overall concern with
the absolute totality of Spirit which surely ought to have
encouraged a single world State rather than "an anarchic collection
of States".2'2
By his definition of it as the "consummation of and realization of
the Notion of objective mind,.., in which mind develops its freedom
into a world posited by mind itself," 2 ' Hegel does indeed appear to
glorify the state. Not for him is the Lockean state founded upon
expedience. The state is not simply a mechanism for the protection
of individual properties but rather a transcendent entity which
demands and has the right to the life of any citizen. In this sense
the state is seen as practically divine. Concomitantly Hegel
regards war as a worthwhile necessity insofar as it strengthens the
state,	 preventing stagnation and the development of private
interest. :214
	Coupled with this view of the state comes Hegel's
notion of history as the process by which the Spirit comes to its
own self-consciousness. In this we might plot the "path" of the
Spirit as it proceeds throughout history leaving in its wake the
great civilizations of the world.
The progression of the Spirit takes the form of a linear development
from east to west beginning with the civilisation of China and
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India, moving steadily on through Greece and Rome and finally to the
Germanic races. Never again will the Spirit retrace its steps
claims Hegel, and thus the oriental peoples will never progress any
further than the level of infancy at which they were left when the
Spirit moved on. Each newly visited civilization was greater and
more advanced than the one preceeding it, for these historical
phenomena were the manifestation of the Spirit growing in
self-awareness and freedom. 2 ' s It will come as little surprise to
find that for Hegel, as we saw in Fichte, the ultimate telos of the
Spirit, the point at which it manifests itself as truely free is
within the Germanic civilization. Germany, says Hegel, is the final
expression of the Spirit and as such has a divine duty to advance
this transcendent culture by whatever means seems appropriate. For
this reason R. H. Murray lays this accusation at Hegel's door:
'Die Welt-Geschichte ist das Welt-Gericht', was the
view of Schiller. The history of the world is the
judgement of the world. Hegel adapted it to mean
that the history of the world is the supreme court
at whose bar each nation stands incessantly to plead
for life or death. He himself stands at the bar of
this court, and his supreme condemnation is that it
Is he, more than Kant or even Fichte, who bestowed
upon the German that sense of a divine mission of
the State which the modern world witnesses with
dismay. 216
As we have hopefully made clear, it is ultimately in the doctrine of
the Notion that we find the basic antipathy towards true coadunacy.
It is in the Notion that the one and the many, the Self and the
Other are resolved into the one absolute Idea and are thence found
to have always been one and the same. The Hegelian Mind, or Spirit,
or Idea at its very core is other to itself, a self-referential one.
It is this very absolitism of the other in the self that Levinas
critiques so thoroughly in his work Totality and infinity217 and it
is this fundamental act of violence to the integrity of the other
that places Hegelian thought in opposition both to coadunacy and to
the Christian gospel.
In the following chapter we shall consider the way in which two
major twentieth century theological figures have attempted to
address the issue of self/other relationality) these thinkers being
Karl Barth and Wolfhart Pannenberg.
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CHAPTER FIVE	 BARTH AND HUMAN RELATIONALITY 
Having examined the factors both contributory and detrimental to
coadunacy as they are to be found within the philosophies of Kant,
Fichte and Hegel, we shall proceed now, in this and the following
chapter, to consider two more recent thinkers, Karl Barth and
Wolfhart Pannenberg.
We have suggested, and will later develop the idea, that coadunacy
ought to be regarded as normative for human being. This normativity
having as its originating locus the divine ontology as essentially
and irreducibly persons-in-relation. In other words God's being is,
to make use of J.D.Zizioulas' terminology, "being as communion". It
has been further suggested, albeit in a preliminary manner, that
human being, by virtue of its being created in the image of the
divine Being-as-communion, shares this same relational ontology.
That is to say, by saying human being we intend persons-in-relation-
in-environment.
Given the above it should be clear where, in any particular
theologian's thought, we might expect to find either support for or
opposition to this understanding of coadunacy.
As we attempted to outline in our first two chapters, coadunacy may
be considered in the lightoithree fields of inquiry and these fields
express themselves in a Christian mode when dealt with by theology.
The first relates to the ontological foundation of coadunacy, its
normativity in other words, and will be found to engage both with
the doctrines of the triune God and the imago del. The second has to
do with the loss of coadunacy, the being of humanity as derived from
the being of God as persons-in-relation is seen as broken in our
undeniable experience of estrangement and alienation from each
other. Alongside this last theme goes the Christian hope for an
empowering to new reldtionality restored by virtue of the redemptive
activity of Christ made actual for us by the Holy Spirit. Thus, in
an examination of our chosen theologians, for the purpose of
ascertaining in what sense they might be considered allies or
antagonists with respect to the notion of coadunacy, we must focus
upon these three fields albeit in their Christian theological mode.
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We shall consider first what is said concerning the phenomenon of
human relationality, then move on to consider Barth isand Pannenbergs
understandings of the imago dei and assess whether or not they have
a conception of the divine Trinity which is adequate to the task of
providing a theological foundation for human coadunacy. Final we
shall consider whether they do adequate justice to the human
experience of relational brokenness and in what manner the
restoration of coadunacy is understood to take place.
Being in Encounter 
In Volume 3/2 of his Church Dogmatics Karl Barth identifies what he
refers to as "the basic form of humanity"' as "being in encounter".2
By addressing the question of humanity's basic form he sees himself
as engaging with the preliminary part of the larger question
concerning the nature of human creatureliness.°
In previous sections of volume 3/2 Barth explains the derivation of
human being as being from God, and that "basically and
comprehensively,.., to be a man is to be with God. " n- This is the
highest and final statement that can be made concerning man and it
is a truth which can be derived only via the revealed word of God,
and by no other means. That is to say, it is a truth of theological
anthropology, and as such is completely inaccessible to the human
sciences. As the man Jesus is elected to be both man and God from
all eternity, we are men only in so far as we are with Jesus, via
his redemptive activity for us, and thus in covenant relationship
with God.
There is a relational dynamic in evidence here at the very core of
our humanness, such that we are only human in the light of our
relationship with God, and we are in relationship with God via the
one who is both for God and man, the man Jesus. ° Thus Barth may
make the claim: "The ontological determination of humanity is
grounded in the fact that the one man among all others is the man
Jesus. "7 We shall return to this issue of the derivation of
humanity from God through Jesus Christ when we consider the question
of the mediation of the imago of God to human being.° In this
section we mean to consider whether or not Barth possesses a notion
of the ontological nature of human relationality akin to our notion
of coadunacy as spelt out in Chapter 2.	 Having said that, it is
nonetheless important to anticipate our later exposition of Barth's
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understanding of the origin and foundation of human being in terms
of being with God in Christ, as this is determinative for his
discussion of human relationality.
In the section of the Church Dogmatics entitled 'The Basic Forms of
Humanity' Barth expounds his notion of humanity as fundamentally
being-in-encounter. In the previous section Barth had identified
Jesus as Man for Other Men9 and had pointed out the ontological
significance of Jesus being "for others":
He is originally and properly the Word of God to
men, and therefore His orientation to others and
reciprocal relationship with them are not
accidental, external or subsequent, but primary,
internal and necessary. It is on the basis of this
eternal order that he shows Himself to be Neighbour
and Saviour of men in time. 10
That there is a disparity between Jesus' humanity and our humanity
Is, says Barth, inevitable. "Christology is not anthropology", and
thus to define the man Jesus as the man for others is not to define
all men in exactly the same way. Only Jesus is the Son of God, the
Word of God to men, only he is fundamentally for others, "For no
other man can we say that from the very outset and in virtue of his
existence he is for others"." We are "victims of idealistic
Illusions" 2 if we seek to attribute to humanity in general features
which are exclusive to the humanity of Jesus.
All this being said, there has to be some similarity between the man
Jesus and other men, otherwise why use the term man to describe them
both? If the disparity between the man Jesus and men in general
were absolute then in what sense can they both be referred to as
man? Similarly, says Barth, it would be difficult to see how the
man Jesus could be for other men as their Saviour, deliverer and
representative if he were totally different from those he came to
represent."' Thus a question is prompted concerning the co-
ordination between Jesus and other men, which takes the form of an
inquiry into the basic form of humanity:
We have also to ask in respect of others how far as
man they are beings which can be represented by the
man Jesus in His suffering and conquering. We have
to ask what it is that makes them possible for the
covenant which is revealed and opprative for them,
which God has concluded with them, in this being of
Jesus. We have to ask what it is that makes them
capable of entering into covenant with God as the
creatures of God. 14
In other words, Barth is looking for a mode of relating which might
establish some manner of "correspondence and similarity" between men
and the man Jesus. 16 He ultimately identifies this similarity,
which is not only between us and Jesus but also, and by virtue of
this former relationship, between us and God, as being with others.
Man in abstraction from his fellows is thus ipso facto non-human,
and this definition of humanity is derived from the "primary text"
that is, the humanity of the man Jesus.'6
Barth's understanding of human being here is clearly ontological in
nature, and in that respect closely resembles our notion of
coadunacy as essential to the very being of humanity. Man in
abstraction, says Barth, is simply not man, and he criticises
Nietzsche's
	 Zarathustra	 for	 idolising the man of	 "azure
isolation"."
If we see man in and for himself, and therefore
without his fellows, we do not see him at all. If
we see him in opposition or even neutrality towards
his fellows, we do not see him at all. If we think
that his humanity is only subsequently and
secondarily determined, as an incidental enrichment,
by the fact that he is not alone, we do not see him
at all. If we do not realize and take into account
from the very outset, from the first glance and
word, the fact that he has a neighbour, we do not see
him at all. 16
To be isolated from one's fellows, or to regard the other as of
little significance, is to be alienated from Jesus and therefore to
be without God and neighbour. Indeed this isolated non-human, says
Barth, cannot have Jesus as Deliverer and Saviour. 1. However, and
It is here that we shall subsequently identify one of the key
weaknesses in Barth's treatment of the phenomenon of human
relationality, it is precisely this sinful man, the man who is
without his fellows, of whom Jesus is the Deliverer and Saviour.
Thus even sinful man does not lose the humanity attributed to him by
grace, for to admit to this would be to attribute to sin the power
of creation and "man does not accomplish a new creation by
sinning". 20
 Man's very being is determined by his relationship to
Jesus and Jesus is always the man for others, the Saviour of
sinners. Thus although man might "shame" his human nature, and
"bring himself into supreme peril" - it is difficult to see just
exactly what such shame and peril might actually involve here - the
fact that he is always with Jesus, that is to say always under the
Lordship of Christ and thus constantly in his presence, means that
he never ceases to be man.
Even the sinful man who denies his humanity and in a
blatant or more refined way turns his back on his
fellows stands in the light of the humanity of
Jesus. 21
We shall consider the implications of this characteristically
Barthian claim in our subsequent critique. Suffice it for now to
note that for Barth the very essence and being of man, that is God's
gift of humanity, is being in relationship and he will permit no
definition of humanity that does not entail the other, the thou.
"We have to rule out the possibility of a humanity without the
fellow man". 22 In this respect Barth provides much support for our
notion of coadunacy which seeks to define human being as being in
relation.
After a lengthy excursus in which he attacks the isolationism of
Nietzsche23 Barth returns to his central theme of being in
encounter by clarifying three central elements within his definition
of humanity. Firstly, humanity is determinate.
	
That is, man is
"created by God and for God"; man is God's covenant-partner. 24
Secondly, humanity is properly "being of the one with the other", in
similarity and distinction to Jesus, who is exhaustively being for
others. Man, says Barth, is with others in a reciprocal
relationship which is unlike Jesus' humanity, which is always and
"irreversibly 'for". 23
 Finally humanity is fundamentally a duality
of the "one man with the other", such that even when one person
encounters many others, true humanity resides in the basic form of
humanity which is the one with the other one. 26 This final point
appears rather curious and we shall be considering in due course why
Barth makes it, and its implications for human relationality.
Barth continues by making a preliminary examination of the statement
"I am" in which he utilizes the work of Martin Buber to illustrate
that even in this subjective confession we make a distinction
between the "I", the "Thou" and the "it". Thus this declaration of
"I", by which I posit myself, points us not towards "a pure absolute
and self-sufficient I", which is an illusion, but towards the I in
encounter with a distinct Thou. 27 Thus to say "I" is never to refer
to an empty subject but is first to acknowledge the distinction
between the I and the Thou, and then to identify the Thou "as
created by the same God", so as ultimately to confess the "basic
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formula", as Barth calls it, "I am as Thou art". 2€ This formula,
says Barth, affirms the dynamic encounter of the one and the other
in historical distinction; it speaks of a necessary encounter proper
to humanity, and of an ontologically significant encounter.
'I am as Thou art', we do not describe the
relationship between two static complexes of being,
but between two which are dynamic, which move out
from themselves, which exist, and which meet or
encounter each other in their existence. 2'
The particularities of my existence, argues Barth, say nothing and
are of no signiPicance with respect to the basic question of my
humanity. 3° The criteria of humanity are visible only through the
realisation of the encounter between the I and the Thou. Having
said this Barth proceeds to expound what he sees as the four basic
elements which characterise human being in encounter. 	 These four
factors are:	 i. seeing one another eye to eye;	 ii.	 speaking and
hearing;	 iii.	 rendering mutual assistance; 	 iv. Engaging in the
above gladly.
i. Seeing "eye to eye" 
Looking at one another eye to eye is for Barth the "root-formation
of all humanity". 3 '	 This looking constitutes both our preliminary
experience of distinction from and visibility to the other. By
looking the other in the eye we automatically allow the other that
same experience of us, we open ourselves to the other in this act of
looking and being looked at, we maintain our particularity as a Thou
in the vision of the Thou, but in the midst of this we recognise
each other as similar:
I know thee as a man, as something like myself, and
I make it possible for thee to know me in the same
way.	 We give each other something in our duality,
and this is that I and Thou are men.
	 We give each
other an insight into our being.32
This looking at each other "eye to eye" bears a similarity to
Emmanuel Levinas' notion of apprehending the "face" (visage) of the
other, although for Levinas the emphasis is upon distinction rather
than reciprocation: "Thought alert to the face of the other is the
thought of an irreducible difference".33
This notion of embodied availability, where a person is present to
another and is thus, in a sense, available to that other is a vital
one and will be taken up in a less formal manner in our concluding
chapter. 34	 The actual looking into a person's eyes might be
regarded as a true signal of availability in that one is, as Barth
so rightly explains, presenting oneself to the other. By entering
the visual field of the other we are presenting ourselves to the
consciousness of the other. 	 We are engaging in openness and "not
refusing to know others or being afraid to be known by them...".
Once again Barth affirms the nature of this encounter as
fundamentally a duality, claiming that "Where a man thinks he sees
and knows a group, or a group a man, or one group another group,
ambiguity always arises". 36 He goes on to argue that often our
encounter with groups are merely matters of social science and
systematisation which are thus encounters with "blind existence".
Barth refers to such encounters where openness in duality is
replaced by the simplicity of a general encounter with a group as
bureaucracy. "Bureaucracy is the encounter of the blind with those
whom they treat as blind". 37 Such a mode of encounter, where people
are categorised and grouped according to arbitrary classifications,
renders human beings invisible to each other. The bureaucrat, says
Barth, is thus "always inhuman".	 What Barth has to say here
concerning bureaucracy mirrors Levinas' criticism of totalism a and
Brunner's criticism of collectivism	 in that he refuses to
understand human relationality in terms of the subsuming of
particularity into an undifferentiated whole. Our encounter with
the other is from the very outset an encounter "as two histor1es".4°
The I and the Thou are never synonymous.
However, despite our agreement with Barth at this point, it seems
unnecessary as a device to avoid the dangers of totalism to suggest
that humanity as being in encounter "can only take place in
duality". 41 We shall return to this point later. At present we may
note that in Barth's first moment of human encounter we find a good
deal of apparent support for an understanding of human beings as
fundamentally available to each other by virtue of their physical
accessibility. 42 We hope to develop Barth's understanding of direct
eye contact with the other into the broader notion of signals of 
availability. Whether or not the simple fact of eye contact can be
made to bear the weight of an activity which opens the self to the
other and vica versa, to the degree that Barth seems to suggest, is
open to question. However, Barth continues to develop his notion of
being in encounter when he moves on to the next moment, which
constitutes an amplification and deepening of the eye to eye
encounter.
ii. Mutual speaking and hearing. 
In this section Barth seems to acknowledge that despite all the
grandiose claims previously made for visual encounter with the
other, there is far more to human being in encounter than simply
seeing each other. Despite the importance and necessity of that
openness which comes with mutual seeing there are, says Barth, no
guarantees that in this openness I truly reach Thou, and vice versa.
By mere seeing we either do not know one another at
all or only imperfectly, for on the plane of mere
seeing the one has no opportunity of putting himself
before the other, i.e., of interpreting himself, of
declaring who and what he is, what his person and
being are according to his own understanding of
himself.4
Mere "seeing" has the tendency to locate the power and initiative to
relationality squarely with the apprehending "I". The "I" can do
nothing but rely upon his/her own resources, forming a picture of
the other, the Thou, in his/her own image. Concomitantly the other
is saddled with the burden of existing "for the one who sees him in
the picture which he has formed of him. He is no more than what he
seems to be in his eyes and according to his standards."'" This is
an important observation by Barth and one that is of considerable
significance in our culture where images and image-making are big
business, and where what is seen of the other is seldom an authentic
expression of that other, but rather a construct designed to shield
the true self. 4s The old adage "never Judge a book by its cover" is
as pertinent today as it ever was, and Barth, for all his claims
concerning the significance of seeing the other, is well aware of
this fact.
What is required, says Barth, to prevent our falling foul of images
and totalistic interpretations of the Thou according to the lights
of the I is "interpretation". To this end "humanity as encounter"
says Barth "must become the event of speech", this speech event
taking the form of reciprocal expression and reception and
reciprocal address and reception. Expression is a speech-act in
which I interpret myself for and to the other, augmenting and
correcting the other's interpretation of me, based on the fact of my
visibility.	 Such self-expression is by no means motivated by any
fear on my part that I might be misunderstood by the other, rather
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It issues out of a desire and indeed a duty to be of assistance to
the other in his apprehension of me, 4.7 We fall short of genuine
self-expression when we present ourselves to the other out of our
own need for vindication or when we articulate a false image of
ourselves to the other:
Only when I speak with him with this purpose in view
- not for my own sake but for his - do I express
myself honestly and genuinely to him. Words are not
genuine self-expression when in some respect I keep
myself back... when I represent myself in another
guise than that in which I know myself... 49
Just as we can present a false visual image of ourselves to the
other, so too can we support that image with false self-expression.
Barth is well aware of the possible misuse of words, although to the
accusation that words are empty and false he replies "It is not the
words that are really empty. It is men themselves when they speak
and hear empty words". 49 We have a fundamental responsibility to
de-mystify ourselves for the other so that in his "unavoidable task
of making something of mens° he is not left merely to his own
devices.	 Similarly the other is also engaged in expressing himself
to me so that neither one of us is left with the potential ambiguity
of a visual representation. In response to the self-declaration of
the Thou I must listen and hear the word that is spoken to me and
for my sake. In this act of hearing I declare the incomplete nature
of my view of the Thou and stand before the Thou in need. To deny
this fundamental need is noe to hear what the other has to say
concerning herself to me and to my assistance.
If I do not accept the fact that my view is
Incomplete and needs to be supplemented and
corrected... there can be no place for the Word of
the Thou.s'
This need to have the other represented to me by the other himself
is not a matter of mere information-gathering or curiosity. It is
an ontological need and thus its fulfilment is absolutely necessary.
"I am not a true I and do not genuinely exist without him". We are
doomed to empty subjectivity if we shut our ears to the self-
representation of the other in encounter with whom lies our true
humanity. s2 In the light of this we ought to be profoundly grateful
to the other for their word to us.
Yet self-representation is not the only speech-event by which we
encounter the Other. The I, says Barth, is and must be involved in
the wider verbal activity of address where we engage in conversation
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with the other, in which we initiate "a kind of penetration from the
sphere of the one into the sphere of another being". .2' It is not
altogether clear what Barth has in mind in the distinction, found in
this section of his argument, between expression and address. Both
modes of speech involve the declaration of the I to the Thou as a
necessary supplement to the other's picture of that I, and both
involve the process of de-mystification of the self for the other.
Such distinction as there is between these two ways of speaking to
the other seems to lie in the function that Barth attributes to
them. As we have seen self-expression is a mode of speech where we
declare what we see as the truth about ourselves to the other;
	 in
effect it is a transfer of information. In the act of addressing
the other Barth appears to have in mind a presentation of the self
for inclusion into the life of the other, "Address is coming to
another with one's being and kneeling and asking to be admitted."4
Address is thus not simply an exchange of information concerning
discrete selves but an entering of each other's sphere of existence
and as such it is a rejection of isolation in favour of a plea for
mutuality.	 Once again Barth sees this addressing of the Thou as a
duty fulfilling a fundamental need. Clearly the other may not be
aware of his need, and may actually wish to be left alone. However
Barth maintains that we ought not to be satisfied with making "a few
tentative efforts" at seeking admittance into the life of the Thou.
I must refuse to be silent by constantly addressing the other, not
witholding our involvement in their sphere. Similarly I too must be
open to the word of address from the other, for "Two monologues do
not constitute a dialogue".s6
The other must not be encountered by me merely as an object of
external consideration, nor must I hide behind a false humility
which closes its ears to the other with the excuse that I can hardly
do justice to the other's address to me. My very existence as an I
is called into question if I choose to remain in isolation, n*
hear the other.	 In the act of receiving the address of the other
and reciprocating that address I and Thou exist as truly human:
A dialogue, and therefore the humanity of the
encounter of I and Thou, begins only when the spoken
word becomes a means to seek and help the other in
the difficulty which each entails for the other. On
this presupposition the two do not merely speak
together, in a commonly produced sound of words, but
they genuinely talk with and to one another in human
words."
What Barth seems to intend here by his discussion of speech-events
as encounter is akin to what we would want to refer to as the
availability of the self which is a fundamental condition of being-
for-others. S7 In our concluding chapter we shall explore the
notions of passive availability, constituted by the simple fact of
our embodiment, of signals of availability - that is to say, those
signs which we consciously and unconsciously give out which indicate
that we might be approachable by the other - and actual availability 
where we begin to communicate ourselves to the other. Barth's first
and second moments of encounter, seeing and speaking/hearing
approximate to our passive and actual availability. However he
appears to ignore the need for the intermediate signalling stage, or
at best subsumes this stage within the moment of speaking and
hearing. This lack of a signalling stage in the process of the self
becoming available to the other characterises the idealistic and
highly formalised nature of Barth's notion of encounter, a theme to
which we shall be returning subsequently.
iii. Encounter as mutual assistance 
The third moment of encounter consists in mutual assistance, 	 that
is to say in being at the disposal of the Thou. "If I and Thou
really see each other and speak with one another and listen to one
another, inevitably they mutually summon each other to action.-"
In this reciprocal summoning to assistance both the I and the Thou
acknowledge their need of each other and their willingness to
support one another.	 This encounter as assistance must not be
confused with mere altruism. Altruism, says Barth, can be as
inhuman as pure egoism if it operates under the illusion that I do
not need the other as much as he needs me, "for everything is
reciprocal in this matter".
By assisting the other we stand by him, we support and help him, we
"take part in the questions and anxiety and burden of him, accepting
concern for his life."'" It is this aspect of self-availability
which we refer to as being a resource for the other. G° God alone,
says Barth, is self-sufficient, I and Thou must live in constant
awareness of our need to grasp each other's Ilene . ' and so to live
with and not without each other in response to mutual need and
reciprocal assistance.
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However, despite this fundamentally human activity of offering and
requesting help and support to and from the other, Barth is quite
emphatic that there is a limit to our self-giving and concomitantly
to our claim on the other. Barth has consistently made the
important point that in all our encounters with the other, "I and
Thou are not inter-changeable." 62 He goes on to argue here that in
so far as we are necessarily distinct we cannot ultimately replace 
or represent the other. Only Jesus can be for man in this absolute
way.	 Human beings can correspond to Jesus' being for only in
standing with or beside the other.
He can be so near to him that his being supports
though it does not carry him; that he gives him
comfort and encouragement though not victory and
triumph; that he alleviates though he does not
liberate.63
It is only in this support that I and Thou avoid "empty
subjectivity", "misery", "void" and "futile being". However all this
is ultimately conditional upon the final moment of encounter which
dictates that all our seeing and hearing and doing be performed
"with gladness".64
iv. Encounter in gladness 
The performance of the first three moments of encounter with 
gladness constitutes for Barth "a great unseen lacuna", "the secret
of humanity" and its "all-animating and motivating dynamic." 6	 It
is the "substance" and "soul" of humanity and as such must accompany
our seeing and hearing and assisting if they are to be truly
constitutive of our humanity.
The category of gladness seems, at first sight, to be a rather
strange one in this context. Of course we would hope that our
encounter and relationship with the other might not be grudging, yet
it is often the case that we relate to the other out of a sense of
duty or even in the midst of animosity out of which we might hope
for a more congenial relationship. However, on further examination
we find that Barth's primary concern in deploying the notion of
gladness relates to what might well be regarded as one of the most
fundamental systematic constraints of his thinking: that of freedom 
and determinacy. It is at this point that Barth's understanding of
humanity and its being in encounter generates many of its strengths,
weaknesses and its ambiguities as we shall see in our subsequent
critique.
The first point to be made concerning the word "gladly" is that its
alternative is not, as one might suppose, "reluctantly" but rather
"neutrally". In other words, to oppose gladness in my encounter
with the other is to suggest that I am free to choose between a glad
encounter or a reluctant merely external encounter. 	 To this Barth
poses the question:
Do I really have the choice of actualising being in
the encounter between I and Thou either gladly or
reluctantly? Am I in some sense free to do justice
either gladly or reluctantly to the human
significance of eyes and mouth and ear and action,
and therefore of my whole relationship to the Thou
of which we have been considering the positive
content? Can I in some way have both possibilities
at my disposal, reserving them both for myself?66
The answer to this question is, for Barth, quite clearly No. To
believe ourselves to be capable of such a choice is to look "past
real man, who is not capable of this reservation and control." 67 If
such a choice for reluctant or glad encounter were indeed possible
we would find ourselves in an impossible position, says Barth.
There would exist an irresolvable conflict between the fact of our
"actual situation" as in encounter with the other as a result of an
ontological ordering of the "I" in relation to the "Thou", and the
motivation of our "innermost being". In other words there would
pertain a radical disjunction between internal and the external,
such that I might subject myself to encounter "as to an ineluctable
law of nature" Es but simply as an "alien law" which has nothing to
do with me as human, but being prescribed for me. For Barth such a
state of affairs is not merely intolerable but impossible. The
relationship between the one and the other is in no way merely "an
accidental fact of human existence", but is to do with his very
essence, and "In his essence ... his heart, he is only what he is
gladly." Any conception of human freedom which permits the
possibility of a choice between glad, essential encounter between
the I and the Thou and a reluctant, inhuman acquiescence to an
external law of encounter with fellow-man speaks of a humanity
"without root, without dynamic, without substance, without soul".69
The point here for Barth is that human t2eimg. is not a matter of
debate or choice. Just as man is not without but with God, so too
is he "not without but with his fellow-man". 7° In this sense man is
confronted by a law, the law of his own creatureliness.
	 Man as
created by God is not alone, but is always in the presence of his
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fellow-man. Human freedom consists in our freedom to obey this law
of God both internally and externally, as an act of absolute
spontaneity. Thus for Barth,
The situation between man and man is genuinely
inescapable, and I do real justice to it, only if it
is not subject to my caprice even in the sense that
I am not free inwardly to accept or reject it, but 
can only accept it, knowing that it is only and
exclusively in this situation that I am myself, and
can act as such. Humanity is the realisation of
this togetherness of man and man grounded in human
freedom and necessary in this freedom, 71
This freedom of man to be together with his fellow-man as a
necessary determination of his humanity does not entail either the
losing of oneself in the other, or the subjugating of the other to
the self. Both these forms of totalism constitute a misunderstanding
of humanity's intrinsic togetherness which interprets free
companionship and association in terms of tyrannny and slavery.72
The fundamental situation of humanity in encounter, in which man
finds himself, is ultimately a mystery to him, says Barth. We may -
and indeed have no choice but to - accept the gift of the other
while in turn offering ourselves in the reciprocal acts of seeing
and being seen, speaking and hearing, helping and being helped, and
all in gladness, but the whys and wherefores leave us silent. "All
words fail", says Barth "at this decisive point". We may however at
least point towards the hiddenness of the conditio sine qua non of
humanity, via our faith in God as Creator. 72
 It is God who
determines human nature as being with the other, and thus it is
impossible to say of God that he gives man the possibility not to be
human. Indeed, to be other than in encounter with the Thou would be
to have a nature alien to that of the man Jesus, such that he alone
would possess true humanity as intended by God, and we would be
beyond representation by him. The ultimate word that can be said of
man however is this:
Real man as God created him is not in the waste of
isolation. He does not have this choice. He does
not need to emerge from this waste. It is not just
subsequently,	 and	 therefore	 not	 with	 final
seriousness, that he is with his fellow-men. His
freedom consists from the very outset in his
intending and seeking this other, not to be his
tyrant or slave, but his companion, associate,
comrade, fellow and helpmate, and that the other may
be the same to him... Human nature is man himself.7'
Having described what Barth means by humanity as being in encounter,
it is important that we consider the mediation of that being. As we
have noted above, ultimately the why of human being must remain a
mystery to all save the creator God. However Barth does identify
the imago dei as being the source, or more accurately the "definite
and unequivocal form", of human being in encounter, and in this
basic assertion we find an agreement with our own notion of human
coadunacy as founded upon our imaging of the Triune God. 7 We shall
proceed now to consider this aspect of Barth's work in an attempt to
understand both the grounding of his notion of being in encounter
and the extent of its similarity to our own notion of human
coadunacy as the divine image.
Barth and the image of God 
In the first volume of the Church Dogmatics Barth argues strongly
against the analogia entis of Roman Catholic theology and Emil
Brunner's notion of a "point of contact" between man and God. These
manifestations of a non-revelatory natural theology, argues Barth,
take their force from an understanding of man, even sinful man, as
in some sense the image of God. It is this imaging of God which is
meant to provide the foundation for man's intrinsic capacity for
God. To this Barth has this to say:
This point of contact is what theological
anthropology of the basis of Gen.1:27 calls the
'Image of God' in man.... In this sense, as a
possibility which is proper to man qua creature, the
image of God is not just, as it is said, destroyed
apart	 from a	 few	 relics;	 it	 is	 totally
annihilated.76
Nevertheless, despite this apparent rejection of the reality of the
imago del for and in man, Barth does not in fact dispense with the
notion altogether. Even in the wake of his designation of the imago 
as "annihilated" he is prepared to admit that there is a proper
sense in which the image of God in man might be spoken of:
The image of God in man of which we must speak ...
Is the rectitude which through Christ is raised up
from real death and thus restored or created anew,
and which is real man's possibility for the Word of
God.77
From these two quotations two points must be born in mind as we
examine Barth's understanding of the imago del. Firstly, the image
of God is never an innate "quality" or "attribute" possessed by man
qua creature. We do not have the image of God. 7°' The second point
is that in so far as human being is in the image and likeness of God
it is so only by virtue of its identification with and
representation by the man Jesus Christ, who is prototypically true
humanity. 7 '3 With these theological controls in mind we turn now to
Barth's developed discussion of the imago in volume 3 of the Church 
Dogmatics.
The imago del,	 says Barth,	 consists fundamentally in the
confrontation and encounter between I and Thou. This encounter
takes two forms, the confrontation between God and human being and
that between man and woman.
In the act of creation God not only brings into being a world of
things whose otherness resides in their simple distinction from God,
he also creates the human who stands in relation with him as a true
"counterpart". Only in humanity, says Barth, is there a real other
to God, another with "independent life",91
There are only two things that we are told about the creation of
humanitvays Barth. The first is, as we have noted, that humanity
was created by God.
	 The second is that it was created male and
female.
	 Leaving aside the suggestion that Barth focuses upon the
man/woman distinction as an attack upon homosexuality 92
 which
undoubtedly has some truth in it, Barth is primarily concerned here
with establishing the man/woman encounter as the actual and definite
form of being in encounter.99
Man can and will always be man before God and among
his fellows only as he is man in relationship to
woman and woman in relationship to man. And as he
is one or the other he is man... The fact that he
was created man and woman will be the great paradigm
of everything that is to take place between him and
God, and also of everything that is to take place
between him and his fellows.94-
It is in this basic form of encounter that human beings can be said
to be in the image and likeness of God. Thus we have a form of
dialectic being established, where we gra the image of God only as
being in encounter, and we exist in encounter by virtue of our
inalienable relationship with Christ as the image and likeness of
God. In Barth's own words, the imago consists "as man himself
consists as the creature of God. He would not be man if he were not
the image of God. "99 What we have here is what we have previously
seen Barth speak of as "the secret of humanity": that humanity is
not without but with God, and that its sole determination is as
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covenant-partner to God. There is a particular and
characteristically Barthian logic in operation at this point, a
logic which must be entered into if we are to fully comprehend what
Barth really intends in his talk of human being and consequently his
talk of human relationality.
Although Barth designates the why of human being and its form as a
secret and a mystery he does provide us with one basic clue as to
the dogmatic foundations of that form. God experiences, in his form
as Trinity, "harmonious self-encounter and self-discovery". He
exists in reciprocal and open confrontation with himself as I and
Thou, Father and Son.	 Man, continues Barth, "is the repetition of
this divine form of life, its copy and reflection". 8' 7
 By this he
means that there is an analogical correspondence between man and his
creator; not an analogy of being but an analogy of relations, the
analogia relationis. It is in this analogical sense that we might
talk of man as in God's image, not as an innate possession but as a
gift of divine grace. Having made the point concerning the
analogical similarity between God and humanity which constitutes the
imago del, Barth initiates a movement to Christology which, in the
light of our previous discussion of his treatment of human
relationality as Christologically determined, can only be regarded
as inevitable.
The human likeness to the divine, says Barth, is neither due to
humanity nor maintained by humanity. It is not and "cannot be his
own concern". 8 In the light of the "episode of the fall" where man
seeks the impossibility of inhumanity, that is, creaturely existence
without God, it is only in "divine restoration and removal" 99 that
man in encounter is in the divine image. 	 Thus the imago del is
properly a fact of salvation and hence of Christology:
... man has reason to look for the man who will be
different from him, but who for this reason will be
real man for him, in the image and likeness of God
male and female in his place and on his behalf,
namely, Jesus Christ and His community.9°
Jesus alone is truly the image of God, claims Barth, and
consequently it is the man Jesus who is absolutely and truly human.
As we have already noted, human being is a determinate being:
determined by its divine dimensions of being for God and for man.
This understanding of humanity is not simply a catalogue of
fundamental accidents but rather a dogmatic statement concerning the
essence of man.	 Yet having defined humanity according to this dual
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encounter the logic of Barth's Christology becomes apparent. Jesus
alone is the one elected by God to be perfectly and absolutely for
God,
Man is essentially for God because he is essentially
from God and in God. When we say this we are
speaking of the man Jesus. We cannot say quite the
same thing of man generally and as such. s"
Again, for man
If the divinity of the man Jesus is to be described
comprehensively in the statement that He is man for
God, this humanity can and must be described no less
succinctly in the proposition that He is man for
man, for other men, His fellows.92
We must emphasise here that these statements of Barth's are
primarily Christological statements and are thus ultimately
trinitarian, having to do with Jesus' relationship to the Father.
This being of Jesus for God and man is not "accidental" or
"external" or "subsequent" says Barth, but "primary, internal and
necessary". 93 It is ontological and total. Thus we find that for
Barth it is the man Jesus who is truly man, humanity as intended by
God. It is Jesus who is the imago del who is both for God and for
man. It is Jesus who is God's perfect covenant-partner and it is in
the act of covenant-partnership with God that we find what Barth
refers to as real humanity.94
In the light of this ultimate revelation of humanity in the man
Jesus, in what sense can it be said that we as particular men and
women are truly human and thus in encounter with both God and man?
Barth provides us with a simple answer to this question: we are
human beings, that is we are for God and man as we are in Christ.
That is to say, what Jesus is by virtue of His election by God we
are by virtue of our inclusion in the man Jesus. Jesus is both the
elected and rejected one of God9G as He is rejected on our behalf He
is also elected on our behalf. There can be no doubt that for Barth
we are only human in so far as Jesus is human. As we saw in our
discussion of being as encounter, particularly in the third moment
of encounter as assistance97 while we might aid our fellows, only
Jesus can represent and indeed replace us. In this He alone can be
truly for rather than simply with us.	 Thus Barth may say
unequivocally:
There is no abstract humanity and therefore no
correspondingly abstract human self-understanding.
Man is no more, no less, no other than what he is
through and with and for Jesus Christ.9'-'1
There can be no sense in which the Son of God took on a humanity
that was alien and prior to Him. The humanity of the man Jesus is
His in a completely non-derivative way as an ontological necessity,
unlike ours which although it is ontological and necessary, is so
only because of our being in Christ. There is no other humanity
than that which is found in encounter with the man Jesus so that
"without Christ" we "would not be man at all", 99 and this is not
just true of Christian man, the man who knows Christ, but "...each
man as such - not just the man who knows him but also the man who
scarcely knows him or knows Him not at all". 1 °° This is at the very
core of Barth's teaching on humanity for in so far as the man Jesus
is elected by and for God and man from all eternity, the humanity of
Christ constitutes both the first and the final form of humanity.
From all eternity God elected and determined that he
Himself would become man for us men. From all
eternity He determined that men would be those for
whom He is God:	 His fellow-men.	 In willing this,
in willing Jesus Christ, He wills to be our God and
He wills that we should be His people.
Ontologically, therefore, the covenant of grace is
already included and grounded in Jesus Christ, in
the human form and human content which God willed to
give His Word from all eternity."'"
In other words God's act of creation and redemption are in fact
metahistorically coterminous. God's being for man and determination
of man for Himself and his fellows constitutes a single act of
covenant fulfilled in Christ.	 While sin is simply an "episode"'°2
in the life of man the covenant is the life of man. Thus the
atonement wrought in Christ in which the man Jesus is elected to be
both for God and for man is no mere counter episode instigated in
opposition to sin.	 It was God's will to become man from all
eternity.	 Certainly the event of the incarnation in history is an
event which saves us from sin and death, and forms the Church,
however there is more and greater than this.
	 As the first-born of
all creation Christ is the first and eternal word of God.
As very God and very man He is the concrete reality
and actuality of the divine command and the divine
presence, the content of the will of God which
exists prior to its fulfilment, the basis of the
whole project and actualization of creation and the
whole process of divine providence from which all
created being and becoming derives. 103
We must grasp the logic of Barth's christology at this point if we
are subsequently to identify its points of weakness. Man, that is
particular man, you and I, exists as truly human only in Christ and
under his Lordship as determined from all eternity in the one
unbroken act of covenant, whereby we are for God and our fellows.
In Christ alone do we "live and move and have our being". Outside of
Christ there is no humanity, not even fallen sinful humanity. 	 We
shall return to this point later.
The point to be made here is that Barth identifies, as do we, the
imago dei as the source of our being as relational, and thus
properly human.	 Further, Barth sees the imago of God relating to
the	 encounter between the Father and the Son within the divine
Godhead,	 identifying the Trinity as the prototype of human
relationality.	 In this we must agree with him, particularly in the
basic form of the imago as man and woman. Thus, before we finally
turn to our critique of Barth's understanding of human
relationality, it would be valuable to consider the nature of those
Trinitarian relations which serve as the source of the possibility
for human encounter.
The triune relationality 
To engage with Barth's notion of the Trinity is to do nothing else
but to cut to the core of his theology. To pull at just one of the
threads of his doctrine is to run the risk of unravelling the whole
of Barth's theology and to become hopelessly entangled within its
complexities.	 I do not propose to do that here. My purposes here
are quite specific. What sort of relating takes place between
Father, Son and Holy Spirit such that their relationality may serve
as the source for ours, as Barth clearly would have it do? Thus if
my explication of the nature of the divine Trinity, as conceived by
Barth, appears to be incomplete, that is because it is not intended
to be in any way exhaustive.
God's being as Trinity is a uniquely theological datum, communicated
to us in God's own act of self-revelation. This act of self-
communication from God to man has a "three-fold fore .'" : the
initial speaking of the Word in the Christ-event; the recollection 
of this event in the text of Scripture; and the preaching of the
Word by the Church. It is only the first of these three which is
the true Word of God. The second and third forms become the Word by
faith and the grace of God who chooses to make himself objective for
us. "The direct Word of God" says Barth "meets us only in its
twofold mediac yu.10E4 Thus there is ever and only one Word of God
which becomes actual for us in Scipture and proclamation by God's
grace. In these two forms God speaks the same Word from all
eternity; in Scripture and proclamation we do not have to do with a
word once spoken in past history, but with God's eternal Word to
man.
It is this doctrine of the Word of God that stands as "the only
analogy" to the doctrine of the Trinity of God, claims Barth.1°6
For revelation, Scripture and proclamation read Father, Son and Holy
Spirit. To the question, Who is this God who reveals Himself in
this three-fold way 107
 the answer must be that "God reveals Himself.
He reveals Himself through Himself. He reveals Himself." God,
says Barth, is the Revealer who is identical both with this act in
revelation and with its effect. 109 It is because God is identical
with his act of revelation that we can know him as Trinity. Thus
the triune nature of God, far from being the product of mere
theological speculation, is for Barth the very truth of God's act of
revelation, and as such the one and only authentic starting point
for theology.	 The very fact of God speaking to us declares him as
Trinity, as the one who is his very Word to man.
The act of divine self-revelation makes known to us God's being as
both veiled and unveiled, unknowable and yet made known to us. As
the God who reveals himself, he is completely free and self-
sufficient, quite beyond human ken. As the God who reveals himself
to us he is free to be for us in self-differentiation. In this act
of self-differentiation the God who is Lord over us and thus totally
independent of us exercises his freedom to become free for us as
well as free from us.
He can so indwell the other that, while He is its
Creator and the Giver of its life, and while He does
not take away this life, He does not withdtw His
presence from this creaturely existence which is so
different from His own divine life."°
This is the ultimate mystery of the incarnation of the Son of God,
that is, God's freedom to be free even from himself, "to be God a
second time in a very different way, namely in manifestation, i.e.,
in the form of something He Himself is not. " 111 Thus God reveals
himself to be both the hidden Lord and Father and also, in divine
self-differentiation, the revealed Word, the Son of God.
	 As the
"effect" of his revelation to human beings God shows himself to be
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the very capacity, for us, to receive his Word.	 In this way he
distinguishes himself also as Spirit."2
This becoming of His own alter-ego by God, in his becoming God a
second time13, is by no means a mere economic device on God's part,
undertaken for the salvation of humanity. On the contrary it is the
very truth concerning the divine being whose "unity is neither
singularity nor isolation" 114. The Son of God, says Barth, while
being the basis of divine immanence through the incarnation, is "as
an eternal mode of the divine being"."	 Thus the divine Trinity is
nothing less than the repetitio aeternitatis in aeternitate."6
For Barth it is of supreme importance that what God reveals himself
to be in his act of self-disclosure is precisely what he is in
Himself. That is to say there can be no distinction between an
economic and immanent Trinity. God is Father not simply because he
is our creator but because he is eternally the Father in his
repetition of himself in the Son:
God's trinitarian name of Father, God's eternal
fatherhood, denotes the mode of being of God in
which He is the Author of His other modes of
being. 117
Thus the Fatherhood, and therefore the being as Creator of God,
cannot be understood in separation from the Son and the Spirit, for
it is only as God repeats himself as Son and Spirit that he is
Father. This unus et individuus of God in "His work and essence" is
similarly true of all the divine activities, such that the Father,
as the Father of the Son, is also the God who "acts in
reconciliation and redemption". " e This unity in distinction is the
truth behind the doctrine of the perichoresis of the Father, Son and
Holy Spirit,
according to which all three, without forfeiture or
mutual dissolution of independence, reciprocally
interpenetrate each other and inexist in one
another."9
There can be no one-sided modalism in our notion of the Trinity,
says Barth; the very unity of God in which he interpenetrates
himself is a unity in eternal self-repetition and distinction. 110
This is the crux of the trinitarian relationality, this mutual
interpenetration. To say that God exists in three modes of being is
not to identify each of these modes as a separate and discrete
center of consciousness, and thus three persons in the modern sense
of the term person. '2'
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The statement that God is One in three ways of being
... means, therefore, that the one God, 1, e. the one
Lord the one personal God, is what He is ... in the
mode of the Father, in the mode of the Son, and in
the mode of the Holy Ghost. 122
There is only one divine subject says Barth, not three, and the
unity of the three modes of being, Father Son and Holy Spirit, stems
wholly from the fact that they are reiterations of this single
subject. God's threeness, says Barth,
consists in the fact that in the essence or act in
which God is God there is first a pure origin and
then two different issues.. . ...
Thus for Barth the unity of Father Son and Spirit cannot be regarded
as a form of social community consisting of discrete persons
involved in intersubjective relationship as there is only ever one
divine subject. Indeed, despite his rejection of an understanding of
the modes of God's being as personal, he does make the concession at
the end of volume 1/1 of the Dogmatics that while it might be
possible to regard Father and Son as persons, "the Holy Spirit could
not possibly be regarded as the third 'person'". 124- It is the
Spirit, says Barth, by virtue of His (he still uses the personal
pronoun here!) being a "common element", constitutes the act of
fellowship and communion between Father and Son.
Yet even given this designation of the Spirit as the "act of
communion, the act of imputation, love, gift", the relationship
between Father and Son is one of a shared identity, an equality, a
formal interpenetration which is summed up in the claim made by
Eberhard Dingel concerning Barth's understanding of the Trinity:
as his own interpreter God corresponds to his own
being. Since, however, God as his own interpreter
... is he himself, since also in this happening as
such it is a question of the being of God, then the
highest and last statement which can be made about
the being of God is: God corresponds to himself.126
JUngel continues by making it perfectly clear that in speaking of
God's self-correspondence we are speaking "of a relationship". 127
In other words, God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit relates to
himself because he is himself, in repeated distinction perhaps, but
nonetheless the one divine subject.
In this understanding of the triune God we find very little by way
of similarity and support for our notion of coadunacy as derived
from the notion of God as persons-in-communion. Furthermore, as we
shall now see, Barth's own understanding of human being in encounter
appears to suffer as a result of his conception of the triune being
of God.
Conclusion 
The first thing that needs to be said concerning Barth's explication
of the phenomenon of human being in encounter is that it appears
overly formal and unrealistic, largely on account of the powerful
Christological determinism so central to Barth's view of humanness.
Barth's insistence on the basic form of human encounter as that of
an I-Thou duality' 2e cannot be fully true to human experience.
Certainly it is true that I relate to distinct others, individual
selves, but it is also true that I encounter the other in plurality,
parents rather than parent, friends rather than simply friend,
family rather than simply piecemeal encounters with a brother, a
sister, a child and so on. These encounters with others surely
represent authentic relationality and not just what Barth refers to
as encounter with faceless "Bureaucracy". 12e The identification of
a dualistic structure as the only true and authentic mode of human
encounter is an inevitable out-working of Barth's systematic
commitment to the divine encounter expressed as the duality of
Father and Son with the Holy Spirit being identified as the bond of
fellowship between these two. By denying the possibility of the
Holy Spirit's being a third person within the Trinity° Barth is
left with no other recourse but to maintain that the basic form of
encounter is that of a duality, that is if he wishes to continue
regarding the divine Trinity as the ultimate source of human
relationality. Indeed, as we see there is cause for doubting
whether the Barthian Trinity ultimately consists of as much as a
true encounter in duality.
For Barth, that humanity is in encounter is a fundamental fact of
its existence. We are not without but with our fellow. Certainly,
and as we have suggested in Chapter 2 and will argue fully
elsewhere, there is a sense in which we are always in encounter with
the other, always passively available simply by virtue of our being
embodied, and thus open to external scrutiny. Barth explains this
in his first moment of encounter as seeing and being seen.
Furthermore we would affirm with Barth the ontological significance
of being as being with the other.
	 However, as we shall see, there
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is a tension in Barth between his recognition of the broken and
alienated state of human existence and 	 his Christological
determined understanding of human being. 	 It is at this point that
we must depart from Barth's understanding of human encounter. 	 For
Barth there appears to be no hiatus between encounter and
reciprocation.	 I encounter Thou in the four moments of being in
encounter, and the Thou reciprocates as a fact of humanity
constituted by being in Christ. For Barth "the rent tearing human
existence to its depths is healed and closed in virtue of a
historical relation to genuine Transcendence" 31 ,that is, by virtue
of human relationship with the man Jesus. Indeed, Barth goes
further by claiming that "at bottom this rent does not exist". 12
Inhumanity, man without his fellow, is, says Barth, "a man who does
not and cannot exist". 13
Despite all his claims that to be without the other is to be "non-
human" Barth allows no room for the possibility of this inhuman mode
of existence. Even the one who denies both God and his neighbour
"showing himself to be supremely non-human" does not cease to be
man, for he does not lose God's address to him "his creaturely
nature stands in the light of the humanity of Jesus." 1 "34 For Barth
the determinative locus of humanity is God. It is God alone who
creates humanity to be human; to be truly human is to be God's
creature in covenant relationship with him and addressed by him. By
sinning we do	 not initiate a new creation altering our nature:
The fact that man sins does not mean that God ceases
to be God and therefore man man. In this context,
too, we must say that man does not accomplish a new
creation by sinning.	 He cannot achieve any
essential alteration of the human nature which has
been given.	 He can only share this nature and
himself. He can only bring himself into supreme
peril. But the fact that he has in the man Jesus
his Saviour and Deliverer is the pledge that he has
not ceased to be a man, a being ordered in relation
to this Jesus.136
For Barth Jesus Christ constitutes "the first and eternal Word of
God" in which the sin of man, that is, the tendency to inhuman
existence outside of the covenant relationship with God, "is already
met, refuted and removed from all eternity". 13G This Word of God
is his Word of creation, which is coterminous with redemption. In
other words, and as we have already noted, for Barth creation is
election. In the light of the impossibility of being estranged from
oneself, from the other, Barth does not feel compelled to address
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the issue of my undeniable experience of the other as stranger.
Concomitantly the exchange of power which, as we shall explore in
our concluding chapter 137, must be regarded as an essential part of
self-availability is not to be found in Barth. There is no mention
in Barth's discussion of the risk involved in self-giving, of the
placing of one's self in the power of the other.	 We are in
encounter with the other purely and simply as a fact of our
humanity. We are human because we are in Christ, replaced and
represented in the humanity of the man Jesus. 1G We are never free
not to be human; all are human because all are in Christ; all are
in encounter because all are human. This is the basic logic of the
Christological determination of humanity.
There is a very real tension in Barth's treatment of human
estrangement, and, concomitantly, his understanding of self-giving
abandonment to the other as stranger, so important for our own
notion of coadunacy, is to say the least ambiguous. Clearly Barth
recognises the brokenness and disorder which characterize human
existence in rebellion against God.	 The human race, argues Barth,
exists in a state of "disorder" and "deviation":
The order from which it deviates is the form of an
obedient life of people in fellowship with God which
includes as such the corresponding form... of a life
of people in fellowship with one another.'39
This disorder is the result of humanity's fall into unrighteousness,
a fall not only away from God but also away from each other and away
from oneself.
	
This is the essence of sin as experienced by
humanity. It is human being in contradiction to itself. While the
Christian may legitimately engage in rebellion against particular
manifestations of human contradiction and alienation, such as
"painful conditions of life" and particularly "tyrants, those by
whom they find themselves browbeaten, defrauded and
oppressed... 'h140 nevertheless as Christians, says Barth, the only
authentic revolt is the one against disorder, that is, disobedience
to God. Alienation from God of necessity involves alienation from
the rest of humanity.
"In and with the sin of Adam, who wanted to be as God, there is
already enclosed the sin of Cain, the murder of his brother." a ' As
we have already noted, the very being of humanity is never the
possession of human beings. Humanness, the imago del, is only ever
a gift, vouchesafed to us in Christ and under his Lordship. 	 For
this reason Barth can assert quite unequivocably that
Man's alienation from God at once carries with it
his self-alienation: the denaturalizing of the
humanity and fellow humanity of his own existence,
the contradiction of the determination, inalienably
given to him as God's creature, that he should
belong to God and have in him his Lord...'42
It is precisely here that we may identify the point of tension
between Barth's understanding of human self-alienation and his
above-mentioned tendency to understand I-Thou relationality as an
inalienable fact of human existence in Christ. It is quite clear
that for Barth human brokenness and alienation from self is a
function of humanity's disobedience and alienation from God; "As
people are estranged from God, so they are from themselves and their
neighbours, alienated from God and themselves and their fellows."149
Barth goes on to point out that it is the Lordless powers, that is,
"human abilities, exalting themselves as lordless forces, against
man h1mself"' 44, originally loaned to human beings by God for our
well-being, which are now in revolt and work to our harm, ' 45 It is
these Lordless powers, human abilities in disorder and disobedience,
which tear apart human society.
The lordship of these powers, which are all of them
no more than exponents of the rebellion that
separates men from God, is synonymous with the
destruction and ruin of both the individual and
society.146
All this being said, there is a serious problem here.
	 Despite all
that Barth has to say about the Lordless powers and human
estrangement,	 these powers are ultimately nothing more than
"fictions" and "illusions". 147	 They are, says Barth, "only a
pseudo-objective reality" 14e
, never truly lordless, never absolute
and never ontologically godless.
	 The reason for this is plain and
we have already touched on it above. The Word of God, which is
Christ, the one Word of creation and election, is the one
inescapable determination for human being. Sin, on the other hand,
is "overshadowed and crowded into the margins by Grace". 149 This
Christological determinism thus takes the form of an anthropological
idealism where Christ alone is the true human being.
If this is indeed the case then we may find support for our
criticism of Barth's treatment of the reality of human brokenness in
Bonhoeffer's examination of communality when he writes; "The whole
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of idealism is unaware of any cleft between the primal state and the
Fall, or of the significance of this cleft for the person and the
view of community".'"
True alienation from God is,
	
according to Barth,	 ultimately
impossible, and so concomitantly is human self-estrangement.
Naturally, man's being without a Lord, without God,
cannot alter in the slightest the fact that God is
his God and that in reality and truth he does have
God as his Lord. He cannot escape from God: 'If I
ascend to heaven, thou art there! If I make my bed
in Sheol, thou art there also!'(Fs.139:8) It would
be unthinkably terrible if this were not so, if God
allowed man to tread his evil way to the bitter end,
if he ceased on his side to be man's God and Lord.
It is bad enough for men, and fateful enough, that
he can at least attempt this alienation from God,
this flight from his Spirit and countenance into the
wilderness of these heights or depths,that in a
dreadful "as if" and in contradiction of his true
determination, he can exist "absolutely". In no
case does he achieve more than an imagined
godlessness and lordlessness, a pseudo-absolute
being and existence, a thought, speech and act "as
if" he were without God and without a Lord. 161
It is in the light of the "more or less one-sided decree" of the
covenant established in Christ as God and man 162, " the rent tearing
human existence to its depths is healed and closed". 1s3 It is this
healing act of atonement that reconciles humanity to God and to
itself, which is "the most basic history of every Man. 	 It is the
first and most inward presupposition of his existence."	 Jesus
Christ as the history of God with man is the very act of atonement
which "takes precedence of all other history". 1E+4
The point being made here is this: if humanity's alienation from
itself is a direct result of its alienation from God, and if this
latter alienation is, according to Barth, overcome in Christ then
surely humanity's self-estrangement is also overcome. Despite a
very real concern to indicate the brokenness of human existence,
Barth's Christological determinism appears to force him into an
understanding of human estrangement as impossible rebellion. The
rent tearing human existence is healed. We are in actuality neither
estranged from our God or our fellows, for we are all under the
Lordship of Christ who determines our true humanity as reconciled to
the one and the other. It is this reconciling history, argues
Barth, which overcomes all other human history and this time, unlike
the pseudo-reality of sin,
There is no room for any fears that in the
justification of man we are dealing only with a
verbal action, with a kind of bracketed "as if", as
though what is pronounced were not the whole truth
about man.'ss
We have suggested, and will later develop the notion, that the
dynamic of human coadunacy be understood in terms of self-
abandonment to the other, whomwe encounter as stranger and to whom
we offer power over ourselves as an act of coadunacy. This act of
self-abandonment, while being performed in hope that the other whom
we encounter will not abuse his or her empowering over us is still
an act which takes place within the context of human estrangement.
The dynamic of coadunacy denies the other as stranger by self-
abandonment in the face of the very real strangeness of the other.
For Barth there is no strangeness in the Thou whose immediate
response to encounter is to reciprocate and not abuse. To abuse
this encounter would be to be inhuman, to be estranged, and this is
ultimattly	 not possible, all humanity existing in the light of
Christ's humanity and atonement.
Barth's ambiguous attitude toward the notion of alienation and
self-abandonment cuts to the very heart of his Christology. In the
face of the irresistible and eternal determination of human beings
for God, there is little sense of a fundamentally human response to
God. Human freedom is freedom for God. It has been pointed out by
others' that in Barth, while there is a definite Hegelian chord
struck in his notion of the triune God as existing in the
distinction of in and for himself, there is no point at which Barth
identifies an act of negation in the transition of God in himself as
Father to God in Christ, as Hegel clearly does. 1s7 R.D.Williams
makes a similar point when he observes that there is little,
particularly in the earlier volumes of the Dogmatics which speaks of
"God's self-abnegation in the face of created freedom."' se Where
God does encounter the fallen word it is in an "annihilating
negation" and not one of abandonment to the other who has become
stranger:
Even in IV/1, the emphasis is far less on the Son of
Man given up into the hands of sinners, God at man's
mercy, than on the judgment of God upon man. Barth
will write eloquently of the suffering and
dereliction of Jesus bearing the wrath of God; but
not of Jesus as 'God bearing the wrath of man',
Bonhoeffer's God 'pushed out of the world on to the
cross.'	 We have already noted Barth's denial (CD
1:1 p.176) that God gives himself into our hands;
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yet the incarnational paradox is that this is
precisely what he does.'9
Thus precisely at the point where Barth identifies the divine imago 
which is constitutive of all humanity as being in encounter, in
other words the man Jesus Christ, we find an almost total absence of
self-abandonment to an other who is empowered over us, and to our
potential harm.
It is significant to note that in Church Dogmatics 4:1, in the
section entitled "The Way of the Son of God into the Far Country", a
section in which one might expect to find the language of divine
self-abandonment to a broken world, we find instead that the way
"into the far country" is characterized by obedience, 1O This
obedience is the Son's obedience to the Father, the Father who, as
we have seen above, is still King even in the far country.	 At his
baptism Jesus subjects himself to God' s '.	 When he suffers it is
"under the hand of God" 1G2. The divine incarnation, the
condescension of God, his becoming flesh has to do not with
abandonment to those who hate him and would do him harm, but with
"(1) the obedience of the Son to the Father, shown (2) in his self-
humiliation, His way into the far country, fulfilled in his death on
the Cross". 163 What we have here is not Bonhoeffer's Son of God,
"pushed out of the world onto the Cross" by a broken humanity to
whom he had abandoned himself, but rather "He stands under the wrath
and judgment of God, He is broken and destroyed on God."'"
This brings us finally to Barth's understanding of the I-Thou
encounter as analogous to the confrontation of Father, Son and
Spirit within the divine Trinity. The first thing to be said here
as regards the intra-divine relationality is that properly speaking
Barth presents us with, at best, a binity of Father and Son. In the
final section of 1:1 where Barth addresses the doctrine of the Holy
Spirit, he makes it perfectly clear that the Spirit is in no sense a
third "person" alongside Father and Son. "=..s The Holy Spirit
occupies the position of "common element" or "act of communion"
which exists between Father and Son. 166 As Moltmann points out, to
refer to the Spirit as the bond of love between Father and Son is to
render him ultimately redundant in the light of the already
pertaining relationship of eternal generation and self-giving. '67
As we have already noted, it is this reduction of the Spirit to the
level of a relationship that establishes the I-Thou duality as the
ultimate form of encounter.
Having observed that Barth's understanding of the Trinity ultimately
collapses into a binity as the Spirit becomes a mere duplication of
the Father's love for the Son, there is good reason to suspect that
even this duality finally falls in on itself, resolving itself into
the one absolute subject. Both Moltmann and Williams argue
convincingly that in opting for a self-interpretoftic ., model of the
Trinity, as Barth does in his prioritizing of God's act of
revelation, he is committed to the notion of a single subject who
speaks and reveals himself as Lord. 16e In speaking, God reiterates
himself as subject in the act of self-interpretation. Indeed in the
first half of 1/1 Barth affirms that in the Trinity there is only
"one divine I"/" Gg Moltmann accuses Barth of attempting to utilize
the doctrine of the Trinity according to an Idealist reflexive
tradition, in order to secure a notion of the divine essence as
sovereignty. As Fichte spoke of "being" and the "existence of
being" and the "reflection" that makes them one"°, so Barth speaks
of God as the one who is absolute subject through distinction and
self-recollection.
Thus God the Father, the one "personality", articulates himself in
Christ through eternal repetition:
But in the reflection logic of the absolute subject,
the Son is nothing other than the self of the divine
"I", the counterpart,	 the other, in whom God
contemplates	 himself,
	 finds	 himself,	 becomes
conscious of himself and manifests himself."'
There is a very serious charge of modalism being made of Barth here,
and one that despite his protestations he is hard put to refute.
Whether we agree with Moltmann's accusations of Barth and his
Idealistic interpretation of Barth's reflexive trinity, there can be
little doubt that Barth certainly places his emphasis upon the
single divine personality in three modes. Any attempt to identify a
single divine subJect as the source for intersubJective human 
relationality must surely be fraught with difficulties. For the
divine Trinity to serve as a the source and model for relationality
between distinct persons it must itself be understood, surely, as
persons in relation, and not as person in three-fold repetition.
Such an observation must also throw a serious shadow over Barth's
attempt to account for the reality of human encounter on the basis
of our imaging the divine nature as I-Thou encounter.
In concluding our discussion of Barth it would be unfair and
insulting to a thinker of his stature and insight to suggest that in
actual fact Barth was unaware of human brokenness and estrangement.
It is important to reiterate here that our criticisms derive their
force from the ubiquitous systematic determination of God's freedom
and sovereignty in Barth's work,	 coupled with a form of
Christological idealism. It is ultimately this dogmatic
determination which forces Barth into an unrealistic and potentially
unsupportable notion of human being, in Christ, as unavoidably and
actually being in encounter. To be fair, there is much in Barth's
writing, as we have sought to show above, to indicate that he was
indeed acutely aware of the brokenness of human existence and its
alienation not only from God but also from itself.
We turn now to a consideration of human relationality as understood
by Wolfhart Pannenberg.
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CHAPTER SIX
	
PANNENBERG AND THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN SOCIALITY 
In the previous chapter we considered the notion of human
relationality as I-Thou encounter within the theology of Karl Barth.
In this chapter we shall be addressing the same issue, but from
within a very different theology. Nevertheless, in our treatment of
human relationality in the theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg we shall
utilize the same strategy as in our previous analysis of Barth.
That is, we shall examine what is said concerning the actual
phenomenon of human relationality and subsequently move on to
consider the significance of Pannenberg's view of the imago dei and
the Triune nature of God, sin and the person of Jesus Christ for
this phenomenon.
Unlike Barth Pannenberg is concerned with what he refers to as
fundamental-theological anthropology', as distinct from traditional
dogmatic anthropology. The latter, says Pannenberg, is founded upon
the presupposition of divine revelation; the fact of God is thus
taken as the a priori of human existence:
since it supposes the reality of God as it sets
about speaking of human beings, it surrenders the
possibility of joining in the discussion at the
level of anthropological findings.
In contrast to this approach, fundamental-theological anthropology
seeks to engage with the phenomena of human existence by way of
interaction with the human sciences such as biology and cultural
anthropology. Pannenberg is insistent that the conflict between
theology and the Enlightenment atheism of Feuerbach and subsequently
of Marx, Nietzsche, Freud and Sartre must take place on the field
of anthropology. It is in this arena that the atheists have chosen
to attack religion with their claim that the notion of God is
fundamentally an expression of human self-alienation 3, and it is
here that theology must make its stand:
The basic question posed by modern atheism is this:
Does man, in the exercise of his existence, assume a
reality beyond himself and everything finite,
sustaining him in the very act of his freedom, and
alone making him free, a reality to which everything
that is said about God refers? Or does the freedom
of man exclude the existence of God...?E'
Thus, says Pannenberg, any choice between religion and atheism must
ultimately be a choice between distinct anthropologies, that is
between distinct understandings of the phenomena of human existence.
Pannenberg argues that the neo-orthodox theologies have failed to
take up the challenge of Enlightenment atheism and as such are
theologies in retreat. 6 These are "positivist" theologies, says
Pannenberg, in so far as they are founded ultimately upon a
fideistic appeal to divine revelation.' The relocation of a
supernatural authority basis from the revelation principle of sola 
scriptura to the "Word of God" as either kerygma (Bultmann) or the
Christ-event as witnessed to by the apostles (Barth) is entirely
inadequate, as "in both cases the authoritarian character of the
appeal to revelation remains untouched." Pannenberg continues by
arguing that modern man regards such authoritarian claims with
"...the suspicion that they clothe human thoughts and institutions
with the splendour of divine majesty" 9, thereby elevating them
beyond critical examination.
Before we proceed to examine Pannenberg's understanding of human
relationality, as he sees it witnessed to within the study of the
phenomena of human existence, it is important that the following
point be made.	 Pannenberg does not regard himself as engaged in
"natural" theology as traditionally conceived. 10	 His concern is
rather with humanity's self-understanding, which issues out of its
experience of itself and the world. 	 Pannenberg argues that it is
impossible to return to a traditional natural theology in the face
of its critics.	 Schleiermacher pointed out that all religion is
fundamentally historical and that natural theology is simply an
abstraction from the concrete experience of religion. Ritschl
denied the possibility of an understanding of God founded upon the
presently existing world, and Barth argued that natural theology
empties revelation of its significance."
Pannenberg allies himself with the tendency to conceive of God as
"the presupposition of human subjectivity", such that
not the natural world as such but human experience
of the world and of the individual's existence
within it repeatedly supplie[s] the point of
departure for discussing the reality of God. 12
He traces this understanding as far back as the fifteenth century
theologian Nicholas of Cusa. Subsequently this view was taken up by
thinkers such as Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, Fichte, Schelling and
Hege1. 13 Indeed, says Pannenberg, with the discovery of the
principle of inertia the notion of a "first maintaining cause became
superfluous"." Thus, for Pannenberg:
The material of a theology which reflects upon this
complex of experience is not a religious
subjectivity which is dependent upon an act of
faith, nor a religious interpretation of the world
laid down in advance by an authoritative revelation.
It is the history of religion as the record of men's
historical experience of themselves in the context
of the totality of their world and thus of the
reality of God and the gods. The truth of such an
experience depends upon its power to illuminate the
situation of men in their actual historical world.'
The importance of the history of religions as the basic data for
theology cannot be stressed strongly enough in Pannenberg's thought
and we shall consider this central theme in some detail in a moment.
Anthropological argument, continues Pannenberg, occupies a position
of apologetic prolegomena to theology in that it may highlight the
constitutive nature of humanity's religious dimension, in opposition
to atheistic critiques of religion, while stopping short of
providing actual proof for the reality of God. '6 In short,
anthropological analysis may be said to demonstrate the finitude and
thus the dependency of human existence, rather than the existence of
an infinite and independent God."
A general theological anthropology cannot be
expected to do more than demonstrate the religious
dimension of man's being. It can show that what
takes place in religious experience is as much a
constitutive part of man's being as walking erect,
or the ability to use fire and tools. But it cannot
be expected to supply a proof of the reality of
God, 1E'
We shall be engaging with Pannenberg's theological anthropology at
some length in a subsequent section of this chapter.
Before we proceed to discuss Pannenberg's understading of human
relationality it is important that we clearly understand the nature
of his concern with theology as having to do with the history of 
religion and, prolegomenal to this, his overall concern with the
task of theology itself.
Theology and its Task 
In his work Theology and the Philosophy of Science Pannenberg
clearly identifies what he sees as the root of theology's inability
to arrive at any final judgements by way of theological statements:
...such statements have to do with reality as a
whole, and not just with its general structural
features, but with the totality of its temporal
process. Because of this a final judgement is
impossible from someone who stands within this still
open process, and not at its end... It is only the
end of all history which can bring a final decision
about all claims about reality as a whole and
therefore in relation to the reality of God and the
destiny of man. 19
This is an important claim in that it indicates for us the areas of
essential concern in Pannenberg's theological programme.
Furthermore it highlights the fundamental relationship which exists,
for Pannenberg, between reality as historical process and the task
of theology; a relationship which, as we shall see, is at the very
heart of Pannenberg's thought.
If one were to press Pannenberg for a concise definition of
theology, at least as it has been perceived to function throughout
history by those engaged with it, his answer would in all likelihood
be that theology is the science of God. By this Pannenberg has in
mind an understanding of theology as a discipline which "derives its
unity from its object", that is, God, and furthermore that "its
object is unitary". 2 ' However, to say that God is the object of
theology is not to endorse what Pannenberg refers to as the
positivism of dialectical theology, in whch the concept of God takes
a dogmatic form. 22 For Pannenberg God is a problem rather than a
dogma of Christian theology. That is to say that the idea of God
takes the form of an hypothesis which "is measured and verified on
its own implications. 22
 This process of substantiation of the God-
hypothesis depends upon what Pannenberg understands as the theme of
theology: that is, the fundamental "assumption... that the word
'God' is to be understood as ref errring to an all-determining
reality" 24 and that, concomitantly, "substantiation of talk about
God requires that everything which eists should be shown to be a
trace of the divine reality."25
That God ought to be understood as the all-determining reality while
being "a linguistic convention, a nominal definition and also
incomplete" 26 is absolutely crucial to Pannenberg's conception of
the very possibility of theology. This notion of God as the power
which determines and unifies the whole of reality is derived, as we
shall see later, from the religious experience of humanity, in which
it encounters the divine reality as that which orders and unifies
the totality of created reality. 27
Pannenberg argues that this understanding of God, at least within
Western thought, is always a "pre-given" "nominal definition",
resulting from the combination of Greek philosophical notions of
divine unity as the foundation for the unity of the cosmos, and
Jewish monotheism. 26 It follows, argues Pannenberg, that if God is
indeed the all-determining reality, then the totality of all that is
is both determined by God and only intelligible with God. Thus to
the question
in what objects of experience is God... indirectly
co-given,	 and what objects of experience can
therefore be considered traces of God?	 The only
possible answer is all obiects.23
When Pannenberg speaks of all existing objects as being traces of 
God he has in mind not individual objects in isolation but rather
the totality of all beings in their "unbroken continuity" with each
other.	 In this light,
Theology as the science of God wouldthen mean the
study of the totality of the real from the point of
view of the reality which ultimately determines it
both asa whole and in its parts.'
Here we have both the problematic and the thematic elements inherent
in Pannenberg's understanding of the idea of God. The problematic
and hypothetical nature of the notion of God arising out of our
ever-changing perspective on reality establishes theology as
a finite search for knowledge,... constantly exposed
to the possibility that its object, as a result of
the process of being explained, may turn into a
different one...3'
While the theological thematic is, by definition, always that power
which determines all that is, Pannenberg argues that it is the
question: "what unifies and determines the totality of reality?"
which forms the interface between theology and philosophy.
Philosophy is concerned not with isolated particularities but with
"the being of beings... reality in general". 32 In dealing with
reality as a whole one cannot avoid the question concerning the
nature of reality's unifying factor;	 in other words, "What is
common to all existing things and what it is that makes all that
exists a unity as a single reality". 3 -3 This question, says
Pannenberg, is a question concerning God and it is one that cannot
be avoided by philosophy without "contradicting itself"."
In its treatment of reality in general philosophy is obliged to make
assumptions concerning the whole of reality and such assumptions,
argues Pannenberg, cannot be made in isolation from the question
about "the possibility of such a totality, of the unity which
unifies it" 35 - in other words, God. The fundamental difference
therefore between philosophy and theology is that while the former
may postpone the question of God, the latter may only engage in a
study of the totality of reality in relation to the divine reality
which determines it. '36 Once again we are returned to the twin poles
of problematic and thematic within Pannenberg's conception of the
theological enterprise. Our idea of God must "illuminate experience
of the world" if it is to carry any conviction. "To this extent
experience of the world" - the problematic - "and the search for
power that ultimately determines it" - the thematic - "is even today
essential to any attempt to gain knowledge about the reality of
God".37
As we have already noted in our preliminary remarks39 Pannenberg
sees not the natural world but human experience of it as the source
for our knowledge of God.
Access to the idea of God... is no longer possible
directly from the world, but only through man's
self-understanding and his relation to the world.39
Such an understanding of the knowledge of God prompts the question
how and in what way do the totality of reality and the divine
reality which determines it exist in human experience? Clearly
reality in its totality is not accessible to oSin view of its still
on-going development. The future, argues Pannenberg, is still open.
The temporal and historic nature of reality renders our experience
of it necessarily provisional and incomplete. This gives rise to a
serious problem. If, as Pannenberg has already claimed, experience
of particularity is only possible in the light of the idea of
totality4° yet the totality of reality is not available to us, in
that we may only experience it incompletely, then from whence do we
derive this concept of totality which makes experience possible at
all?	 Pannenberg suggests that this problem might be overcome by
means of hypothetical models of the totality of meaning:
The totality of reality does not exist anywhere
complete.	 It is only anticipated as a totality of
meaning. The totality which i3 an essential
framework for any item of experience to have
determinate meaning does not exist at any point as a
totality;	 rather, it can only be imagined by
transcending what exists at any point.
	 This
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anticipation, without which... no experience is
possible at all, always involves an element of
hypothesis, of subjective conjecture, which must be
confirmed	 -	 or	 rejected	 -	 by	 subsequent
experience.'"
This understanding of an anticipated totality of meaning is of vital
importance to Pannenberg for he maintains that it is only within
such models that the reality of God is present. 42
 It is for this
reason that Pannenbrg can assert that while "God is not present to
human experience as one object among others" he is nonetheless
present, albeit indirectly, "only on the assumption that the reality
of God is co-given to experience in other objects". As Furthermore,
in so far as models of the totality of meaning are always
subjective, anticipatory hypotheses which are historical in nature,
then the co-givenness of the divine reality, God's self-revelation,
is also historical. This is the very basis for Pannenberg's
characteristic understanding of revelation as history."
if the totality of reality itself is still
Incomplete and is at any time a totality only by
anticipation in subjective models of meaning... it
follows not only that the particular experience of
reality as a whole must be subjective, but also that
it must be historical, and it further follows that
the reality of God can make itself known only in the
same way that reality as a whole has always been
experienced, that is, historically.As
In the light of this understanding of God's presence being co-given
with models of the totality of meaning, Pannenberg maintains that
all talk of the totality of reality takes the form of religious 
language. Furthermore all expressions of the unity of human
experience may rightly be perceived as religious phenomena, and in
both these cases the presence or absence of God-language is seen as
irrelevant.As
Pannenberg goes on to qualify this last point by suggesting that
while individual religious experience may be regarded as the building
blocks of "the great historical religions", it is only within these
socially organized religions that such experiences become
"intersubjectively valid truth". 47
 In other words,
it is the historical religions rather than
individual religious experiences alone which must be
regared as the expressions of the experience of
divine reality within the totality of meaning of
experienced reality.As
We shall be returning to Pannenberg's treatment of the importance of
the history of religions in this chapter.
So, what then does Pannenberg understand the task of theology to be?
Quite simply, the task of theology is the testing of religious 
traditions. 4s Theological investigation takes the form of an
inquiry into the claim of religious traditions to worship, or at
least describe, the all-determining reality. In this respect
theology may be regarded as the science of religion, although not of
religion in general but of specific historic religions such as
Christianity. SO Thus,
The method of a theology of religion and religions
Is to test religious traditions by the standard of
their own understanding of the divine reality.., it
tackles the... important question of whether the
particular tradition has fulfilled in one historical
situation, or now fulfils, the claim implicit in its
talk of a God with power over reality. Does it, in
other words, provide an interpretative approach to
reality which gives insight into the way it is
experienced in practice?s'
The superiority of the Christian religion for Pannenberg relies on
Its ability to demonstrate, under critical scrutiny, its capacity
for providing the best unification of human experience into a total
understanding of reality currently possible, and to demonstrate also
that this "anticipatory grasp of reality as a totality" be
understood as the self-communication of God.62
Pannberg makes it perfectly clear that claims concerning divine
reality are to be tested not against any form of supernaturally
revealed dogma but in the light of their "implications" for the
interpretation of experienced reality. 53 Because experienced
reality is historical, theology itself is therefore historical.
Pannenberg thus maintains that
The presence of the all-determining reality in a
historical phenomenon can be investigated only
through an analysis of the totality of meaning
implicit in the phenomenon."
Pannenberg is not unaware of the possibility that our hypothetical
models of the totality of reality might take on the character of
"unwarranted dogmatise. ss
 Although such hypotheses are necessarily
presupposed in all experiences of reality this does not mean that
theytted remain critically unexamined, nor does it exempt them from
revision.
Pannenberg is ultimately concerned to show how theological
statements take the form of hypothetical utterances concerning the
meaning of our experience of reality. Such speech takes place in
the light of the theological thematic - that is, God as the all-
determining reality - and the theological problematic, that being
the indirect co-givenness of this divine reality within historical
human experience.	 This historical form of human experience of the
divine reality demands that theological statements submit to
hermeneutical criteria. By this Pannenberg means that the process
by which religious experience is transmitted and received in
particular historical forms must be brought under constant
examination. The reason for this has to do with the religious
material's "implications on a changed horizon of experience". 6G In
other words theology has as its concern not a collection of static
doctrines, but the study of the process whereby the religious
hypotheses of a tradition are transformed in the light of an
alteration in the historical perspective. Pannenberg suggests
thereforethat the Christian religion, for example, ought to be
studied as "a process of transmission" rather than as a "system of
doctrines and rites".7
We shall turn now to a more detailed examination of the importance
of the history of religions in Pannenberg's thinking particularly as
this relates to his understanding of the superiority of the
Christian tradition.
Theology and the History of Religion 
It is this conception of the theological enterprise which places
Pannenberg in opposition to dogmatic theologians such as Barth. By
placing emphasis upon the historical manifestation of the divine
reality within the process of human history, Pannenberg understands
revelation and the religious cults which seek to interpret it as
essentially provisional in nature. The provisionality of divine
realization in history makes it necessary for all religions to
remain open to their own transformation, to their future. Failure
to maintain an attitude of such openness results in what Pannenberg
calls the finitization of religion, where the infinite God who is
always making himself known anew is reduced to a static archetype or
tradition.se
In the opening paragraphs of his essay "Toward a Theology of the
History of Religion" Es9 Pannenberg allies himself with the concerns
of Paul Tillich, who challenged Christian theology to develop an
attitude to the history of religions which was neither
supranaturalistically exclusivist in the manner of Barth, nor
abstractly naturalistic in the manner of the Enlightenment. In this
Pannenberg recognises the influence of one of Tillich's teachers,
Ernst Troeltsch:
Tillich's shift to the questions of Ernst Troeltsch
takes on the significance of an impressive omen.
The longer theology persists in a kerygmatic
approach that permits no questioning of the truth of
the kerygma itself, the longer the urgent questions
concerning Christianity as a religion among the
religions... are put off, the greater must be the
devastation that will occur when it awakens from its
kerygmatic dreaming. The recent discussions about a
Christian atheism provide a foretaste of this.6°
Pannenberg clearly takes up this challenge, expressing real concern
that unless Christian theology engages seriously with the critical
study of religions, then it will be in no position to distinguish
Itself from said religions. Such a lack of distinction would render
Christianity susceptible to the general critiques of religion as
voiced by such as Feuerbach and Freud.6'
Despite all this however Pannenberg finds that he must take issue
with Troeltsch in that the latter's theology does not allow for any
claims to ultimacy by the Christian religion. This he attributes to
a failure on Troeltsch's part "to take seriously the presence of the
eschaton in Jesus and in primitive Christianity. It is here that
we come to the crux of the particularity of the Christian religion
for Pannenberg.
The ultimacy of the Christian revelation can be
illuminating, not as a supranaturalistic
presupposition, but only if it can result from an
unprejudiced understanding of the total process of
the universal history of religion.63
We shall return to this issue and its Christological significance
for Pannenberg later,
Pannenberg is concerned to identify, through the study of religions,
the fundamental mutualities which exist between religions and which
might indicate a deeper underlying relationship between them. As a
means of discovering such kinships Pannenberg regards the approach
of the phenomenology of religion to be fundamentally flawed. His
primary reason for this evaluation is that it "abstracts from the
historical particularity of its material" 64 ;	 in other words, it
fails to take into account the provisional and thus "historically
alterable" nature of religion. The phenomenological method proceeds
as if "'the' religious life has remained essentially the same
throughout time".- Such a view is clearly at odds both with
Pannenberg's anthropology and also with his understanding of the
reality of God.
As regards the former, Pannenberg makes it clear that, the general
anthropological sciences notwithstanding, man is a fundamentally
historical being and as such is essentially in transformation.
Thus, "it is only through historical portrayal that one comes as
close as possible to the actual course of the concrete life of
man".
€'6 With regard to the latter, the coming to appearance of the
divine reality for man is always, argues Pannenberg, an experience
of all-encompassing power, which takes place "within the horizon of
current experience of existence". 67 Pannenberg talks about the
experience of divine reality - that is, acts of God - as
"happenings"	 (Widerfahrnis) which occur within the concrete
experience of historical humanity. Thus "happenings of divine
reality are historical events". 6.9 It is precisely for this reason
that questions concerning the veracity of religious claims about the
reality of God or gods have to do with the history of religions.
Thus we find that both human beings and the experience of divine
power are historical in nature. Consequently only a history of
religions can provide us with an adequate understanding of
humanity's religious experiences. G9 In pursuit of this endeavour,
however, we are warned by Pannenberg against adopting the notion of
a universal religion, in the manner of Hegel, of which the
particular historical religions are merely types. 7° It is important
for Pannenberg that specific religions are regarded as both
essentially open to their own transformation - which might take the
form of a syncretistic union with other religions7 ' - and as related
to other religions by more than mere historical succession.
Above all, it is no longer possible to coordinate,
with Hegel, any particular religion with a single
stage of the total process of the religious
development of mankind, once one has become aware of
the profound changes one and the same religion
undergoes in the course of its history. ... As a
rule, the growth of religions has taken place in the
form of adjacent processes, sometimes in mutual
interaction, less frequently as a succession in
which one religion accomplishes the dissolution of
another....72
So where does the historian of religion look to find the fundamental
unity of the religions? Pannenberg clearly recognizes that "The
religions of mankind have as little unity at the outset as mankind
itself". 7	Yet it is this phrase "at the outset" which gives us the
clue to Pannenberg's attempted resolution of this problem.
Characteristically,	 the unity of	 the multifarious religious
traditions is not to be found in common archetypes or shared
origins, but rather in a future destiny. This destiny is achieved
via the competitive conflict which arises when particular religions,
with their own specific understandings of the unity of human
experience and the meaning of human existence, collide with each
other.
Pannenberg here begins to introduce the distinctiveness of the
Christian religion as he writes: "One can begin to speak of a global
process of integration for the first time in relation to the history
of Christian missions and the Islamic conquests." 74 The relevance,
even the "saving power" and thus the "truth" of a religion is, .
argues Pannenberg, a function of its ability to "provide a basis for
a universal unity in the experience of reality". 7e When religions
contend with each other a process of integration takes place, the
result of which is a syncretistic religion which provides a more
total view of reality, by virtue of the potency of its God or gods,
than did the original competing religious perspectives. 76 Indeed
Pannenberg regards Christianity as affording "the greatest example
of syncretistic assimilative power" in its absorption not only of
Greek philosophical thought but also of the mediterranean religious
traditions.77
Thus by means of its thrust towards a universal
mission, Christianity has become the ferment for the
rise of a common religious situation of the whole of
mankind. And only in relation to this is it
possible to speak of a general religious history of
mankind. The unity of the history of religions is
therefore not to be found in their beginnings but
rather in their end. 7E
Thus for Pannenberg, as we have	 noted earlier, one of the
fundamental task of theology in its study of the history of
religions involves the examination of the basis and shape of the
unity of religions, as the historical disclosure of that unity of
the divine reality towards which human beings are orientated. 7e To
refer to our previous quotation, the task of theology is to explore
the "ferment" out of which a unified religion will arise.
The key to Pannenberg's understanding of the progressive unification
of the world's religions lies ultimately in his understanding of
God,	 an understanding that he regards as common to all the major
religious orientations. It is because mankind has always construed
its gods as "powers determining the totality of reality" e° that
conflict over the nature of reality takes place when religions
collide. Indeed it is at this level of "reality-reference"
(Wirklichkeitsbezug), as Pannenberg calls it, that the religious
perspective per se enters into conflict with the atheism of
Feuedach. Feuerbach's understanding of religious experience as
merely the expression of human psychological states is a critique
which operates at the level of the debate concerning "the
fundamental structures of human behaviour". As we shall see
later, Pannenberg is concerned to engage with this anthropological
debate in an attempt to indicate, contra Feuerbach, the structural
orientation of human beings towards God.
However, while "the anthropological argument is decisive for the
atheistic criticism of religion" e2, the situation is not so
straight-forward for those seeking to affirm a religious
perspective. The abstractness of structural language concerning
human existence, particularly as in relation to divine reality, must
be overcome by reference to the actual concrete experience of divine
power within the history of human existence. ee That is what
Pannenberg means when he speaks of an act of God, or a "happening"
of divine power;
The gods of religion confront men as realities
distinct from themselves because they are
experienced as powers over the whole of men's
existence including the world."-
It is this experience of the totalising effect of divine power over
human existence which is the subject matter for theology. Through
religious language we seek to articulate both the nature of this
unifying power and also our orientation towards it. ee Insofar as
these experiences of divine power are historical in nature, their
analysis necessitates a perspective on the history of religions as
the history of those powerful events which unify the totality of
human experience and which point towards a common destiny.ee
...granted that what is at stake for man in his
being referred to that mystery is essentially the
wholeness of his own being and therefore of the
universal truth that unites all men, as well as the
unity of the world and the correspondence of his
existence with this, it follows that this mystery
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will confront his particularity in events which
illluminate a wider range of his experience of
existence and in fact will encounter him as a power
over at least one aspect of his existence and of his
world as a whole.e7
Once again we see that it is within history that God reveals himself
in a definitive way. This coming to appearance of the divine takes
the form of an historical succession, where each revelation of the
divine reality is always provisional. It is this very
provisionality which is at the heart of the divine infinite, argues
Pannenberg. Indeed he goes as far as to suggest that in most
instances the successive stages of the divine coming to appearance
conflict and contradict each other.°e
Nevertheless, despite this provisionality Pannenberg wishes to
maintain that history, rather than being characterized by the
elusiveness of some future divine destiny, is to be seen as the
actual coming to appearance of this destiny. So, although mankind
attempts to close off religion from the future, by living in
unhistorical relation to primordial myths and archetypes and
traditions, the historical nature of religious experience constantly
brings about religious transformation:
...archaic people close themselves off from the
historic future. But in actuality, and against
their own will, all religions stand within a process
of history that does not allow the allegedly
archetypal contents of their myths to continue to
exist as perfect exemplars, but alters them and in
this way unmasks their provisionality... In the
repetition of ever renewed critical revision of
every one of its stages, the history of religions is
the unending path along which the infinite
destination of man for the infinite Godmoves toward
its appropriate realization and, indeed, even comes
to be manifested...°9
Pannenberg makes clear in the strongest terms that it is the very
reality of the divine being, or beings, which is thrown into
question by the history of religions. In the history of religions
we have to do with the rise and fall of divinities, as once supreme
and totalizing gods give way to a new understanding of the divine
that is better able to make sense of the totality of human
existence.9°
It is here that we find expressed the uniqueness of the Judaeo-
Christian tradition for Pannenberg. With the religion of Israel we
encounter a distinct orientation to the future, encapsulated in the
hoped-for redemption by Yahweh from national exile. However,
despite this apocalyptic perspective, there still persisted a
residual tendency to look back, toward archetypical divine events
such as the Exodus and the giving of the law at Sinai. It was only
with Jesus' message of the eschatological kingdom, which had already
come in power, that a complete turning toward the future was
initiated. While non-Christian religions, due to their closedness
to the future and thus to their own transformation, were only aware
of the appearance of God in a limited and fragmentary manner,
Christianity	 perceives	 the	 revelation	 of	 God	 in	 its
"inexhaustibility". 91 This definitive appearance of God's future
reign within human history is identified by Pannenberg with the
person of Jesus of Nazareth, and it is thus to Pannenberg's
Christology that we now turn.
Jesus as the Anticipation of the Power of the Future 
If we are to understand what it is that Pannenberg regards as
essentially determinative for human existence, and thus for human
sociality, we must consider two related themes which characterize
his theological programme. The first we have already dealt with -
that is, the essentially historical nature of human existence and
its orientation towards the divine power of the future, whose coming
to appearance in history is articulated within mankind's religious
traditions. The aforementioned traditions must, as we have seen, be
continually open to their own transformation in the light of more
integrative disclosures of the divine mystery. It is mankind's
orientation towards this common, unified destiny which, as we shall
later see, forms the basis for Pannenberg's understanding of human
sociality.
The second theme, prolegomenal to Panenberg's whole enterprise, is
his understanding of Jesus of Nazareth as the historical person in
whom God has come to appearance. Pannenberg makes it quite clear
that Christianity has as its foundation not the abstracted teaching
of Jesus, but Jesus the historical man.
The Christian faith is founded on the historical
person - that is to say, not on his teaching or
anything else which can be detached from him as a
person, but on this particular man.2
Pannenberg's Christology, while differing from that of Barth in its
primarily historical - as opposed to dogmatic - shape, does share an
important similarity with the Barthian Christology. This similarity
is summed up in one of the final sections of Jesus, God and Man,
entitled "The summation of Humanity in Jesus Christ". 93 Pannenberg
himself acknowledges his indebtedness to Barth at this point, when
he writes
Barth has... made theology conscious anew of the
mediation of all other elections both of the
community and of the individual,	 through the
election of Jesus Christ. Further, building on the
solid heritage of Reformed covenant theology, Barth
has grasped the relation between Jesus and the whole
of God's history with humanity more profoundly than
most contemporary theologians. For him the unity of
God with man in Jesus Christ is the fulfilment of
the community with man which God had always planned
in his covenant.94
Where Pannenberg takes issue with Barth is over the latter's
prototypical understanding of the person of Jesus Christ, and his
relationship with humanity. While for Barth the divine act of the
election of humanity in Christ takes the form of "a hidden decree of
the eternal God without involving his historical revelation in Jesus
Christ", for Pannenberg God's election of humanity in Jesus is
coordinate with Jesus' historical mission.
....only in the function of his historical mission
of service to humanity toward the coming Kingdom of
the Father is he as a person God's elect, on whom is
decided the election or rejection of all other men.
He is not God's elect in his own right, but in his
service to the people of God who are elected by the
Father through him.6
It is at the resurrection of the man Jesus that his divinity, in
other words his identification with the futurity of God's reign, is
confirmed. Furthermore, this confirmation of Jesus' divinity has,
says Pannenberg, "retroactive power" over the whole ofJesus' pre-
Easter activity. 97 Having made this point, Pannenberg is concerned
not to give the impression that he believes Jesus' divinity to be a
"consequence of his resurrection... Jesus did not simply become
something that he previously had not been". 99 By raising Jesus from
the dead God both confirms his divine authority and makes his
"divine Sonship" manifest.
Clearly Pannenberg's ontology of eschatological determinacy must be
kept in mind here.	 It is that mode of existence for which a person
or thing is destined that is essential to its being.	 Thus Jesus'
destiny to be raised from the dead by God, constituting the one
unique and wholy sufficient revelation of God, is ontologically
determinative for his entire existence.99
Resurrection from the dead, argues Pannenberg, is not only integral
to the Judaeo-Christian apocalyptic expectation, but also to the
very structure of human existence. It is humanity's hope for the
future which permits it to cope so well with the inevitability of
death. Pannenberg draws on the thought of Ernst Bloch here when he
writes:
Ernst Bloch has expressed the suspicion 'that
death... can only be suppressed so well because new
life was once hidden behind it, that is, it was
dreamed about and believed to be there. '°°
The fulfilment of human existence, maintains Pannenberg, would
appear to be a "foolish" notion in the face of death. Only hope
oriented to a future resurrection from death provides humanity with
the strength to live in spite of the grave. 	 Pannenberg identifies
this hope with humanity's openness to the world (Weltoffenheit), as
perceived by contemporary anthropology. 	 We will consider this at
greater length in due course. Furthermore this openness to the
surrounding environment is indicative of a more fundamental openness
to that which transcends the finite: in other words, an orientation
towards the God whose future reign will bring about the fulfilment
of human destiny.
The phenomenology of hope indicates that it belongs
to the essence of conscious human existence to hope
beyond death. This supposition is confirmed by
consideration of that specific element in human
existence summarily expressed in the language of
modern anthropology by the concept of man's openness
In relation to the world (Weltoffenheit) or his
environmental freedom (Umweltfreiheit). More
precisely, this concept involves an openness that
goes beyond every finite situation.'°'
In the light of this anthropological datum Pannenberg maintains that
although the Judaeo-Christian apocalyptic may no longer be valid for
modern man per se, "Its fundamental elements, the expectation of a
resurrection of the dead in connection with the end of the world and
the Final Judgment can still remain true even for us. 11102
Thus, with the resurrection of the man Jesus we have to do, says
Pannenberg, with the proleptic experience of the end of the world.
It is in the resurrection of Jesus that the future destiny of man to
be raised from death to communion with God is made actual for us in
history.	 Indeed it is this unique historical event which
constitutes the very act of God's self-revelation. For Pannenberg,
The Christ event is God's revelation.., only to the
extent that it brings the beginning of the end of
all things. Therefore, Jesus' resurrection from the
dead... is the actual event of revelation. 103
Indeed, following Barth's identification of the Revealer and what is
revealed Pannenberg seeks to establish an identity of essence
between Jesus and God, founded upon the historical event of the
resurrection. It is here that we may find the basis of Pannenberg's
unique understanding of the doctrine of the Trinity. Rather than
being, as is characteristically the case, a piece of dogmatic
speculation,	 the doctrine of the Trinity is for Pannenberg
historical in nature. It issues out of the identification of Jesus
with the divine essence at his resurrection and coupled withhis
perceived distinction from the Father during his ministry.'"
It should now be quite clear that the historical nature of the
theological enterprise is absolutely central to Pannenberg's
thought. Human being is for Pannenberg historical being and the God
who makes sense of this historical existence reveals himself in that
history and is the lord of that history. Consequently we shall find
that in accordance with his primary anthropological concern with
human self-understanding Pannenberg's analysis of relationality
takes the form of an examination of the human experience and
understanding of the historical reality of a shared world or
"culture" 106 and ultimately of a common destiny to community with
all humanity under God and empowered by Jesus and his message of
salvation. 106 We shall turn now to an examination of these issues
as they relate to Pannenberg's treatment of the phenomena of human
relationality.
Anthropology and human communality 
We shall be drawing most of the material for our discussion of human
relationality in Pannenberg from his recent work on theological
anthropology, Anthropology in Theological Perspective. This is for
the very obvious reason that it represents his most comprehensive
and mature treatment of the issues and questions. We shall of
course be referring to the Pannenberg corpus in general wherever it
is appropriate for clarification or for highlighting the remarkable
single-mindedness and consistency exhibited in Pannenberg's work
over the last two decades.
Although it is always a somewhat arbitrary exercise to attempt to
identify a "centre." or "lynch-pin" to a person's theology, we shall
do so here by way of providing a starting point for our analysis.
In resorting to this approach we do not intend to reduce
Pannenberg's thought to the level of one over-arching notion, but
rather to use this notion as a way into a very complex theological
programme which, in our view, defies any attempt at entering at
random Ne4hich Foltwthe reader to engage with it only at certain key
points. The concept that we have chosen as at least one entrance
into Pannenberg's anthropological thought, is that of exocentricity 
or openness, and its obverse egocentricity or centredness. The
reason for this choice ought to be clear to anyone who is familiar
with Pannenberg's work in that the notion of exocentricity touches
his theology at every point. It is with this concept that
anthropology, metaphysics, Christology and dogmatic theology find
their point of engagement for Pannenberg.
In modern anthropology Pannenberg identifies, particularly in the
writings of Max Scheler and Helmuth Plessner, the concept of
"openness to the world", by which is intended humanity's spiritual 
being which is "no longer subject to its drives and its environment"
but is "free from the environment". 107 This notion of openness,
argues Pannenberg, witnesses to the religious and specifically
Christian thematic in which "the essence of human being is seen as a
destiny that will be achieved only in the future". 109 It is this
destiny which constitutes God's image in human beings, as we shall
see later, and which represents the point at which fundamental-
theological anthropology and dogmatic anthropology meet. Dogmatic
anthropology, says Pannenberg, has as its central themes the image
of God in human beings, and the notion of human sin. lc"=. These two
dogmatic themes, argues Pannenberg, are also central for any
theological	 interpretation	 of	 non-theological	 anthropological
analysis. However neither of these two themes must be seen as
irrevocably wedded to what Pannenberg regards as the now outdated
world-view which gave rise to the classical doctrines of the
original state and the fall:
If we avoid this prejudice, we will see that the
doctrines of the image of God and sin thematize the
two basic aspects found in the most varied
connections between anthropological phenomena and
the reality of God. To speak of the image of God in
human being is to speak of their closeness to the
divine reality, a closeness that also determines
their position in the world of nature. To speak of
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sin, on the other hand, is to speak of the factual
separation from God of human beings whose true
destiny nonetheless is union with God; sin is
therefore to be thematized as a contradiction of
human beings with themselves, an interior conflict
in the human person. 110
The Christological thematic is introduced when Christianity asserts
that it is only through Christ that human beings are freed from the
bondage of sin, or closedness, and reconciled to God, which is their
ultimate destiny.	 It is thus reconciliation in Christ which frees
human beings for true humanity as the image of God. We shall
consider Pannenberg's Christological understanding in more detail in
a subsequent section of this chapter.
The notion of exocentricity or openness has its distinctive
metaphysical manifestation in Pannenberg's understanding of the so-
called ontological priority of the future. We shall not attempt a
full explication of Pannenberg's metaphysics at this point, but as
It is such an important element within his theology it is necessary
that we outline it, albeit briefly, before we proceed any further.
In an article which analyses Pannenberg's philosophical foundations,
R.D.Pasquariello identifies "four notions which function as
postulates" for Pannenberg's understanding of truth:
L Truth is historical in nature.
2. As truth is a whole, ultimate truth is accessible only from the
perspective of the end of history.
3. Truth and reality "as-a-whole" are identical.
4. The truth of a being is determined by its future destiny. 111
The Hegelian ancestry of Pannenberg's thinking is obvious here112.
Truth, argues Pannenberg, is coextensive with the process of
history. The corollary of this, as has already been noted at the
beginning of this chapter, is that any comprehension of the truth at
a point within the historical process is always merely provisional
with respect to the ultimate truth which is resolved only at the
eschaton" 3. It also follows that the truth of any contingent
individual, that is to say its essence, is a function of its future.
In other words it is determined by its ultimate destiny which is
established not at some primordial beginning, but rather at the end
of history itself.	 It is this understanding of truth and reality
which constitutes the basis for Pannenberg's contention that the
future is ontologically prior to all preceding historical reality.
Thus for him human openness to the future is ultimately human
openness to God, with whom it is our destiny to be in communion. How
Pannenberg effects this transition from his understanding of the
totality of the future and to God is a moot point and one that we
shall subsequently return to.
In the light of the above comments it should be clear why we
consider the notion of openness as central to Pannenberg's work, and
why it is that we choose to begin our analysis of his understanding
of human relationality from this point.
Unlike Barth's thought, there are no convenient dogmatic assertions
concerning human relationality in Pannenberg's writings. As we saw
in the previous chapter, Barth takes the I-Thou distinction and
builds a thoroughly dogmatic and Christological understanding of
human relationality as encounter. Indeed, we have made the
accusation that for this very reason Barth's view of human
sociability is less than fully authentic to human experience.
Pannenberg	 criticises the personalist anthropology, particularly
that of Buber, on the grounds that it
depends upon separating personal I-Thou
relationships from the practical concerns of the
human experience of the world, in a way which is
nowadays no longer possible."4
As we have already noted, Pannenberg rejects traditional natural
theologies which he regards as being bound up with an outmoded
preoccupation with the natural order and its presupposed first
cause. " 6 His criticism of I-Thou personalism represents the other
side of this same coin. Just as a preoccupation with the impersonal
natural order is unhelpful, and indeed no longer viable as the
starting point for apprehending the divine reality, so too says
Pannenberg, is exclusive or excessive personalism. What is required
is an approach which "argues from the existence and experience of
human beings in order to show that God is inevitably presupposed in
every act of human existence. 11S	 In other words Pannenberg is
suggesting a synthesis of the personalist and naturalist
perspectives to form something akin to Hegel's understanding of
reality as always being for mind. 117 Modern philosophy, he argues
...showed increasing determination in conceiving God
as a presupposition of human subjectivity and to
that extent it thought of him in terms of humanity
and no longer of the world. Not the actual world as
such but human experience of the world and of the 
individual's existence in it repeatedly supplied the
point of departure for discussing the reality of
God. 118
As we have said, rather than following the Barthian dogmatic which
sets out to derive the nature of human relationality from an
absolute revelation s Pannenberg seeks to appropriate the theories
of the anthropological sciences in an attempt to reinterpret them,
according to what he refers to as the religious thematic. Thus, at
least in the first instance, much of what Pannenberg has to say
concerning the phenomenon of human relationality takes the form of
description rather than prescription. For Pannenberg the human
experience of relationality is part of the much larger context of
human beings' total experience of the world. The corollary of this
observation is that in attempting to identify the anthropological
factors which Pannenberg considers relevant to the theme of human
communality, we are engaging in a somewhat artificial and piecemeal
analysis of his work. This having been said, it is nonetheless an
important and necessary piece of analysis in that it highlights an
entirely different way of addressing and normalizing the notion of
human relationality than that found in theologies such as Barth's
and Brunner's, which are dependent upon the pattern of the I-Thou
encounter.
Pannenberg begins his anthropological discussion by maintaining the
uniqueness of humanity's place in the natural world. Contrary to
the views of behavioural science, Pannenberg argues that human
beings are by no means
limited in their behaviour to an environment and
therefore to a sector out of the total reality of
the world, a sector that is determined by the vital
Interests of the species and corresponds to an
innate behavioural schema. 119
If such an innate behavioural schema does indeed exist within human
beings, then it exists, says Pannenberg, "only in a singularly
rudimentary and attenuated form". 120 It is this understanding of
humanity's special place in the world which marks philosophical
anthropology out from behaviourism, with which it otherwise has much
in common. 121
Pannenberg draws on the work of Arnold Gehlen, who regarded the
characteristic form of human instinctual behaviour as being one of
"natural instability".	 Thus contrary to the behaviourist views of
•
men such as Konrad Lorenz and the biologist Jacob von VexkUll that
human beings, like animals, have an instinctively limited focal
awareness of their surrounding environment, Gehlen argued that human
instinctual life is characterized by "plasticity", and a "readiness
to deteriorate". 122 Gehlen further argued that unlike animals who
may undergo instinctual deterioration at a secondary level via the
process of domestication, the readiness to determination in human
Instinctual life is "primary and not secondary in the case of man".
The reason why this particular piece of anthropological analysis is
so important for Pannenberg becomes clear when we find that to
describe humanity's special place in the natural order, Gehlen and
others have utilized the notion of "openness to the world", 12
Humanity's openness to the world stands in marked contrast to the
animal world's limitation to and dependence upon particular
environments which are in fact discrete sectors of the totality of
the world. Pannenberg singles out Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner and
Arnold Gehlen as the originators of the discipline of philosophical
anthropology 124
 with its understanding of human being as "open to
the world", or as Plessner referred to it, as exocentric.
Scheler, drawing on the vitalist philosophy of Henri Bergson, and
particularly his book Matter and Memory 126 developed a view of
human beings as spiritual beings whose spirituality - while
manifesting itself in a bodily correlate - is not dependent on or
derivative of biological factors. Scheler identified this bodily
correlate to humanity's spirituality as the human person's openness
to the world. Human beings, rather than being limited by their
instinctual drives to an environment determined by their perception
of those features significant for personal survival and the survival
of the species, are free to inhibit such instincts. It is this act
of "voluntary inhibition", argues Scheler, which points to an origin
that transcends human biology - in other words, the human spirit.
Indeed Scheler goes on to argue that in this act of spiritual
transcending of biological factors, human being reveals its unique
character as one which transcends life itself, even its own life.
This voluntary inhibition of instincts - which at
every point is presupposed in all freedom from
inhibition and indeed makes the latter possible to
begin with - points precisely, according to Scheler,
to that 'which gives man his unique
characteristics', that is, to a 'principle opposed
to life as such, even to life in man'.'26
This human spirit which opposes life itself must have a source
outside of the process of evolution, maintains Scheler. Such a
course, he continues, "can only be located in the highest Ground of
Being". 27 In other words, for Scheler humanity's special place in
the world is derived ultimately from God.
Helmuth Plessner, although thinking along parallel lines to Scheler,
sought	 to	 establish	 a non-metaphysical	 origin for human
exocentricity. In so doing he adopted the notion of exocentric 
position, by which he sought to describe the uniquely human
experience of being centred both within the immediate self -
subsequently defined in terms of a central nervous system, in the
manner of the rest of the animal world, but also outside of the
immediate self. It is the exocentric character of human existence
which is witnessed to in our ability to distance ourselves both from
the world in which we live and objectify it, and furthermore to
stand back from ourselves in acts of self-reflection.
Pannenberg suggests that Plessner's notion of exocentricity is
ultimately synonymous with self-consciousness and thus does not
entirely disengage from Scheler's notion of spirit, although how
Pannenberg identifies self-consciousness with spirit is not
clear. 12 Plessner's primary perspective is however non-
metaphysical in that it seeks to establish human exocentricity not
upon any transcendent grounds ultimately opposed to life, but rather
from within a structurally modified life exhibited in humanity.
According to Pannenberg, the weakness of Plessner's understanding
lies in his lack of clarity as regards the exact nature of the
"outside" in which human beings have their exocentric existence. It
is for this reason that Arnold Gehlen chooses to adapt Scheler's
notion of openness to the world, rather than Plessner's terminology.
Gehlen sought to develop an understanding of human openness and
humanity's special place in the world without adapting either the
metaphysics of Scheler or Plessner's view, which had humanity as
merely different from other animals by degree. Gehlen maintained
that humanity's unique capacity for instinctual inhibition, which
Scheler traced back to spirit and thence to God, might be explained
as
a central structural feature of the human form of
life... We are no longer dealing, then, with a
special effect produced by some force, but rather
with the specific structure of the human mode of
existence itself. 12
Gehlen continues to develop this idea by taking Scheler's notion of
humanity's inhibition of evolution and refining it into his own
conception of human beings as "deficient beings". By this term
Gehlen had in mind the work of the anatomist Ludwig Bolk and the
zoologist Adolf Portmann. Bolk's work showed the apparently
underdeveloped state of human organs, which he described as "foetal
states or conditions that have become permanent." 3° This, argues
Gehlen, is an observable physical manifestation of humanity's
capacity for biological and evolutionary inhibition. He goes on to
appeal to Portmann's description of human beings as "physiologically
premature".	 Human beings, according to Portmann, unlike the other
higher animals, appear to be born a year too soon and therefore in
an unfinished state. As a result of this enforced prematurity,
human beings spend their final year of properly interuterine
development exposed to the influences of a social environment.
It is precisely this condition of human deficiency and helplessness
with its corresponding need for social support which gives rise to
what Gehlen refers to as a "hiatus" between perceptions and
impulses. By this Gehlen means that while in animals perception and
impulse form a closed system, where the senses only admit those
impressions which will trigger the animal's innate instincts, in
human beings this is not the case. Human perceptions, argues
Gehlen, are not inflexibly wedded to instinctual reactions and thus
the closed behavioural mechanism found in animals is not the
dominant factor in human life. Our instincts, by virtue of their
aforementioned deficiency, are far too indistinct and underdeveloped
to be triggered invariably by distinct perceptual stimuli. For this
reason human perceptions are given free rein, or, as Pannenberg puts
it, "a life of their own", 13 '	 and we are permitted impressions of
the world which are not limited by our instinctual impulses.
Gehlen maintains that humanity both makes up for its instinctual
deficiency and copes with the attendant "inundation" of stimuli and
perceptions by way of the characteristically human activity of
language and culture-building.
Through their action they ease the burden of the
complex multiplicity of stimuli that pour in on them
by creating in language a symbolic universe that
enables them to render manageable the profusion of
impressions. In Gehlen's view, language is the
fundamental instance of human creative cultural
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activity.	 The concept of action includes, for
Gehlen, all cognitive processes and cultural
achievements... for Gehlen human beings are beings
who create themselves by gaining control of their
world. 1i2
While Pannenberg is in agreement with Gehlen's understanding of
human being as cultural being he is critical of his tendency to
regard human openness to the world as unqualified, a weakness found
in many of the other thinkers concerned with exocentricity 133, and
as representing a given state rather than a process of human self-
realization.
Pannenberg	 finds	 support	 for	 his	 understanding of human
exocentricity as a process in the writings of Herder. 	 Indeed he
points out that Gehlen regarded Herder as the forerunner of his own
work. ' 34	 Yet there are, observes Pannenberg, major differences
between the view of Herder and those of Gehlen. 	 Unlike Gehlen,
Herder does not regard human action as the source of human self-
realization. While humanity must indeed construct a world for
itself in the light of its instinctual alienation from the animal
world, nevertheless this process of self-development is by no means
the unique result of human activity. In Herder's view humanity has a
disposition towards self-improvement, this disposition taking the
form of reason and freedom.	 Further, this innate "direction for
human 1ife" 136
 is regarded by Herder - as in Scheler - as having its
source in God:	 indeed it is identified by Herder with the image of
God which replaces basic animal instinct in human beings.
We shall be considering the importance of the imago del for
Pannenberg in the following section of this chapter. However it is
important that we touch on this matter briefly here, as it is
relevant to Pannenberg's understanding of human self-realization as
being a teleological process, dependent upon external factors.
Herder maintains that the image of God in humanity corresponds to
instincts in animals, in that both provide direction to the
respective lives of those beings. Furthermore the imago is a
teleological concept in that it represents a standard or goal to be
achieved.	 It is for this reason that Herder can write "we are not
yet men, but are daily becoming so." 13 Thus the imago dei and the
essence of human being are intrinsically related for Herder. But if
the present human experience of the image of God is as a disposition
towards teleological self-realization, the question arises how is it
that we achieve our ultimate entelechy? As we have noted, Herder
does not regard human self-development as being the result of human
activity. Pannenberg observes of Herder that "... he says
explicitly that human beings are unable to 'Hew art' or 'fashion'
themselves."'"	 It is to education that Herder looks for human
self-development, and by education he has in mind the twin elements
of tradition and learning coupled with reason and experience. The
former of these two elements involves human beingst
 interactionwith
each other, and is particularly germane to our present concern with
human relationality. Pannenberg quotes Herder on this point
no one of us became man of himself: the whole
structure of his humanity is connected by a
spiritual	 birth,	 education,	 with his parents,
teachers, friends;	 with all the circumstances of
his life, and consequently with his countrymen and
their forefathers;	 and lastly with the whole chain
of the human race.13e
Of course there is an element of individual participation in this
process of self-becoming. I must cooperate with tradition and
learning via the exercise of my reason and experience - in other
words by the use of my "organic powers" which, in turn, are
stimulated by the external influences of tradition. In this respect
we are not simply passive receptors but actively engage with
learning and tradition. Ultimately it is divine providence working
through these two factors which provides Herder with the guarantee
that humanity will achieve its destiny:
Learning and tradition, on the one hand, and reason
and experience, on the other, contribute to the
achievement of this destiny only because in the
collaboration of these faictors divine providence is
also at work and, through the mediation of other
human beings, forming individuals for the good to
which they are destined, educating them, that is, to
be the image of God.'39
Herder is significant for Pannenberg in two ways; firstly in his
understanding of openness to the world as descriptive of a process
which has "the human subject for its result" and secondly for his
insistance that this process of human becoming cannot be understood
as the product of the human subject. Where Pannenberg parts company
with Herder is at the point at which Herder introduces the idea of
divine providence.
If there is to be any justification for Herder's
procedure, it must be shown that the religious and
theological concepts are not extrinsic to the
phenomena but correspond to a dimension exhibited by
the latter. 140
It is for this reason that Pannenberg turns to Scheler and Plessner
who, as we have seen, argue that the religious thematic, manifested
in exocentricity, is essential to the very structure of human life.
For our present purposes two important points have emerged as
regards the significance of human relationality in Pannenberg's
thought. Firstly, Pannenberg identifies true humanness, what he
calls human essence, with human destiny. This destiny, while being
characteristically "not yet", is still - as we found in Herder -
determinative for present human existence. Thus for Pannenberg
The present life of human individuals even in the
case of radical alienation is still human. The
essence or essential nature of being human thus
becomes a matter of the destiny of men to be
human... 141
Human destiny, argues Pannenberg, is to become the image of God. In
this respect Jesus Christ represents the realization of human
destiny when he is spoken of in the New Testament as the image of
God. We shall consider the significance of Pannenberg's Christology
for our concern with human relationality in a subsequent section of
this work. Suffice it to say here that Pannenberg's anthropology
takes as its norm the notion of humanity as being in God's image. 14-2
In this regard we find ourselves very much in agreement with
Pannenberg in that we have suggested that the essentiality of
coadunacy for human being be understood as having its basis in the
imago as the point at which the divine communality, that is God in
Trinity, is normalised for humanity. 142 However, as we shall see
later, there is an important question to be asked concerning the
extent to which human essence, as future destiny, is determinative
for present human existence. Is it, in the manner of Herder,
determinative merely in a dispositional sense, as a tendency or
direction towards an ultimate good, or is it determinative in the
same sense in which Christ as true man is determinative for humanity
in Barth's thinking?
The second of the points, relevant to our concern, which arise out
of Pannenberg's consideration of Herder and the others who have
followed him is more immediately germane to the theme of human
relationality.
In Herder we noted that human development towards a fully realized
identity as in the image of God is not a matter of autonomous self-
enhancement but rather involves participation in an exocentric
process. Pannenberg concurs with this view refining Herder's
exocentric categories of learning and tradition into the notions of
human solidarity and human culture;
The way of human beings to the (divine) reality in
which they can ultimately ground their exocentric
existence and thereby attain to their own identity
is thus always mediated through the experience of
the external world. This is especially true of the
relationship with the other human beings, that is,
with beings whose lives are characterized by the
same questions and experience. 144
Thus as human beings we are not engaged in what Pannenberg calls an
exercise in "Promethean... self-enhancement" but rather in an
involvement in the finite world of the other upon which our destiny
depends. In this understanding of the finite as performing a
mediating function with respect to human being and the infinite.
Panennberg admits his indebtedness to Hegel as well as to Herder. 14
So we find that just as with our own notion of coadunacy, Pannenberg
identifies openness to the other, both socially and
environmentally 146 as having to do with the very essence of human
being. Indeed he defines human sin in terms of centrredness, the
obverse of openness or exocentricity, by which he understands a
radical individualism which serves to alienate the self from the
other:
The image of the individual who takes himself or
herself to be the centre of his or her life aptly
describes the structure of sin... In the Christian
tradition this radical individualism is considered
as alienation from the authentic destiny of man.
When the highest value is no longer universal
reason, but individual decision, radical autonomy
has been often considered the peak of existential
freedom. In a Christian perspective, it can be the
darkest alienation from authentic existence, from
one's own destiny and Identity.
However inspite of the value of this understanding of human
relationality in terms of openness and human sin as centeredness the
question of the sufficency of these conceptions must be raised.
While openness to the other,	 exocentricity,	 is clearly a
prerequisite for human relationality	 it cannot be completely
identified with the actual experience of human relating. Openness,
availability to the other may well
	 constitute the necessary
condition of coadunacy but must not be confused with coadunacy per 
se as Pannenberg appears to do. Similarly the notion of centeredness
or egocentricity as a translation of the concept of sin is also
susceptible to the charge of being an insufficent one Centeredness
is for Fannenberg essentially privative characterized by ignorance
as regards the proper destiny of man. Following Augustine Pannenberg
understands sin as a pervertion of human desire which is in essence
good; sub ratione boni l4e. This perspective throws into question the
nature of sin as wilful rebelion and conscious rejection of both God
and the other:
Therefore, no one can leave God behind in the sense
that one can deny other, finite possibilities of
choice. As Augustine knew, a man does not come into
the animosity of sin toward God directly through a
naked decision against God. ... Rather, a man falls
into sin and thereby into contradiction against God
through his relation to things and men, through his
refusal to transcend and thereby to affirm his
particular finite situation... Men generally do not
come to the decision against God as a result of an
original free decision, but as a consequence of
their behaviour.	 Here they live in fundamental
error about themselves.,.. 14.9
In the light of his understanding of sin as having to do with
egocentricity and autonomy Pannenberg maintains that although "the
eternal value of the individual and of his life" represents one of
the most	 important contributions of Christianity to human
existence°, nevertheless, human destiny and thus essential 
humanity "involves the idea of an eschatological community".'''
This community is first and foremost a community with God, indeed it
is the Church's role to symbolise this new humanity.	 However
Pannenberg goes further by asserting that
One can stay in communion with God only by
participating in his love for the world. Thus,
God's love aims at a universal community of human
beings in communion with him.162
It is the responsibility of the Christian Church therefore to
support and encourage other persons towards their destiny to be in
the image of God.163
The importance of human relationality, or what we have called
coadunacy, for Pannenberg is clearly undeniable, and yet there is a
tendency, as with all of Pannenberg's work, towards a rather
generalized discussion of the issue. Certainly human communality is
central for Pannenberg but thus far he has said little to indicate
how such human communality might function. In other words, what the
criteria for relationality might be. The imago Del, which we have
suggested ought to be understood as the source of human coadunacy
in that it mediates the divine communality to us, functions in
Pannenberg's understanding, as we have already seen, as a
description of our ultimate destiny to be in communion with God and
our fellows. ' 64 While we would wish to argue that human coadunacy
arises out of the same will to self-abandonment exhibited within the
divine community of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, so far Pannenberg
has done little more than indicate that our communality is an
eschatological reality which is determinative for our present
existence. It is this future destiny to which we are orientated that
establishes the structural openness of human existence perce\ved by
the anthropological sciences. We have already expressed our concern
over Pannenberg's tendency to identify the condition of openness
with the actuality of human relationship and so shall not repeat
ourselves here.
Pannenberg is as concerned to indicate the importance of human
sociality for human self-consciousness as he is to demonstrate its
significance for our procession towards an eschatological destiny.
Indeed both these themes are ultimately continuous for Pannenberg,
drawing on Hegel's Philosophy of Spirit, particularly the master and
slave analogy, along with the work of William James and G. H. Mead on
the notion of the social self.'E'6
Pannenberg asserts that
the social reference could not explain the
genesis of self-consciousness were it not that a
being 'present to the other as the other' were
presupposed as a universal basic structure of human
behaviour.'66
Thus once again we find that for Pannenberg the social dimension of
human existence is fundamental to the very structure of human being;
in other words, it is essential. He goes on to maintain that
The concrete explication of these relations that are
implicit in the structure of human behaviour takes
place, of course, in the context of social life.
To understand this we must return to Pannenberg's previous
discussion of the philosophical anthropologists and zoologists.
As we have seen Pannenberg wishes to relate the development of
individual self-consciousness to the social context. However in
addressing the issue of self-consciousness, he sees no reason why he
should abandon the arena of behavioural analysis for that of
psychology. Behavioural research of the kind conducted by Gehlen
and Portmann has to do with "behaving" or "self-comporting"
individuals and thus, argues Pannenberg, deals with the subject in
its entirety. ' 67	 In other words, Pannenberg regards human bodily
behaviour as corresonding fully with the "appearance of self-
consciousness"; that is to say in the tensive relationship between
centrality and exocentricity. Only in the treatment of self-
consciousness as it relates to the totality of human life can
behavioural science adequately fulfil its brief, which is the
description of human external behaviour.
In that it is human self-consciousness which represents for
Pannenberg "the place where the struggle for identity must be
carried out"'', the question arises concerning the role of the
social context for human identity-forming. Pannenberg has already
maintained that the struggle for identity, that is the resolution of
the tension between the centrality of the ego and our exocentric
destiny, takes place within and is in some sense generative of self-
consciousness.	 Having made this point he tables the following
question, which he clearly wishes to answer in the affirmative:
Is human exocentricity perhaps to be defined as
sociality? Do human beings perhaps live outside
themselves, extra se to the extent that they live by
participating in the enveloping context of their
social and cultural world with its traditions?'
Pannenberg regards human sociality as ultimately a cultural
phenomenon, by which he means that it has both a biological and a
symbolic referent. There is more to human sociality than a mere
animal pack-instinct. This is not to deny the biological data which
points towards humanity's distinctive social relations. We have
already noted Arnold Gehlen's view that human beings, in the light
of their alienation from the natural world of instinct, are
fundamentally cultural beings in that they must create a cultural
environment in order to survive. Adolf Portmann's understanding of
human being as "physiologically premature" prompts him to recognize
that the uniquely human functions such as speech and particular
modes of behaviour, which develop during our first year of life,
are from the outset phenomena that have a social
imprint... from the very beginning they are
influenced in their formation by the fact of social
contact.16°
Here Pannenberg once again identifies the religious thematic.
Following Herder's notion of the image of God, Pannenberg argues
that it is the very incomplete and thus necessarily social nature of
human being which militates against it being the creator of its own
social environment. Action of this type, argues Pannenberg,
presupposes a completed subject while human being is a being in
becoming, a developing ego. This "chicken and egg" dilemma of
whether humanity creates culture or vica versa can only be resolved
with reference to the eschatological destiny of humanity, which is
at least dispositionally determinative for present human existence.
As we have previously noted Pannenberg rejects the dialogical
personalism of Buber as a way of understanding the significance of
human social relations. 161 The I-Thou encounter, argues Pannenberg,
who is following Theunissen here, is never developed into a positive 
description of relationality but rather depends upon a via negativa 
that defines I-Thou encounter as the obverse of I-It relations. 1E2
Furthermore the theological manifestations of this form of
personalism tended to simply invert the I-Thou relation prioritizing
the Thou, in this case God, and transforming it into the sovereign
I. Pannenberg is similarly unhappy with both the implied
denegration of the I-it relation, that is to say our involvement in
a shared objective world, and what he regards as the danger of the
possible justification of
a withdrawal from the modern technicized world which
is controlled by the I-It relation and from the
anonymity of social mechanisms.16:3
It is these percieved deficiencies in the I-Thou encounter model
which prompts Pannenberg to look elsewhere for a proper
understanding of human sociality.
Pannenberg recognises a more significant development of the theme of
the ego's social, relationship to the other in the work of G.H. Mead.
Mead, following William James, drew the distinction between the
spontaneous ego or I and the ego that is the object of self-
reflection - that is, the me or the self. Mead was concerned to
identify the way in which human beings externalise themselves in the
process of self-objectification. 	 Pannenberg comments upon this
concern by observing that
The object of this question is nothing less than the
genesis of the human form of life which we have
already seen, with Plessner, to be characterized by
exocentricity. 1 64
Pannenberg is, understandably, favourably disposed towards Mead's
insistence that human self-consciousness issues out of a process of
becoming, rather than representing a "primordial datum of human
subjectivity". ,66 Our ability to objectify ourselves in the process
of self-reflection, argues Mead, arises out of our social engagement
with other persons. This process demands of human beings that they
exist extra Se 166 ;	 that is to say that they put themselves in the
place of the other.	 It is this exocentric or social self which is
the me of reflection. Mead suggests that the way in which the
social self realizes itself, that is places itself with the other,
is via the medium of gestures and movements.
It is in having our gestures interpreted and returned to us by way
of response by the other that we are able to reflect upon ourselves.
Mead amplifies upon this by pointing out that vocal utterances are
essentially vocal gestures and that the responses we receive from
others as a result of these gestures permits us to apprehend the
meaning and significance of these gestures. It is in this manner
that we put ourselves in the place of the other.
The possibility of self-reflection in human beings
Is based, therefore, on the fact that they perceive
their own vocal utterances and experience the
reaction of others to these as a reaction to the
sound they have produced. They thereby put
themselves in the situation and role of the other
and are able to see themselves from the vantage
point of the other and thus from a distance, as it
were.'s'
While Pannenberg sees much of value in this view he also recognises
its fundamental difficulties. It is not easy to identify the basis
for the unity of the ego and the self in Mead's thinking.
Pannenberg points out that in as much as it is the ego which
composes the social self, via the act of reflection, then it is the
ego that is ultimately constitutive for the self and not the social
process as Mead would clearly have it be. 1G Further, there is a
problem with any notion of a unified self-image in that the social
self must inevitably engage with a broad variety of others, each of
whom will present us with a different image of the self that our
egos reflect upon.	 In response to this line of criticism Mead
argued that in fact we engage not with individual others but with
social groups or generalized others.	 However this does not fully
deal with the problem as there are clearly a multiplicity of such
groups also.
	 Ultimately, argues Pannenberg, we must have an
understanding of the social component to human self-realization
which touches upon the very ego itself, and does not remain
operative merely at the level of an extrinsic social self.
Pannenberg sees the psychoanalytical tradition of Freud as resolving
some of the problems apparent in Mead's theory of the self. Freud,
rather than looking to generalized social groups for the source of
the ego's self-image, turns instead to our specific identification
with our parents or more specifically to their idealized
superego. 16 It is in the overcoming of the Oedipus complex that
the narcissistic ego, Pannenberg's centered "I", gives way to real 
tEa; that is, an exocentric mastery of reality. 170 Even in the
more developed forms of Freudianism as expounded by Heinz Hartmann
and Erik Erikson the problem of the unity of the ego and the self
still pertains:
are not ego and self identical? Am I not
myself? And is not my self my self only because I
am identical with it? But if I and my self are in
fact identical, then a change in my self necessarily
means a change in my ego as well. At this point,
the question does of course arise: Who is it, then,
that accomplishes the process of change?"1
Pannenberg seeks to resolve this problem by prioritizing the self as
the foundation for the ego's stability. In this way he seeks to
demonstrate that both the self and the ego are socially
determined. 172 The ego, he argues, contrary to its treatment in
the idealism of Fichte, is not to be regarded as a self-positing
unchanging subject, which lies behind all alterations in the
extrinsic self.	 Rather it is to be regarded as relating to the
existential moment of identity with the self: only in this moment
. does the ego establish its identity and continuity. In this respect
the individual person is socially determined at every level of its
identity formation.
Only indirectly, insofar as the "I" of the isolated
moment is known as identical with "myself", and
therefore as the mmentarily present manifestation of
that totality of states, qualities and actions that
in the eyes of a 'generalized other' are to be
ascribed to the individual which I am - only in this 
way does the 'I' as such acquire a continuity that 
lasts beyond the isolated moment. 172
Despite all of this, says Pannenberg, we are by no means passive in
this process of identity formation. The individual may accept,
reject or ultimately modify the roles and indeed the social self
assigned to them.	 It is in this way that we can be said to define
our own identity and thus,
	 concomitantly,	 our own cultural
environment. Pannenberg continues this line of discussion by
attempting to identify that which makes this self-identification
possible.
In tackling this issue he turns to the science of developmental
psychology and its understanding of the symbiotic nature of a
child's relationship to its mother in the early stages of its life.
Pannenberg suggests that it is here, where the child's life is not
clearly distinguishable from that of its mother, that "we may
probably see the ontogenetic point of departure of human
exocentricity."" A By this he means that the symbiotic relationship
between mother and child forms the basis for human beings' intense
involvement in the external world.
Following Erik Erikson Pannenberg sees the experiences of basic
trust as arising out of the mother/child symbiosis. This basic
trust is, in the first instance, given to the mother who represents
for the child the totality of its world.	 Subsequently trust
broadens to include the father and the larger family. Ultimately
the child must disengage from its unique bonding with its parents as
the totality of its environment and redirect its basic trust towards
the world.
	 Pannenberg quickly points out that this trust in the
world is by no means a naive lack of awareness concerning the
negative or antagonistic components within our environment. To
ignore these is to retreat into a fantasy world. Such behaviour, he
argues,
is not simply to be judged, with Freud, a regression 
to an infantile attitude towards reality. Such
behaviour is also a perversion that is directly
opposed to basic trust.	 For in basic trust, human
beings preserve their openness to reality: the
reality of other human beings and the World and, via
these, the reality of their creator.'75
Basic trust must include what Tillich referred to as "the courage to
be" in that it stands in opposition to anxiety and the desire for
"limitless wish fulfilment". 17 Trust directs us away from the ego
as the foundation of human self-becoming and towards a symbiotic
involvement in the totality of the world.
There is certainly some similarity here between Pannenberg's notion
of trust and our understanding of coadunacy as arising out of the
human capacity for self-abandonment. 177 In that basic trust enables
human beings to engage with the world and the other without fear and
in the face of the negative experiences of life, it corresponds with
our understanding of the self's abandonment to the other in the full
knowledge of the dangers involved in such an act. Pannenberg
asserts that "The identifying of oneself with something always
requires courage and trust in the soundness of that with which one
involves oneself. 178 With this latter qualification we find
ourselves at odds with Pannenberg for, although self-abandonment
certainly requires courage of us in the face of the risk involved,
It is precisely because we cannot be sure of those to whom we
abandon ourselves that such an act is courageous. For Pannenberg
the act of self-abandonment takes place in the light of "the
constancy and reliability of that in which they put their trust"179,
while we would want to maintain that abandonment to the other takes
place without any such guarantee. The point of disagreement between
Pannenberg's view and our own notion of human coadunacy becomes
apparent when we recognise that for Pannenberg basic trust is
ultimately to do with selfhood and not with the other as other:
The connection between trust and self-identification
makes it clear that in the child's basic trust and
in the later actualizations of this the issue is
selfhood... As a trust that concerns selfhood and
not merely secondary issues, basic trust presupposes
in those to whom it is given a commitment to the
fostering of the selfhood of the trusting person.19°
Thus while we are endebted to Pannenberg for his analysis of the
socio-biological origins of human relationality and his subsequent
treatment of the ecstatic elements within human life which project
us out towards the other', we remain suspicious as to the actual
status he allows to the other. It would appear that in so far as
Pannenberg focuses upon the individuals trust and openness the
initiative for human relationality is always in the power of the
self. While we would certainly want to affirm that in the context of
human brokenness and the attendent alienation from and fear of the
other the individual must engage in a deliberate act of abandonment
to the other this must only ever be regarded as a necessary
condition for coadunacy. Paradoxicalt LI1t10L1 khe. cc\pc\city for self-
abandonment is a strategy of dispossession it is not, as Pannenberg
would appear to have it, relationality as such. True coadunacy, as
we understand it, only takes place once the abandoned self in all
its powerlessness is disposed of by the other.	 We shall return to
this point again.	 Suffice it to say here that it would appear that
Pannenberg may well be liable to the same criticism that we made of
Hegel, and indeed Fichte, that in the final analysis the other is
merely a means to an end - in this case the end being the
realization of the self.
The Significance of the image of God 
We turn now to the important question of the place of the imago del 
In Pannenberg's treatment of human sociality.
We have already noted how significant Herder's understanding of the
image of God is for Pannenberg's consideration of human
exocentricity. The imago for Herder stands both as the realization
of human destiny and also as a dispositional determination towards
that destiny.	 Pannenberg finds this view particularly congenial to
his understanding of the ontological priority of the future and of
God as the power of the future. Pannenberg rejects the notion of
the image of God as "a perfection of the original state that was
lost by the fall" 192, which he sees as issuing out of the no longer
viable mythical orientation towards a primordial and paradisal time.
The imago del must not be conceived of as the foundition for a
process of Promethean human self-realization, rather it is to
characterise humanity's openness to the world and to God:
Herder's recourse to the idea of the divine image
seems thus to be an expression of his opposition to
the idea of a human self-fulfilment through active
self-enhancement. 	 In order to realize their human
destiny, their humanity, human beings remain
dependent on the most varied influences from outside
and on the harmonious contribution of these to the
advancement of their humanity. Their disposition to
be like God is therefore fulfilled only by God
himself, through the operation of his providence. 183
This understanding of the image of God as being the realization of
human destiny for communion with God is fully in keeping with
Pannenberg's conception of truth as an historical reality. In as
much as truth is only fully realized in its completed historical
form, at the eschaton so too humanity will only achieve its full
realization - that is, the coincidence of existence and essence - on
arrival at its future destiny. Indeed for Pannenberg this is the
definition of salvation which, he argues, "is obtained when the
destiny of man becomes identical with his present existence, when
man is united in his present with his past and his future." 16 	It
would be fruitful, in the light of this close relationship between
Pannenberg's understanding of truth and human destiny, to consider
the former in some more detail.
In the essay "What is Truth?"', Pannenberg traces the western
understanding of	 truth back to two sources, the Greek and the
Hebrew traditions. The Hebrew emeth, unlike the Greek aletheuein,
does not denote some eternal, static and complete entity or set of
entities, such as Plato's "forms", which may be apprehended in total
by human rationality, but rather represents a dynamic continual
process of faithfulness and reliability. In this sense, says
Pannenberg, while aletheuein simply "is", emeth "must occur again
and again". In pointing out this distinction Pannenberg cites Hans
von Soden who argued that for the Hebrew, truth is
reality seen as history ... not something that in
some way or another lies under or behind things, and
is discovered by penetrating into their interior
depths; rather, truth is that which will show itself
in the future. 186
Thus	 for	 the	 Greek,	 the notion of truth required
conceptualisation in terms of unchangeableness. The Hebrew
understanding however allowed for the integration of contingent
events,that is the ongoing process of history, into its definition
of truth. Emeth 
... has the meaning of standing firm, establishing,
supporting, bearing. Emeth means reliability, the
unshakeable dependability, of a thing or word and
thus also the faithfulness of persons. The words of
a man are emeth to the extent that they prove to be
reliable. 187
It is this aspect of "becoming" that is totally absent from the
aletheia which is forever the same, timeless and absolutely simple.
Indeed aletheia is constantly hidden behind the multiplicity of
sense experiences which may be penetrated only by the "logos-
informed" reason. Yet despite these differences there are, says
Pannenberg, some elements held in common between emeth	 and
aletheia. Both recognise truth as ultimately reliable, the one
element of constancy and permanence in a world of flux, and
similarly, it is held by both that truth could be experienced,
albeit in rather diferent ways. As we have pointed out, experience
of truth for the Greek involved its disclosure "to the logos of
cognitive comnprehension". Emeth however had to do with binding
oneself in faith to the God of truth:
Previous experience of the constancy of a man or
even of God is always,
	 for the Israelite, a
presupposition, the ground of faith. Israel always
lived from the experienced faithfulness of its God,
and precisely through this, its history, is it
called to entrust itself to its God for the future
too.1°9
Pannenberg is self-confessedly heavily indebted to the Hebraic
conception of truth, as referred to above, which refuses to regard
truth as a concealed "object", but instead, with its emphasis upon
truth's historical character, views it in a more contingent manner.
Indeed, says Pannenberg, in the West there has been an increasing
shift towards the subjectivization of truth, coming to a focus
within the Romantic movement and nineteenth century historicism.
Thus, in the light of this understanding, a false distinction
between truth and its diverse historical manifestations must be
avoided. The
unity of truth can now only be thought of as the
history of truth, meaning in effect that truth has a
history and that its essence is the process of this
history.1e9
Pannenberg believes that the philosophy of Hegel represents the
first real understanding of truth as an historical process, and
offers comment upon Hegel's claim in The Phenomenology of Mind that,
"the truth is the whole":
That which makes this whole into a whole can become
visible only at the end. All preliminary stages will
be driven beyond themselves by their inner
contradictions. They will first find their truth
beyond themselves.'9°
Pannenberg sees Hegel converging with the Biblical notion of truth
in two ways. Firstly, in his understanding of truth as process and
not as the "unchangeable", and secondly in his claim that the
contradictory elements within this process are resolved and find
their unity at the "end". So, "what a thing is, is first decided by
its future, by what becomes of it." 19 ' Nevertheless, Pannenberg is
aware of a fundamental error in Hegel's thinking. Given the nature
of his analysis of the unity of history and truth, Hegel was obliged
to regard his own perspective as that of the end of history, the
consequence of which militated against his having an openness to the
future. It is this error which in turn gives rise to the
undervaluing of contingent events and uniqueness in Hegel's system.
It is at this point that Pannenberg's distinctive Christology
provides a solution to the Hegelian error. For in Christ, as we
noted earlier, we have a proleptic manifestation of the end of
history and thus an anticipatory understanding of the unity of
truth. The apocalyptic nature of Jesus' ministry bears witness to
the reign of God and the establishing of his kingdom at the end of
history. Indeed, Pannenberg goes further. Through the event of the
resurrection of Christ both the message and divinity of Jesus are
confirmed beyond doubt:
Jesus of Nazareth is the final revelation of God
because the end of history appeared in him. It did
so within his eschatological message and in his
resurrection from the dead.192
Due to the ontological priority of the future the divinity of
Christ, realized at the resurrection, becomes retroactively
applicable to the whole of his pre-resurrection ministry. Without
the resurrection the person of Jesus lacked not simply vindication
but actual divinity. Indeed Pannenberg goes even further when he
asserts the interdependency of the persons of the Trinity in such a
way as to be able to claim that
The	 resurrection	 of	 Jesus	 is	 ...	 just	 as
constitutive for the divinity of the Father as for
the divine sonship of Jesus. Without the
resurrection of Jesus the Father proclaimed by Jesus
would not be God.193
Christ, in other words, is the eschaton, the reign of God, in what
Pannenberg calls Vorgriff. He is the full expression, in our
history, of the end of history and all that that entails for the
unity of truth, the completion of the kingdom, the fulfilment of
human destiny and the revelation of God. R.D.Pasquariello explains
the category of Vorgriff in the following way:
The Vorgriff is mere anticipation; it is not the
whole. However, because it is anticipation, it is
the presence of the whole constituted from the
future, the end	 being	 already anticipatorily
present.	 This Vorgriff, an anticipation which is
conscious of itself as such, which realizes that the
end is provisionally present, allows an
understanding of meaning that remains open to the
future. It recognizes that the ultimate meaning of a
thing is given only in the context of the whole. It
is an anticipatory grasp of the final future of the
individual contingent event.194
It is through this very category of Vorgriff that Pannenberg is able
to explain the age-old dilemma of the "Kingdom of God" being both
"already and not yet".
It is thus the proleptic nature of the Christ event which is
determinative for human destiny and which provides us with the
guarantee of our future as the image of God. As we have previously
noted salvation, for Pannenberg, is to be equated with the
fulfilment of our destiny to openness for God, an openness which is
of the very structure of human existence and "which is designated as
openness to the world in contemporary anthropology". 19E. However,
despite the so-called structural nature of human openness Pannenberg
regards the man Jesus as ultimately determinative for human destiny
as the image of God
Man's destiny to openness for God constitutes not
only the object of Jesus' office, but it is at the
same time fulfilled by Jesus' own conduct in his
office and in his destiny. 19E
In this respect Pannenberg is very close to Barth. The man Jesus,
says Pannenberg, not only represents God to man but also man to God,
such that "In his person, Jesus has become the fulfilment of the
human destiny to communion with God." 197 Pannenberg is quite clear
in his claim that in Jesus Christ the essential nature of being
human, that is, human destiny is realized. It is for this reason
that Jesus can be referred to as the image of God 198. As we have
already noted Pannenberg appears to take a very Barthian perspective
here when he speaks of Jesus as representative man, the man who is
"well-pleasing in the eyes of God". 199 It is precisely because of
Jesus' status before God, in the light of the resurrection, that our
communion with him is the guarantee of our communion with God.
Jesus is in Pannenberg's theology ultimately what he is in Barth's,
the true man, the "prototype of the new man" 20° and Pannenberg is at
pains to indicate the authenticity of this conception from within
the totality of the Christian tradition. As we shall now see he
focuses on nine fundamental "conceptual patterns", as he calls them,
which serve to confirm the representative significance of the man
Jesus. 201
To begin with, Jesus is the man who, via the incarnation, is in full
possession of the Logos. In this respect Jesus is man in full
communion with God, which is Pannenberg's definition of the imago 
dei human destiny and human essence, which are coextensive in his
theology. As a continuation of this, Jesus is also the man who, via
his ethical perfection, brings about the realization of man's
"striving towards the imitation of God (homoiOsis the(51)"20=2. 	 Also
through his act of obedience to the Father Jesus fulfils the
requirements of duty which a fallen humanity is bound to offer by
way of satisfaction through his work of supererogation.
The fourth of Pannenberg's nine points brings us closer to the heart
of Jesus' status as representative humanity. In his act of
submission to the judgment of God, and here we have an echo of
Barth's understanding of Christ as rejected as well as elected man,
"Jesus is the prototype of God's dealings with humanity and thus
also the prototype of justification by faith".-2°3 Jesus is further
considered prototypical of humanity in that	 in him man's
consciousness of God is fully realized. We saw in the previous
section of this chapter how Pannenberg's notion of human self-
becoming is bound up with the exocentric structure of human
existence. It is the social self which feeds the developing fir14204
We further noted how this exocentric orientation, witnessed to in
contemporary anthropology, is nothing less than a manifestation of
human beings' openness to God, which is ultimately determinative for
the essence of human being. 	 In the man Jesus, the exocentric
orientation to God is dominant, thus establishing the essential 
humanity of Jesus Christ;	 that is, the unity of existence and
essence. It is this unity of existence with human essence that
constitutes the image of God in Pannenberg's theology, and which
thus identifies Jesus as that image.206
Pannenberg continues his discussion of Jesus' representative
humanity as being a function of his relationship with God by
invoking Barth's notion of Jesus as the man for us. As we noted in
the previous chapter, Barth regards Jesus' determination for us as
being ultimately dependent upon his prior determination for God. It
is in his being for God that Jesus is true man and it is only as a
subsequent outworking of this essential humanity that he is for his
fellows. Pannenberg regards this Barthian conception as yet another
indication of Jesus' prototypical humanness. 206
As the Son of God Jesus further represents the ought of human
existence.	 He is the one who through his relationship with the
Father is the inheritor of creation. In this way he represents the
foundation of what Gogarten understands as "the sovereign lordship
of modern man over the world" 207, the realization of which,
according to Pannenberg, calls us to greater care of the created
order and to put an end to our exploitation of it.
The realization of the image of God in Jesus Christ
calls for responsible stewardship of man in the
-208-
creation which, in the words of Paul, 'waits with
eager longing' for 'the glorious liberty of the
children of God' (Rom.8:19-2l).2°°
Jesus, continues Pannenberg, is furthermore the "essence of faith"
or, as Ebeling put it, the "witness of faith" 209
 in so much as his
relationship with the Father generates for us the content of our own
faith.
The final point to which Pannenberg wishes to draw our attention is
the Catholic understanding of Jesus Christ as the perfection of
human being. Karl Rahner makes the following point in the light of
this view: "Christology is the beginning and end of anthropology,
and this anthropology in its most radical realization, namely
Christology, is in all eternity theology." Pannenberg relates this
view to his understanding of Jesus being characterized by total
openness which is constitutive of true humanity.21°
For Pannenberg Jesus is the proleptic experience of communion with
God which is our destiny. It is in this respect that, just as we
found in Barth, the imago del may only truly be regarded as a
designation of the man Jesus Christ. There appears to be an
unresolved ambiguity in Pannenberg's thinking at this point however.
By referring to Jesus as the image of God, the true man, does he
intend this in the same sense that Barth does? In other words, is
Jesus Christ in some way ontologically true man, such that all that
he is is made real for us, or is he simply an exemplar, the
guarantee and hope for the future? While there appears to be very
real evidence for the latter view,
When we say that ultimately through his resurrection
from the dead the true man, the real human being
that is the destiny of us all, has appeared in
Jesus, then we can only mean that in him the hopes
of men are fulfilled.2"
Pannenberg clearly wishes to say more than this.
	 It is precisely
because Jesus is the fulfilment of human hope that his "saving
character" can have "universal relevance". 212
 It is quite clear
that in Pannenberg's view it is Jesus alone who is to be regarded as
the Son of God in that unique way established by his resurrection.
Our sonship is a derived one made real through communion with the
man Jesus. In so far as Jesus is also true man by virtue of his
sonship, that is his communion with God which is the essence of
human being, so too do we derive our essential humanness from
Jesus. 213
In his exposition of St. Paul Pannenberg sees the determinative
nature of Jesus' humanity spelt out quite clearly. In Romans 8:29
Paul identifies Jesus as the one and only true image of God, such
that
...the appearance of Christ meant that what had
previously been regarded as humanity was now
replaced by a radically new kind of humanity.
	 The
first Adam was confronted in Jesus - and
definitively so in the resurrection of Jesus - by a
new and final form of human being whose "image" we
all bear, that is, to whom we are all to be
conformed. (Rom.8:29). 214
Indeed, Pannenberg expounds Paul in a particularly Barthian
conclusion when he argues that Jesus Christ, the image of God and
destiny of humanity (2 Cor.4:4) is also the protological image of
God spoken of in Genesis 1:27. 21s This view, coupled with the more
traditional perspective also found in Paul which has the imago as
"at every point already a feature of the human being" is seen by
Paul as being harmonised in the understanding of Christ as
prototypical human being.
	 It is thus in his image that the first
human being was created.
In order to explain the connection between that
first human being and the new human being who has
been manifested in Christ, these (early Christian)
theologians maintained that only the visible
appearance of this prototype itself in the
incarnation could bring the image of God in us to
its completion. 21G
Pannenberg is in full agreement with this understanding of the
significance of Jesus' appearance for human being. Jesus is the one
who brings into history, that is into human becoming, the
realization of that becoming. In the light of this proleptic
experience of our future destiny manifested in the life and ministry
of the man Jesus the future becomes "powerful in the present";
indeed Pannenberg goes further in that it is seen as powerful over 
the present. "It is the power of contradiction to the present, and
releases forces to overcome it." 2 " Thus the presence of Jesus as
the power of the future is the confrontation of human existence and
human essence, where the latter becomes dominant. 21 	 It is for this
reason that Pannenberg can assert that, "... it has become possible
to	 live one's present	 existence	 in its current,	 concrete
configuration in the way it appears in the light of God's future and
thus in his ultimate truth." 219	He makes the same point when
expounding Ignatius of Antioch:
... the historical once-for-all of the saving event,
in which the eschatological destiny of the human
person becomes present and operative, caused the
concept of human nature to be, as it were, liquefied
and remolded into that of a salvation history
(oeconomia) which leads 'to Jesus Christ, the new
man'...	 In this way the theologians avoided the
error of a dualistic separation between the first
Adam and the second, the earthly man and the
heavenly, and, ultimately, the God who creates and
the God who redeems.22°
From this we may conclude that Pannenberg, in much the same manner
as Barth, treats creation and redemption as ultimately a single
divine act. 221 The image of God in which human beings are created
Is synonymous with Jesus Christ who is true man, essential humanity
that is realized in communion with God and with the rest of
humanity. Thus, as we found in Barth, the essential humanness of
human beings is not founded upon a primordial act of creation in
which the image of God was in some sense made our possession. 222
Rather, according to both Barth and Pannenberg, we are in the image
of God, that is in receipt of our essential humanity, only via our
participation in Christ. Pannenberg goes on to maintain that as
this participation in Christ is both the redemptive and creative
activity of God, in that it is the proleptic realization of our
destiny, the creative and ultimately dominant power of the future,
it is universally determinative. 222 To be human is to be orientated
towards the future,	 that is open to God, and this is achieved for
us in Jesus who is the realisation of human destiny.
It is from this perspective, namely, the explication
of the Christ event as an event for all people, that
it becomes clear that the father of Jesus Christ has
always been one God from the very beginnings of
Israel and, indeed, from the beginning of the
world. 224
From this it is difficult not to conclude that human relationality,
openness to the world and the other, is for Pannenberg a fact of our
inevitable determination by the future as realized by our
Inescapable participation in Christ. 	 By blurring the traditional
distinction between created and redeemed humanity, through his
identification of creation with the eschatological destiny of
humanity for community with God and others, Pannenberg appears,
unintentionally to be sure, to evacuate his conception of sin as human
centredness of much of its power. 22	Thus the struggle between
human egoism and human coadunacy which we have suggested demands of
us an act of self-abandonment 1	seem to be already resolved for
Pannenberg in Christ, who brings about the resolution of this
struggle in the proleptic power of human essence over existence. 22
We shall consider now the nature of Jesus' empowering to
relationality as the bringing to actuality of human destiny for
community with God and others.
Jesus and the empowering to relationality 
Pannenberg clearly understands Jesus, his message and his
relationship with the Father, as the true exemplar of human
relationality. Jesus' message of the approaching Kingdom of God and
the attendant salvation offered freely to all demands of those who
receive his words that they sacrifice all to the fulfilment of the
will of God. Pannenberg points out that
to do the will of God means to act as God acts, who
lets his sun rise on the evil and the good and ...
directs his salvation to the just and the unjust. 27
The very logic of divine forgiveness, argues Pannenberg, demands
that those who are in receipt of forgiveness ought to forgive
others also. Indeed, "Even the forgiveness that has already been
received is forfeited when it is not passed on in one's own conduct
towards others. "228
In this process of divine forgiveness being received and transmitted
within human experience Pannenberg recognises the theme of futurity
so characteristic of his theology; "The divine forgiveness that
opens the future to the recipient places him in a position to open
up the future for his fellowmen also. 229 The connection between
forgiveness of sins and neighbour love is, argues Pannenberg, the
very foundation of Jesus' radical interpretation of the law. When
questioned concerning the right way to pray Jesus is said to have
taught the Lord's Prayer in which divine forgiveness and our
forgiveness of others are intimately related.
Yet forgiveness of others does not simply involve an uneasy truce
between two hostile parties. It has a positive rather than a
negative character. Forgiveness, suggests Pannenberg,
includes the most radical form of love, love for the
enemy (Matt.5:43ff). It is decisive for
understanding forgiveness that one sees it in this
kind of unity with love and does not conceive it
only negatively as the renunciation of hostile
sentiments.	 It is common to love and forgiveness
that both open the future. Therefore, also,
forgiveness always includes the active element of
help for life, just as Jesus himself heals by
forgiving sins (Mark 2:1-12). The parable of the
good Samaritan (Luke 10;25-37) shows love's creative
relation to the situation and lack of preconditions,
corresponding to the lack of preconditions in Jesus'
proclamation	 of	 forgiveness	 and	 presence	 of
salvation.2-1'°
This understanding of unconditional neighbour love is not merely an
utopian ideal, inappropriate to "the raw reality of life" 221 , rather
it is the love empowered by Jesus' message of eschatological
salvation. It is this promise of future situation, as we have
already noted in our treatment of the imago dei in Pannenberg's
thought, which makes manifest human destiny. Human destiny is to be
with God and with our fellows. That is to say, human destiny is a
communal destiny. Jesus' message of salvation, by which Pannenberg
understands both his words and his life lived vicariously for
humanity, 232 establishes in history the reality of human destiny for
community.	 "In his person, Jesus has become the fulfilment of the
human destiny to community with God."233
Pannenberg makes it quite clear that communality has always been the
destiny, indeed the essence of human existence. However with the
coming of Jesus this has become clear for the first time. 234 It is
in Jesus and his message of salvation that human community,
indiscriminate neighbour love finds its fulfilment:
By creating community, love realizes the unity of
human destiny. Thus Jesus' commandment of love also
reveals the essence of men, his destiny to
community... all human striving towards community
finds its fulfilment in the love Jesus has made
possible. 23S
The empowering to true comunality which is simultaneously the
essence of humanity and its destiny derives directly from the
presence of the future Kingdom of God in the man Jesus. Indeed, says
Pannenberg, the very language of Fatherhood used by Jesus of God is
intended to indicate the closeness of the reign of God and thus the
reality of its power to bring about the fulfillment of human
destiny. "That the nearness of God's Kingdom includes salvation in
itself establishes the confident nearness of God himself expressed
in addressing God as 'Father'."236
There are a number of points in Pannenberg's discussion here that we
would wish to affirm as being essential to a Christian understanding
of human coadunacy.
Firstly and, as we shall see in a subsequent chapter, the radical
nature of Jesus' call to neighbour love must be regarded as being at
the very heart of the Christian experience of coadunacy. Love of
the other must be modelled upon Christ-like self-abandonment where
the other, no matter how alien or hostile, is related to
unconditionally. Love of the stranger ought to be characterized not
by fear but, as Pannenberg maintains, by trust.
The next point to be affirmed is Pannenberg's insistence that
humanity is essentially communal - in his understanding, by virtue
of its destiny - but also that the capacity for unconditional love
of the other is a gift made actual for us in Jesus as the one who
fulfils human destiny. These twin poles are essential to a balanced
understanding of human communality for they bear witness both to
humanity's essential nature as communal while also indicating its
need for empowering to true community in the context of human
brokenness or "centeredness". We shall expand on these points in
more detail when we consider the notion of coadunacy at length in
our concluding chapter. We shall turn now to consider what
importance, if indeed any, Pannenberg gives to the doctrine of the
Trinity as it bears upon our concern with human relationality.
The Significance of God as Trinity 
Pannenberg makes it quite clear that in so far as he regards the
doctrine of the Trinity as being grounded in the fact of revelation
he is very much in the company of both Hegel and Barth. It is "In
the fate of Jesus", says Pannenberg, that "the God of Israel is
revealed as the triune God". 237 Having said this it is important
that we recognize the fundamental dissimilarity which exists between
the Barthian - and for that matter the traditional Western -
conception of divinity, and what Pannenberg has in mind. Pannenberg
thoroughly rejects what he sees as Western theology's Platonic
conceptualization of God as the incomprehensible "world-ground", in
favour of a notion of divine otherness as rooted in free historical
activity.
The notion of the one divine being as person in the
sense of self-consciousness is to be seen as the
heresy of Christian theism. This understanding of
God leads either to the concept of a God who exists
beyond (senseitig) the world or to the idea of a
self-unfolding	 of	 God	 in	 which	 the	 world
consequently	 becomes	 a	 condition	 of	 divine
realization. 22
Divine sovereignty,
	 argues Pannenberg,	 is not founded upon
transcendent subjectivity but rather upon God's "immanence in the
phenomena of the world".	 God is, to quote Bonhoeffer, "the beyond
in the midst of our lives". 2"	 It is for this reason that
Pannenberg criticises Barth's doctrine of the Trinity. He points
out that following Dorner Barth speaks of the one self-conscious and
personal God who differentiates himself into three modes of being
and thus opens himself up to the charge of subordinationism:
It is impossible to avoid - in spite of all the
emphasis upon the equal divinity of the three modes
of being - an understanding of the Father as the
original form of the divine ego and as the author of
his other modes of being.241
Pannenberg suggests that this problem might be resolved if God's
personhood were regarded as the result of, rather than the basis for
the three modes of being. However, this would prove highly
problematic for Barth, for whom the doctrine of the Trinity is "an
expression of God's subjectivity, in his revelation, that is that
the subjectivity of God is the root of the Trinity and not its
result. 112.42
Pannenberg's own understanding of the Trinity is one in which "the
plurality of the persons is not derived but original and only in
this is the unity of God real". 243
 This claim requires careful
unpacking in the light of Pannenberg's theology as a whole.
It is important that we understand that for Pannenberg, God is the
power of the future, indeed the future is the very "mode of God's
being", such that prior to this future God's being is always
conditional being. 244
 Thus we find that
the being of God and that of his kingdom are
identical, since the being of God is his lordship.
He is God only in the execution of his lordship, and
thus full accomplishment of his lordship is
determined as something future.24.s
Pannenberg is here drawing upon the thought of Ernst Bloch and his
understanding of "futurity as a quality of being". 246 Thus history,
in its totality, as the process by which God's reign is finally
established, is nothing less than the realization of God himself.
Pannenberg is at pains to point out that by this he does not mean to
describe the movement of history as expressive of or a manifestation
of some abstract transcendent consciousness 247
	but as the actual
process of divine becoming.
the otherness of God is demonstrated in
specific, contingent events with a concrete meaning
for the men participating in it, so God assumes
properties into his eternal essence through such
deeds in that he chooses these and no other events
as the form of his contingent operations.24s
Here we have Pannenberg's anthropological understanding of the
social self's priority over the ego, which we considered earlier',
having its ultimate expression in the way of being of God himself.
Having established the nature of divinity as the exercise of the
reign of God, Pannenberg proceeds in his explication of the Trinity
to consider both the unity and distinction between God the Father
and God the Son. As we have already noted, it is in the man Jesus
that the future reign of God, his lordship, is realized
proleptically in history. It is in this way that God is for us here
and now, in anticipation of our destiny for communion with him. In
that Pannenberg has already identified God with his reign, the
recognition of the man Jesus as the one in whom the Kingdom of God
has become proleptically apparent establishes his essential 
divinity2s°.	 In this we see not the revelation of an abstract and
metaphysical relationship between the Father and the Logos2s1 but
rather the actual eternal unity of the Father and the Son. 	 Alan
Galloway describes what Pannenberg has in mind here when he writes
the second person of the Trinity is not some
essence or metaphysical entity other than Jesus of
Nazareth. The eternal communion within the Godhead
between the Father and the Son is not some ghostly,
metaphysical transaction. It is precisely what took
place between them in the birth, life, death and
resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. 22
Furthermore, the differentiation between the Father and the Son is
now the historically undeniable characteristic of the man Jesus'
relationship to the Father.2s°
Pannenberg, as we found also in Barth, is reluctant to designate the
Holy Spirit as a third person within the Godhead, 24 choosing rather
to identify some attrilution of personhood to the Spirit's activity
within human subjects.
The Spirit shows himself to be a personal reality by
not extinguishing the personal character of human
action through his activity but by letting personal
life	 come	 to	 consummation	 through	 willing
dedication.2ss
The personhood of the Holy Spirit speaks of our exocentricity, that
is the human person's dependence upon that which is other than
itself.	 In the specifically Christian sense the Holy Spirit is the
"personal center of Christian action". The Spirit's unity with
the divine essence stems from his activity in uniting us with Christ
while his distinctness is one with our present experience of
distinction from both the Father and the Son.257
W,J.Hill	 refers	 to	 Pannenberg's	 view	 as	 Neo-economic 
Trinitarianism28•8 and there is certainly a degree of consensus with
this opinion. H.Burhenn speaks of the trinitarian distinctions in
Pannenberg's thought as "temporal distinctions" 269 while R.Olscn
refers to them as "connected with the different phases of the
activity of God in history". 2G° This would certainly appear to be a
justifiable description of
	 Pannenberg's Trinitarian thinking,
particularly in light of statements such as the following:
The trinitarian God is ... a single being and this
one God is not impersonal, nevertheless, he is only
a person in the form of one of the trinitarian
persons at a time. This is because each of the
persons not only derives its being and personhood
mediatorily through its relation with the other two
but also its divinity. 21
Unlike Barth's understanding of human being as being in encounter
and our own notion of coadunacy Pannenberg does not look to the
inter-trinitarian relations to establish the foundation for human
communality and this is just as well. Pannenberg's so-called neo-
economic trinitarianism, understanding God in terms of a single
person, certainly does not recommend itself as an adequate
foundation for a model of human relationship. Indeed the emphasis
upon the other as ego-forming, which we noted in Pannenberg's
anthropological analysis, seems to be very much in evidence here
where the divine person posits itself in history as a means towards
self-realization. Hill notes this Hegelian perspective when he
observes:
Such a God is engaged in a dialectic of self-
differentiation, an emptying act of himself into the
other that explains both his own life and the being
of the world. In trinitarian language, this means
the Father positing his Word and the Spirit arising
out of the tension between them as a synthesis of
love... This calls into question the unity of God
until it is realised that the fulness of personhood
Is achieved precisely in the relinquishing of
autonomy and isolation in surrender to the other,
out of which emerges a new and higher form of
unity.262
The actual status of the other in this process gives cause for some
concern. Is the other simply the means to a higher synthetic end?
If this is so then for all Pannenberg's talk of the self-dedication
of the self to the other, the other is ultimately taken up into the
one divine person. Furthermore, if only one of the three "persons"
constituting the Trinity is truly personal at any one time, in what
sense can they be said to be involved in acts of interpersonal
relationality? Is not the ultimate fate of such a Trinity
to collapse dialectically into a unity that either
is abstract and impersonal in kind, or reduces to
the moral unity of a divine koinOnia726*'
Conclusion 
There is undoubtedly much of value in Pannenberg's treatment of
human sociality, particularly in his analysis of the anthropological
manifestations of human exocentricity. We certainly find support
for our notion of human coadunacy in the explication of Portmann's
understanding of the human "extrauterine springtime" which
establishes human being as "deficient being" in need of immediate
social support. 264 Similarly the notion of basic trust and Mead's
treatment of human gestures as the means to human ecstatic existence
would all seem to provide anthropological evidence for our
contention that human being is fundamentallycommunal being. However
it is at this point that we must part company with Pannenberg.
As we have attempted to indicate throughout this chapter, our basic
difficulty with Pannenberg's understanding of human sociality
revolves around the status he accords to the other. It would seem
that human openness to the other, while prioritizing the social
self, has as its goal the development and realization of the ego.
The point we wish to make concerning human being as coadunate is
that the other is prioritized as other. The notion of coadunacy
regards human being as irreducibly communal, as a complex consisting
of the self and the other, in mutual abandonment to each other. We
see the difference between Pannenberg's view of human sociality and
our own particularly highlighted in his notion of basic trust. At
first sight this conception might appear to echo our own
understanding of the necessity for the will to abandonment 26s
 as a
condition for human coadunacy.	 However this is not the case.
	 For
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Pannenberg trust may well involve an act of abandonment, but it is
by no means an abandonment of the self to a potentially hostile
other.
Those	 who	 trust	 abandon	 themselves	 to the
consistency and reliability of that in which they
trust. Basic trust is not, however, directed
immediately to the self but rather to that agency
which is able to protect and promote the self and in
fact promises to do so.	 This last point is
important. As a trust that concerns selfhood and
not merely secondary issues, basic trust presupposes
in those to whom it is given a commitment to the
fostering	 of	 the	 selfhood	 of	 the	 trusting
persons.2'6
Two things need to be said concerning the conception of basic trust.
Firstly, it appears to be either optimistically naive 267
 or highly
selective. Either Pannenberg is of the opinion that all to whom we
might abandon ourselves in trust will be reliable and beneficent, or
that we ought only to commit ourselves in this way to those who we
know will have our best interests at heart. Secondly we note once
again that basic trust has as its goal not abandonment of the self
to the other qua other but the promotion of the self through the
agency of the other.
There would appear to be in Pannenberg's thought a form of
historical determinism intimately bound up with his christology
which might well be responsible for what we have spoken of as his
optimistic naivety concerning the reliability of those in whom we
put our trust. As we have already noted, this tendency towards the
overcoming of present human fallenness - via the proleptic event of
Christ which establishes creation and redemption, existence and
essence as coextensive - drastically reduces the reality of human
brokenness.	 Indeed, in the light of this theological structure,
Pannenberg can even maintain that
the person is not at the disposition of others, even
though others may very well dispose of the present-
at-hand, bodily existence of individuals and even,
in differing degrees according to the particular
case, of their psychic reactions. This kind of
disposition may be exercised through physical force
but also through seduction and through forms of
psychic influence which render the individual
pliable and which run from brainwashng to the more
subtle forms of persuasion. The personality of the
person so abused is not put at the disposal of the
other, but it is, as it were, disconnected.26°
We need to be very suspicious of this rather gnostic sounding
language. Surely if we are not at the disposition of the hostile
other, in so far as our essential personhood is yet to be realized,
then this holds true even for our disposition towards the other who,
in Pannenberg's language, we can trust. Is not the logic of
Pannenberg's view that in our present existence we are inevitably
disconnected from the other? Furthermore, such a view would seem to
drastically devalue human suffering by disengaging it from essential
personhood.
In conclusion it would seem that while making a significant
contribution to a view of human being as both structurally and
essentially social, Pannenberg falls foul of the idealistic
tradition upon which he draws and its tendency to reduce the other,
that towards which we are structurally open, to the means towards
self-realization. Similarly, by rooting the essence of human being
in a future human destiny which is proleptically determinative for
us, through communion with Christ via the Spirit, Pannenberg reduces
the significance of present human existence and consequently
evacuates sin and human brokenness of much of its powe_r.
The realization of human coadunacy must take into account the
brokenness of human being and its environment. It is for this
reason that we have spoken of the will to self-abandonment in the
face of this brokenness as the condition par excellence of human
coadunacy. Furthermore, in speaking of human coadunacy, we do not
intend a self-realizing process but rather a multipersonal complex
which is, in its very nature as communal, the being of humanity.
I.Fairweather and J. McDonald express this thought very well,
particularly as it effects the Church, when they write:
Christians have the resources to be more aware of
their own self-deception. In the revelation of the
transcendent God who removes all restrictions on our
concern for others, and in its place for confession
and forgiveness, Christian faith can free people
from their self-deception because it frees them from
their anxiety... Accepted by God, and continually
accepting that acceptance, he is free for existence
for others, and has ceased to be careful about
others' acceptance, and to be worried about his own
sense of importance... this freedom is never a
permanent possession, and has to be constantly
renewed and realised in obedience to God's love, 2E9
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CHAPTER SEVEN	 THREE THEMES OF COADUNACY 
In the previous four chapters we have attempted to describe and
assess various ways in which self/other relationality has been
understood. Furthermore we have sought to identify certain areas of
weakness in these conceptions of relationality, particularly with
regard to the prioritizing of the self over the other and the
abstraction of said notions of relationality from concerns over
context or environment.
As we stated in chapter two, and need to reiterate here, our
critique has not been a disinterested one, that is to say we have
engaged with our selection of thinkers from a perspective within the
Christian tradition. We have sought to assess to what extent each of
the aforementioned approaches to the issue of relationality might
represent an inadequate and insufficient understanding of a
Christian notion of coadunacy. To this end we previously outlined
three fields of inquiry which functioned as an implicit agenda for
our analysis, these being the nature of coadunacy, the loss of
coadunacy and the restoration of coadunacy.
The purpose of this chapter is twofold. Firstly we shall consider
what it is that we have learned from our study of Kant, Fichte,
Hegel, Barth and Pannenberg as regards the notion of human
coadunacy. We hope to be able, in the light of our previous
analyses, to identify those elements which are of most value to the
Christian tradition and those which might be regarded as unhelpful
to it. Secondly, in so far as our aforementioned three fields of 
inquiry have operated at a tacit level throughout the previous four
chapters, we intend here to make good our promise, in chapter two,
to develop these general fields into three explicit Christian 
theological themes of coadunacy. These themes will represent a
distinctively Christian theological approach to the questions raised
within our initial three fields of inquiry albeit in a preliminary
form.
Before we continue with the two basic tasks of this chapter it will
be useful indicate here the theological shape of coadunacy as it has
begun to emerge from the previous analytic chapters.
It should be clear from what has gone before that the primary
commitment of this work is to an understanding of human being as in
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essence a complex involving persons in relation inhabiting an 
environment. Having said this we are not concerned with the simple
phenomenon of a multiplicity of selves relating in a minimalist way
within indistinct or abstract space-time. In other words, we have a
particular quality in mind when we talk of human relationa/ity and
inhabitation. By using the term essential in this context we intend
to convey an understanding of human relationality involving the self
and the other which is of ontological significance. It has been
suggested that the basis of this claim to ontological significance
for human communality is to be found within an understanding of
human being as created in the imago trinitatis.' Clearly such a
claim will ultimately require some detailed consideration of both
the doctrines of the Trinity and the imago del. However, while we
hope that our discussion and critique of both Barth and Pannenberg
may provide some indication as to the direction that such a
theological enterprise might take it is beyond the scope of this
present work to take up the task proper. We have hinted throughout
the preceeding chapters that a social model of the Trinity which
lays its emphasis upon the threeness of the persons rather than the
oneness of the substance or subject would seem to be of most value
in establishing the normality of coadunacy and there would appear to
be no shortage of such models within Christian theology. 2 For the
moment however, we must limit ourselves to the perhaps less familiar
task of outlining what might be called the dimensions of and
conditions for coadunacy, that is to say for human being as
fundamentally relational and environmental.
The term that we have chosen to deploy in this connection is
coadunacy. As we have already pointed out the word coadunate speaks
of congenital unity, of the many being unified in the one. Having
suggested an ontological derivation of coadunacy from the divine
Being as persons in relation, mediated to human being via the imago
trinitatis through both creation and redemption, our concern in
these final chapters will be to discuss the shape of a substantive 
theological understanding of human coadunacy. That is to say, what
it is and how it is realised within the brokenness of human
existence: the dimensions of and conditions for coadunacy.
In our previous discussion of the protological dimension of human
coadunacy, in chapter one, we made it quite clear that there is a
very real sense in which the "conditions" of coadunacy are met
simply by virtue of our creatur0.iness and furthermore as being
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created in the image of a coadunate, or more properly tri-adunate
God. That is to say, the being of humanity is by creation
coadunate, just as the Being of God is Trinitarian. Nevertheless in
the light of the middle term of the Christian story, humanity's
undeniable estrangement from both God and itself, we are prompted to
consider what coadunacy ought to look like and what conditions must
pertain in order to encourage and restore what is, after all, the
proper being of humanity.
The Lessons of History 
From our examination of a range of thinkers who have exerted a major
influence upon western thought, and theology in particular, and who
have also engaged with the issue of relationality certain lessons
may be learned.
Without doubt the issue of subject/object or self/other
relationality is found to be of fundamental significance for Kant,
Fichte, Hegel, Barth and Pannenberg. With Kant there is a clear
desire to maintain that the phenomenal world in all its complexity
is intimately related to the thinking subject which provides its
form and order. All that "I" encounter as object in the world is
related to me via sensible intuition and the transcendental
categories of thought. However, and as we noted in chapter three, it
is this very cognitive power of the subject over the object in the
former's constructive representation of the latter that has given us
cause for concern. The object, for Kant, is always object in 
relation to subject. The reality of the other thus only impinges
upon the self as an appearance construed by the self. Engagement
with the other self-in-itself is clearly beyond the constitutive
capacity of the categories of thought. The other qua other and the
other-for-self are by no means equivalent for Kant. We must beware
the Kantian tendency to over-emphasise the power and priority of the
subject who is always regarded as acting upon the other and thereby
construing that other for self.
We have further noted that while the Kantian understanding of human
community as a kingdom of ends, as found in the Second Critique,
certainly has value it is by no means sufficient as a description of
human relationality. The language of "reverence", "dignity" and
"respect" which is central to Kant's understanding of persons as
ends can only have a preliminary and formal status as an expression
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of self/other relationality. Nevertheless it is undoubtedly here
that Kant is most helpful to our particular concern for it is here
that he begins to consider the issue of self/other relationality as
distinct from that of subject/object. The relationship between the
self and the other who is always, in the first instance, encountered
as stranger must surely begin with respect and an acknowledgement of
worth and dignity.
However, Kant would appear to leave the issue at this stage.
Indeed, we have suggested that there are grounds for suspecting that
for Kant the object of reverence is the "moral law within" rather
than the actual person, with all their existential inclinations.3
The question regarding who has the priority within self-other
relationality is one which has persisted throughout our study.
With Fichte's ethical idealism we saw the development of Kant's
notion of the autonomy of the will in terms of the absolute ego's
free and unlimited activity. We have noted that for Fichte the
absolute ego progresses towards self-consciousness through the
activity of finite selves within the world. 	 It is as individual
agents struggling against the natural order that human beings are
seen to be moral agents.	 The external world is regarded as
possessing no innate value, and thus humanity is not in any way
obligated to it,	 the natural world is posited merely to be
overcome.
For Fichte all externality is understood as subordinate to the self
whose behaviour is informed by laws derived from that self as an
expression of the absolute self-activity of the ego. By means of a
form of social contract theory, Fichte exports this totalism of the
self into the general will, giving rise to a totalism of the state.
The truly national state, argues Fichte, may only gain stability via
world-wide expansion. Indeed, such a state has a cultural mission
which it must pursue militarily.
In Hegel's thinking we have discovered much of value. Clearly there
is a concern throughout his work to do away with the dualisms
established by critical thought, by emphasising a necessary
relationality as existing between the self and the other, the
internal and external, subject and object. Furthermore, Hegel seems
to regard the doctrine of God as Trinity as being the religiously
expressed ideal of Self/other unity. In dispensing with the
subject/object dualism Hegel seeks to unify the Kantian dichotomy
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between appearance and things-in-themselves, establishing the world
as our world and rendering redundant the question of an underlying
and inaccessible reality. The world, Hegel argues, is uniquely
personal, as it is there only for the subject.
Likewise, the self without the other is only ever an empty universal
and abstract "I".
	
It is our engagement with the other which
establishes us as free.	 The other is, for Hegel, intimately
involved in the self's ontology of becoming. Hegel's insistence
that actuality is formed from the unity of the self and external
otherness, by way of the synthesis between inward essence and
outward appearance, does much to establish a reality from which we
are not fundamentally alienated.
However, all this having been said, we found ourselves concluding
that the Hegelian synthetic process - while certainly a unifying
process - was ultimately agressive towards the "other" in its
particularity. For Hegel, the self as empty universal comes to
itself via confrontation with the other, only to return to itself
again having subsumed the other within itself. This totalism of the
self is enshrined in the very process of dialectic where, in its
movement towards the moment of synthesis, the other is reduced to a
mere illusory foil which is necessary to the self-actualisation of
the self.	 We noted that ultimately for Hegel "there is no real
other"4
With Karl Barth and Wolf hart Pannenberg we turned to the
distinctively theological engagement with the issue of self/other
relationality.
In Barth's theology the notion of self/other relationality is
discussed by way of the concept of encounter. This encounter takes
the form of an I-Thou duality which is absolutely central to the
essence of human being. The basic form of humanity is described by
Barth as "being-in-encounter" . Barth's understanding of the
ontological basis for human relationality closely resembles our
concern that coadunacy be regarded as essential to the very
constitution of human being. Indeed, Barth clearly wishes to see
the imago dei as having to do with the essentiality of human
relatedness. We noted further that Barth, in response to Nietzsche,
denies the possibility of the individual human being in
abstraction.6
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Barth devotes a substantial part of volume 3/2 of his Church 
Dogmatics to a detailed explication of the four elements which he
regards as characteristic of human being in encounter: seeing,
speaking/hearing, assisting and gladness, which is the attitude in
which the other three ought to be rooted. This understanding of the
nature of human relationality, which seems to see it as a process
comprising of stages of deepening commitment - in addition to seeing
it as in some way essential to human ontology - is a valuable one.
Clearly if the Christian tradition wishes to maintain its commitment
to the doctrine of sin and human brokenness then some understanding
of human relationality as being in need of healing and restoration
is in order.	 However it is at this point that we take issue with
Barth.
We have argued that the powerful Christological determinism central
to Barth's understanding of humanness gives rise to an overly formal
notion of human relationality.	 That humanity is in encounter is,
for Barth, a fundamental fact of human existence in Christ. Our
present experience of alienation from the other is overcome, in
Barth's theology, by the ultimate determination of Jesus' humanity.
While we have noted that Barth is quite clearly aware of human
brokenness and estrangement, we found ourselves having to conclude
that the ubiquitous systematic determination of God's freedom and
sovereignty, coupled with a form of Christological idealism, forces
Barth into an unrealistic notion of human being - in Christ - as
always and actually being-in-encounter. The power and initiative
for human relationality are ultimately in God's hands, not ours.
Thus there is some justification for suggesting that a totalism of
the subject is operative in Barth's thinking, albeit a totalism of
the divine subject.
With Pannenberg and his characteristically anthropological approach
to theology we found a great deal of valuable support for our
concern with the essentiality of human coadunacy. Pannenberg's
notion of exocentricity and his drawing on the anthropological
sciences in support of this concept of human openness presents us
with a convincing picture of the phenomenon of fundamental human
communality.	 Portmann's understanding of human being as "deficient
being" requiring social support, coupled with Erikson's
identification of basic trust as developing from child/mother
relationships to a general orientation beyond the self are regarded
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by Fannenberg as constituting anthropological evidences for the
understanding of human being as essentially social.
Clearly we would wish to affirm with Pannenberg that human
communality cannot simply take the form of a dogmatic assertion. If
human being is fundamentally communal being, albeit fallen communal
being, then this ought to be manifest, to some degree, within actual
human experience. Nevertheless, despite this valuable contribution
by Pannneberg, we are forced to take issue with him over the status
his theology accords to the other.
It appears that while openness to the other certainly prioritizes
the social self for Pannenberg, this exocentricity has as its goal
the development of the ego. It is this understanding of openness to
the other as essentially a means towards self-realization of which
we are suspicious. As we have noted previously one of Kant's most
significant and valuable contributions to the issue of self/other
relationality is that human persons are never to be regarded as
means, but rather always as ends. This assertion must surely be
regarded as a necessary - albeit prolegomenal - condition for human
communality.
We have further found ourselves taking issue with Pannenberg's
theological determinism which is expressed in terms of human
destiny. As with Barth, so too with Pannenberg it is the person of
Christ who is true human being.	 It is only through our communion
with Christ via the Spirit, and that proleptically,	 that we are
orientated
	
towards	 a	 future
determinative for human being.
orientation towards the future,
particularity, and the reality
diminished in their significance
in	 this	 connection	 the
reinterpretation of the doctrine
destiny which	 is ultimately
In the light of this inevitable
present human existence in all its
of human brokenness, appear to be
In Pannenberg's theology. We noted
insufficiency of Pannenberg's
of sin in terms of centredness.
Clearly there is much to be learned from the thinkers with whom we
have engaged.	 All five of them are unanimous in their belief that
the	 very	 structure	 of	 reality,	 both
	
ontologically	 and
epistemologically, is fundamentally relational. 	 We contribute
structure to the world, says Kant;	 we are part of the over-all
unity of reality argues Hegel; reality in its historical development
is the very mode of human existence, suggests Pannenberg. The other
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must be regarded as being of the highest worth, an end not a means.
The other is absolutely necessary to the self and to be without the
other is to be less than fully human. We must thus live life in an
attitude of openness and trust, for only in this way can human
destiny be fully achieved. All these insights are of immense value
for our understanding of human coadunacy.
However, there are two major themes that need to explored by
Christian theology in its attempt to express an understanding of
human relationality, and which appear to have been neglected in the
thinking of the aforementioned thinkers.
The first of these, as has been suggested throughout this work, is
the prioritisation of the other in human relationality as an
expression of Christ-like self-abandonment. While relationality is
clearly a major concern of the thinkers we have considered, the
initiative or power for relationship appears always to come from the
subject, be that subject divine or human. Furthermore, the reality
of human relational brokenness must constitute the starting point
for our consideration of a strategy for self-abandonment. We must
take "centredness" seriously as an aspect of human sin. Thus any
notion of self/other relationality which seeks to prioritize the
other must first discuss a strategy for the disempowering of the
self.
The second theme which we wish to take up in our concluding chapters
is that of human situatedness. With the possible exception of
Pannenberg, there is a sense in which all the thinkers with whom we
have concerned ourselves have tended towrds a somewhat abstract
notion of relationality. Human relationality is treated
universally, rather than particularly. The context that we inhabit
is either marginalised or, as in the case of Fichte and Hegel
treated as an object of animosity. In short	 relationships are
regarded for the most part as "being made in heaven".
It seems to me that any thorough-going notion of human coadunacy
must involve an understanding of human beings existing within a
context or environment or place. Human being as embodied existence
must be treated with due seriousness if we are to provide a
theological understanding of relationality which is true to human
experience, and which does not stop short at dogmatic and idealist
assertions. How we relate to our surrounding and how this
relatedness affects who we are and how we engage with the other is
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an issue which has increased in significance proportionally with our
ability to structure our own environment. While our treatment of
the theme here will of necessity be preliminary in character, I hope
that it will at least have the effect of tabling the issue for
further theological consideration.
In chapter two we outlined three basic fields of inquiry which
formed the basis of our exploration into the thought of Kant,
Fichte, Hegel, Barth and Pannenberg: The nature of human coadunacy,
the loss of human coadunacy and the restoration of human coadunacy.
We pointed out that while this schema would not be found expressed
as such during the course of our analysis we would be imposing it
upon our own thinking in this concluding chapter. We intend to make
good this promise now by outlining a Christian theological approach
to these three themes which appear, in their Christian mode, in the
following form: Human coadunacy as creaturely norm, The problematic 
of sin and The Christological restoration of coadunacy.
Three themes of coadunacy 
i. Human coadunacy as creaturely norm
In speaking of that which is normative for human being we are
engaging with issues concerning the very essence of humanity.
Explorations into the norms of human existence are motivated by the
fundamental question "what is a human being?" and for this reason
questions concerning normality are ontological ones which seek to
identify the necessary constitutive elements of human being. Such a
task is clearly fundamental to Christian theology which maintains
that humanity owes its existence to a creator God. Indeed the
Christian tradition has at its very centre an understanding of human
being as both intended by God and as in some way spoilt by
deviation from the divine intention. These perspectives on the
nature of human being are associated with the doctrines of creation
and redemption, the latter being understood in terms of new
creation, and the doctrine of sin. For the Christian tradition to
speak of human normativity is for it to address the issue of what
the creator God intended humanity to be. Thus, to suggest that
coadunacy is normative for human being a Christian theology must
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identify it as part of the divine creative intention for that being.
To this end certain doctrines, fundamental to the Christian
tradition, must be considered.
By saying that coadunacy is normative for human being, at its most
basic level, we are reiterating the biblical observation that it is
not good that we be alone and that the ideal mode of human existence
is to be one in Christ. The theological foci of normative human
coadunacy, it is suggested, may be usefully identified as having to
do with human creatureliness, which we have already considered in
chapter one, and the twin doctrines of the imago dei and the Triune 
nature of God. The choice of these particular doctrines for our
exploration into coadunacy as normative for humanity is hardly a
startling one. The doctines of the imago del and the Trinity are
considered foundational for the Christian tradition or to use a term
suggested by T.F.Torrance they are part of the "ground and grammar"
of theology. 7 It is to the Christian doctrine of creation that
theology has always looked for an understanding of human being as a
creature of God, as one whoeLvery existence is derived from God and
whose_nature and mode of being issues from the divine intention to
create a being of a certain kind. Furthermore, it is fundamental to
Christian theological anthropology that the human creature is
created in the divine image, that in some way human being is an echo
of the divine being. The doctrine of the imago del has always been
seen as central to any theological explication of the essential
nature of human being and consequently the Christian doctrines of
God and Humanity are inextricably linked. For the purposes of
our examination into the normativity of coadunacy for human being it
is the distinctively Christian understanding of God as Trinity which
is of significance here. Once again we must say that when dealing
with the doctrine of the Trinity we are engaging with a fundamental
doctrine of the Christian tradition which, while it has never ceased
to be problematic for theology, has always been regarded as central
to the understanding of God as Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The
point that we wish to make here is that the doctrines which we are
dealing with here as essential to our understanding of the norm of
coadunacy are by no means marginal to the Christian theological
enterprise but are ones which have always been recognised as being
of foundational significance.
The claim that human beings are first and foremost creatures is
already to establish them as in relation. That is to say that human
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being is always one pole of the creator/creature relationality
which, within the Christian tradition, is characterised as an
interpersonal relationship of familial intimacy. Thus a Christian
notion of coadunacy must involve, in its claim to normality,
reference to human creatureliness and we have already explored the
significance of human creatureliness in chapter one. In our quest to
focus our theological understanding of coadunacy as a norm for human
being we will concentrate our attention here on the doctrines of the
image of God, and the Trinity.
a. The imago dei and the norm of coadunacy 
The Christian doctrine of the imago dei is by no means an
unproblematic one. Questions concerning the constitution of the
imago and its status and condition in the light of human sin make it
a difficult doctrine to build on.	 The biblical tradition says
little concerning the specific nature of the _Lag_clin. In Genesis 1,
where the Judeo-Christian tradition finds the first reference to
human being created in the image of God, we read
"Let us make man in our image, after our likeness;
and let them have dominion over the fish of the seas
and over the birds of the air, and over the cattle,
and over all the earth..." So God created man in his
own image, in the image of God he created him; male
and female he created them.(Gen1:26)
We are further informed in Genesis 9 that while "every moving thing
that lives" may be considered food for man (9:3), "whosoever sheds
the blood of man by man shall his blood be shed; for God made man in
his own image" (7:6). This clearly indicates the sanctity of human
being as image bearer.
In the New Testament the imago dei is seen in a specifically
Christological light. In Colossians 1:5ff it is said of Christ that
He is the image of the invisible God, the first-born
over all creation. For by him all things were
created... He is before all things, and in him all
things hold together.
Similarly in 2 Corinthians 4:4f we hear of
the light of the gospel of the glory of Christ who
is the image of God ... For God who said "Let light
shine out of darkness" made his light shine in our
hearts to give us the light of knowledge of the
glory of God in the face of Christ."
It is significant that both these references to the imago are to be
found in passages concerning creation. We will consider this
further in a moment.
That the imago del is in some way constitutive for human being is
something that Christian theology has always wanted to maintain,
although the content of the image has been interpreted differently.
Augustine, referring to Genesis 1:26-27, writes: "... this text says
that human nature itself, which is complete in both sexes, was made
in this image of God. 'e
Thomas Aquinas, following Augustine, relates the imago to human
beings' unique rationality: "God's likeness in the manner of an
image is to be found in man as regards his mind; but as regards his
other parts only in the manner of a trace". e However he does go on
to suggest that the human bodily form is "more after God's image and
likeness than the bodies of other animals". 10
In many ways Calvin is in agreement with Aquinas when he informs us
that
although the primary seat of the divine image was in
the mind and heart, or in the soul and its powers,
yet there was no part of man, not even the body
itself, in which some spark did not glow."
Indeed, in the light of this Calvin asserts at the very outset of
his Institutes that "Without knowledge of self there is no knowledge
of God" and "without knowledge of God there is no knowledge of
self".1
With Luther we encounter a less precise and - as a result - a more
dynamic understanding of the imago del. For Luther, to be in the
image of God would appear to mean living a life orientated towards
God. In this respect the imago is relational for Luther rather than
having to do with a specific human power.
... my understanding of the image of God is this:
that Adam had it in his being and that he not only
knew God and believed that He was God, but that he
also lived in a life that was wholly godly; that is,
he was without the fear of death or of any other
danger, and was content with God's favour..1e
Luther paraphrases this understanding of the imago : "living, just
as God lives". 14
As we have already seen this understanding of the imago del as
principally relational is taken up and developed by Karl Barth.le
For Barth, to be created in the divine image is to be created after
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the image of the triune God who is always in relation. In this
respect, Barth's notion of the imago bears similarity to that of
Luther, in that it is our covenant relationship with God that is at
the very heart of the matter. Indeed, it is Christ's perfect
relationship with the Father which identifies him as truly the image
of God.
In a similar view, we found that for Wolfhart Pannenberg the imago 
has to do with relationality, with our future destiny to be one with
God and with our fellows.16
It is with this relational understanding of the imago del found,
for example, in Luther, Barth, Brunner and Pannenberg that we wish
to ally ourselves. It seems to us that four fundamental points
arise out of the Genesis 1 passage concerning the imago del.
Firstly, as we have argued in chapter one, human beings are
creatures of God and as such are, from the very outset of their
existence, in a Creator/creature relationship.
Secondly - and it is understood that this is a contentious issue -
the plural "let us make man..." (Elohim) is significant in that it
introduces an interpersonal dimension into the divine decision to
create human being. This divine plurality, which is subsequently
understood as triunity, represents the God who creates humanity as
personal and relational in his very essence, prior to any act of
creativity.	 It is because God is relational that he creates human
being, he does not create so that he might be relational.
	 As we
have learned from Hegel, it is only in the presence of otherness
that the one becomes truly personal." This person-forming
plurality in divinity is vital if we wish to understand human
personhood as being derived from God. This perspective is one that
is clearly taken up by Barth, as we have also seen.
Next - and again as we see in Barth - we are told that when God
created human being in his image he created male and female. Apart
from the clear implications this may be taken as having for sexual
equality, for man/woman relationships and for the sacrament of
marriage, this duality exemplifies the communal nature of the divine
image. Thus we would wish to maintain that while the imago del has
to do with human covenant relationship with the divine Creator, it
also has to do with a human self/other reciprocity which is
necessary to human existence, in the light of the divine assertion
that "it is not good for man to be alone". (Genesis 2:18)
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The radical nature of this relationality is illustrated by the
insufficiency of human relationship with any other creature (Genesis
2:20) and the subsequent description of woman as "bone of my bone
and flesh of my flesh" (Genesis 2:23). This radical "flesh and
bone" reciprocity is at the very heart of our notion of coadunacy as
having to do with congenital unity, ' e that is with a unity of
familial significance.
Finally we are told of humanity's "dominion" over the earth, which
issues out of his being created in the divine image. In the light
of this we would want to maintain that the imago del has to do not
only with human/divine and human/human relationality, but also with
relationality between human beings and their environment. Genesis
2:15 speaks of men being put in the garden of Eden to care for it,
and we are subsequently shown how human sin effected a radical
breakdown of harmonious relations with God, with other beings and
with the created order. (Genesis 3:17-19, cf. Romans 8:22). The
significance of place and situation is vital to any consideration of
human relationality and it is a concern to which we will be
returning in some detail.
Although Christology properly constitutes our third theme, it is
important to note here that, as Barth has argued so strenuously, the
imago del has a vital Christological dimension which must find a
major place in any discussion concerning human relationality.
Jesus' relationship with the Father must be regarded as the
paradigmatic form of coadunacy. The fact that the New Testament
references to Christ as the image of God are found within the
context of concern with creation is surely indicative of the
restoration of human relationality in a new act of creation in
Christ. We will speak of this further when we consider our third
theme. As we have already said the status of coadunacy as normative
for human being depends upon our understanding of the nature of the
God in whose image we are created. We turn our attention now to
therefore to the Christian doctrine of God as Trinity.
b. The triune nature of God and the norm of coadunacy 
The doctrine of the imago del becomes particularly significant for
the issue of human relationality with the development of a
trinitarian understanding of God. While a full discussion of the
development of the doctrine of the Trinity is beyond the scope of
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this present work 19
 there are a number of important points which do
need to be made, some of which have been adumbated above.
To begin with, in speaking of the divine Trinity the Christian
tradition claims to be saying something distinctive about the divine
ontology. Furthermore, it is expressing a truth about the nature of
God which is made apparent only by way of the divine self-witness.
In other words, the Christian confession of God as Trinity is
derived uniquely from his act of communing with humanity in history.
It is in the specific event of the incarnation of the Logos that we
witness the relationship of Father, Son and Spirit. In the person
of Jesus Christ we are permitted to gaze upon the mutuality of God
in the Son's address of the Father as a discrete person. We are led
further into the divine mutuality with the coming of the Paraclete,
the comforter, provided by Christ and described by him as the
mediator of his continued presence and activity to and for the
Church.
In its attempt to avoid both modalism and tritheism the doctrine of
the Trinity seeks to express the mystery of the divine unity in
particularity. As we saw when we considered the idealism of Hegel,
the tendency to subsume particularity into a single totalizing
subject has disastrous implications for coadunacy. The Trinitarian
understanding of God as the unity of three persons speaks of radical
reciprocity and not of absorption. In this respect Pannenberg's
suggestion that our Trinitarian formulations ought to begin with a
consideration of Jesus' relationship with the Father, as opposed to
beginning with debates concerning the pre-incarnate relationship of
the Logos with the Father, has considerable merit. 2° Clearly the
Gospel accounts of Jesus' relationship with the Father illustrate
both particularity and intimate communion. Jesus prays to his
Father and places himself in obedience to the will of the Father.
As we shall discuss in our concluding chapter, it is Jesus' attitude
of self-abandonment to the will of the Father which is paradigmatic
for our relationship with others.
Alongside this particularity Jesus' unity with the Father is made
quite apparent. "He who has seen me has seen the Father", says
Jesus. He prays that we will be united with one another even as he
is with the Father. Indeed the cry of dereliction from the cross is
surely expressive of the pain experienced as a result of the
intolerable rift which opened up between Father and Son. It is for
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these reasons that the New Testament can assert: "No one who denies
the Son has the Father; whoever acknowledges the Son has the Father
also". (John 2:23).
The Christian confession that "God is love" (1 John 4:16) also
speaks of divine relationality. To say that God is love is to say
that it is part of his very essence to love and that this has always
been the case even prior to human creation. The Triune God does not
require a created other to provide an object for his love, for he is
in eternal relationship with himself as Father, Son and Spirit.
Richard of St. Victor expresses this point with both clarity and
beauty when he writes:
Surely it ought to be noted in the divine persons
that the perfection of one demands the addition of
another and consequently in a pair of persons the
perfection of each requires union with a third. ...
For when two persons who mutually love embrace each
other with supreme longing and take supreme delight
in each other's love, then the supreme joy of the
first is in intimate love of the second, and
conversely the excellent joy of the second is in
love of the first.	 As long as only the first is
loved by the second, he alone seems to possess the
delights of his excellent sweetness. Similarly, as
long as the second does not have someone who shares
in love for a third (condilectus), he lacks the
sharing of excellent joy. In order that both may be
able to share delights of that kind, it is necessary
for them to have someone who shares in love for a
third. 21
It seems to us that an understanding of the triune nature of God as
being expressive of persons in relation is of immense value in
helping to establish communality as normative for human being.
Clearly if the triune nature of God is to be seen as significant for
human coadunacy, then a social model of the Trinity would appear to
be necessary. 22 Indeed, in our analyses of both Barth and
Pannenberg we were particularly concerned to assess the place and
significance of the doctrine of the Trinity for their respective
theological anthropologies.	 The point at which a social
understanding of the Trinity might become normative for human
sociality is quite clearly in the imago del. If human being is
truly to be regarded as being in the divine image then that image
must be communal in some manner. E.Schillebeeckx makes this very
point when he argues that
Created and called to be the 'image of God', the
image of the triune God, man is also orientated
towards the human community. Being man means living
in one great family of men, which comes from God and
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goes back to the one God. The love of God and
fellow-humanity are therefore two fundamental
demands of life. 23
We thus suggest that the imago del ought more properly to be
expressed as the imago trinitatis and that being after the likeness
of God is always being as communion. 24 As we shall see in
subsequent chapters, any monarchial understanding of the divine
being as, for example, a single subject, removes vital theological
support for the normality of human communality.
What we have attempted to focus on here in the first of our three
themes are the bases for a normative theological anthropology,
specifically as regards the norm of coadunacy, founded upon uniquely
Christian theological data. By normative we mean having to do with
the very ontology of human being. By Christian theological data we
have in mind doctrines that have been regarded as foundational to
the faith by the Christian tradition.
As we have argued above, that human being is derivative and
dependent is part of what the Christian tradition understands by
human creatureliness. At the very center of theological
anthropology, therefore, is the recognition that we are creatures of
God. Concomitantly we must understand our creatureliness as an
outworking of divine intent. That is, when God created human being
this act was a function of his will to create a being of a
particular type. For this reason it is appropriate for theology to
speak of the norm for human existence - in other words, the divine
intention for human being.
For our purposes we have been concerned to articulate the basis for
normative human coadunacy - that is to say, for human being as
essentially relational by divine intent. We have argued for this
normative coadunacy in the light of human creatureliness, the imago 
dei and the trinitarian being of God. Human being is being in
relation precisely because it is created being, and thus always
encounters an other in its Creator. 26 Furthermore, human being is
created in the divine image that is, in the image of the God who is
himself always in relation, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. The
reciprocity encountered in Jesus' relationship with the Father
speaks to us of a trinitarian communality which is radical, but
which avoids the absorption of one into the other.	 Thus in our
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understanding of human communality as an expression of the imago 
trinitatis the particularity of the other must be maintained as an
essential aspect of that being in communality.
Ii. The problematic of sin 
In the previous section we have suggested that any notion of
communality that is to be considered normative for human being ought
to entail as its essential foundations human creatureliness, the
doctrine of the imago del and 	 the divine interpersonal triunity 
which informs the relational dimension of that image. It is
precisely this doctrine of the image of God, with its reference to
human origins in God's creativity and character, which gives
Christian anthropology its normative perspective. That is to say it
permits Christian theology to engage in discussions concerning what
Is proper and improper to an understanding of human being. 	 The
inquiry into the nature of human being, for Christian theology, must
always take into account the divine, creative intention. Our
anthropology is not purely phenomenological; for Christian theology
human being is a function of divine agency.
Having said this it is vital that our present experience of the
brokenness of human relationality be acknowledged as a - if not the
- fundamental problematic of the Christian faith. In saying this we
are engaging with the existential reality of human being. These two
poles of the essential and the existential are always present in a
theology which tries to do justice both to God's creative
sovereignty, and to human actuality.26
As has been mentioned earlier, the biblical tradition clearly
identifies sin as having to do with the brokenness of human
relationships with God and with others. Indeed human sinfulness has
always been regarded as central to Christian dogmatic theology, and
this is inevitably so given that it constitutes the raison d'être of
the Christian gospel of salvation. To characterise Jesus' message
and mission as one of redemption, or reconciliation or salvation, is
always to prompt the question - redemption from what?
The doctrine of sin is in itself a problem in that it appears to
elude precise definition. R. R. Williams informs us that "there is no
positively stated orthodox doctrine of sin comparable to the
soteriological doctrines of Trinity and Christology". 27 However,
having recognised the relational aspect of the imago, it ought not
to surprise us if we find that sin - which in some way signifies the
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loss of or damage to the imago - also has a relational dimension.
It has been suggested that the doctrine of sin is best understood as
a "tensive symbol", expressive of a range of meanings 26' and this
seems to us to be a useful perspective. Thus, while we will most
certainly be laying emphasis upon the relational dimension of sin,
this is by no means to suggest that this exhausts the meaning of the
doctrine.
In his book Death; the Riddle and the Mystery, Eberhard Jiingel
speaks of sin and its ultimate end in death in terms of
relationlessness. He writes:
... death is the consequence of man's pernicious
drive	 toward	 this	 relationlessness.	 Man's
disastrous urge towards the deadliness of
relationlessness stands in direct proportion to
death's aggressiveness as alienating man from God
and as breaking up human relationships.29
In a similar vein, as we have seen, Pannenberg wishes to interpret
sin in terms of "centredness" or "ego-centricity", where the
individual person's openness to God and to others is replaced by
self-prioritizing. Karl Barth, writing in The Christian Life, is
quite adamant that "the Fall" was a fall not only away from God, but
away from one another: "In and with the sin of Adam, who wanted to
be as God, there is already enclosed the sin of Cain."30
The Judeo-Christian picture of the Fall has at its root man's desire
for autonomy and self-sufficiency. As Barth points out from the
Genesis narrative, Adam's sin was that he wanted to be as God. The
consequence of this dislocation from God is that we no longer
consider ourselves to be our brother's keeper. Our current
experience of relational brokenness prompts us always to encounter
the other as a stranger. Indeed, the opening chapter of the Gospel
of John illustrates how even God is now considered a stranger by us:
"He was in the world, and though the world was made through him, the
world did not recognise him. He came to that which was his own, but
his own did not receive him." (John 1:100.
It seems to us that our experience of the other as stranger is born,
in part, out of fear: fear of, or at the very least anxiety over,
the sin of Cain, fear of the potential for violence and animosity
Inherent in the mysterious stranger. It is this which represents
the tragedy and paradox of relational brokenness, for while it is
the mysteriousness of the stranger which fuels our fear, it is our
fear which helps to fuel our estrangement from the other. 	 In the
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light of this it is important that Christian theology articulate a
strategy for breaking into this paradox, and clearly this must be a
Christological strategy for it is Christ who frees us from fear. We
shall be exploring such a strategy in a subsequent section of this
chapter by means of the notions of signals of availability and self-
abandonment to the other as ways in which the self may be
disempowered for the other.
Clearly if we wish to talk about the normality of human coadunacy
then we must attempt to account for our present experience of
relational brokenness. Similarly, if we wish to speak of the
reconciling work of Christ as an empowering to restored and
transformed coadunacy, as we do, then we must understand such an
empowering as taking place in the context of human sin. In other
words, we must avoid any triumphalistic tendency which understands
full human relationality to be restored immediately by divine fiat.
Those who acknowledge Christ as Lord and who constitute his Church
are quite clearly not experiencing full coadunacy. No matter how
realized an eschatology one may have, there is no sense in which
humanity, or any group of human beings, might be regarded as
fulfilling the image of God in all its intended perfection, at the
present time. Jurgen Moltmann sums up this point when he writes:
It is the old experience so often shared by
believers: 'Christianus semper est in fieri', says
Luther. A Christian's being is in becoming. His
becoming is a continual repentance, a continual new
start in a new direction.	 It is a new start from
sin to righteousness, from slavery to freedom, from
doubt to faith, and from past to future. 	 That is
why the Christian's being is still hidden in the
womb of the divine future.	 'It does not yet appear
what we shall be'. (1 Jn.3:2).31
In the light of this it will be important to discuss the conditions 
for coadunacy. In other words, how is true Christ-like communion
with the other brought about within the context of a fallen and thus
alienated humanity?
Throughout this work it has been found that while certain
influential thinkers are clearly aware of the normative status of
self/other,	 subject/object relationality,	 and while they are
similarly aware of disjunctions between the two poles of this
relationality, the manner in which unity is seen to be restored
tends to prioritize the subject over the object. We have suggested
that this is true not only of philosophers such as Hegel, but also
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of theologians such as Barth who appear to prioritize the agency of
the divine Subject over human particularity. It seems to us that
this prioritizing of the subject over the other is part of what the
Christian tradition would wish to understand as sin.	 In this
respect it is part of the sickness and not part of the cure.
In speaking of the human experience of broken relationality, we are
thus dealing with nothing less than the Christian doctrine of sin.
To say, as we have done above, that the imago dei has to do with
relationality is also to say that the loss of that image, or any
damage suffered by it, also has to do with relationality.
Human relational brokenness affects both our relationship with God
and that with our fellows. Human sin seeks to prioritize the self
over the other, and to establish an autonomous egocentricity. This
condition of sin gives rise to the tragic fear-estrangement
syndrome, where we fear the stranger because of his or her
strangeness, and we perpetuate estrangement because of our fear.
The reality of human sinfulness experienced in terms of relational
brokenness takes the form of a tragic condition which unaided
humanity is incapable of resolving. It is for this reason that the
Christian tradition speaks of the need for grace and for divine
empowering to a restored humanity - the divine image.
iii. The Christological restoration of coadunacy 
As we have already mentioned, hope for restored coadunate existence
and the empowering necessary for its realization is always to be
understood Christologically. The Christological reference of our
anthropology is two-fold, and corresponds to the afore-mentioned
poles of the essential and the existential; that is to say, it has
to do with Christ both as the revelation of what human being should
be - the essential - and as the one who responds to and overcomes
the brokenness of our situation - the existential. In the light of
this we can speak of Christ as the one who is our exemplar, the
"true" human being, whom we must imitate, and as the one who
empowers us to the restored image of God. Both these poles need to
be maintained if we wish to avoid an understanding of Jesus Christ
which regards him as either simply an example to be followed or as a
totalising power who ultimately does violence to human freedom.
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It is through the person and work of Jesus Christ that we are
reconciled to God and our fellows. This relational aspect of
salvation is consonant with the systematic pattern which we have
already suggested whereby the imago is seen as essential
relatedness, and sin as the breakdown of human relationality. The
New Testament speaks of a "new creation in Christ" 32 whereby those
who follow Christ and who constitute his Church are to be restored
to the ideal of human existence before God. As we have seen in a
previous chapter, human destiny for communion with God and others is
a major theme in Pannenberg's theology where it is expressed with
great insight.
As we shall also see in the rest of this chapter, our concern with
the empowering and the imitation of Christ raises important
questions about the relationship between divine and human action.
To say that restored human coadunacy is fundamentally Christological
could be to do nothing more than to take refuge behind one of the
primary symbols of Christian theology. What we must do here, albeit
in a suggestive manner, is to specify what we might mean by invoking
Christology in this way, considering these two categories of the
empowering of Christ and the imitation of Christ.
a. The Empowering of Christ 
By "Christological empowering", what we ultimately have in mind is
grace; that is, God's unconditional gift of salvation from sin and
reconciliation with himself through the person and work of Christ.
The Christian faith has always maintained, in some form or another,
that sin has to do with an "enslavement" from which human beings are
incapable of releasing themselves. 39 It follows that human
alienation, as an aspect of sin, is similarly invincible, and that
grace is necessary to effect freedom from this condition. As we
have already noted, the New Testament uses the language of creation
and re-creation to describe both the person of Christ as the image
of God, and also the redemptive work of Christ on our behalf. In
other words, what we are saying is this: for Christian theology to
talk about the restoration of human coadunacy is not for it to
engage, primarily, in sociological but in soteriological discourse.
We thus suggest that human communality, in the context of human
brokenness, is made truly possible only via the empowering work of
Christ, by which human being is restored to the imago del. Only
through the restoration of human being to proper creaturely
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relationship with God and to the image of that triune God - in other
words, divine being as communion - is coadunacy re-established as
normative for humanity. The "high-priestly prayer" in the Fourth
Gospel has Jesus praying that those who believe might be unified.34
Similarly in the letter to the Galatians we are told that we are
"all one in Christ Jesus" because of our "faith in Christ Jesus",
because we were "baptised into Christ" and "clothed with Christ".36
It seems clear that according to the New Testament witness the
normality of coadunacy lies solely in the reality of being the body 
of Christ. It is as Christ's body that human beings are, in the
context of their sinfulness, restored to unity with each other and
with God. E.Schillebeeckx sums up this point when he writes with
reference to Vatican II:
...the christian basis of the community and of
fellow-humanity is concisely stated - God calls us
in Christ to a community of brothers. The gift of
grace is a covenant between God and his people, his
great family. Because of this, the church of Christ
is a fraternal community.6
b. The Imitation of Christ 
Having considered the place of divine empowering to coadunacy
through Christ, we also want to suggest here that a truly Christian
notion of coadunacy ought to involve the imitation of Christ. That
is to say that if Jesus Christ is to be understood as the exemplar
of the Christian faith, and the revelation par excellence of what
true (essential) human being ought to be, then relating to others as
Jesus related to others must be a primary condition for human
coadunacy.
The basic concept of incarnation as the presence of God with us,
Emmanuel, should not be overlooked in this context. The very mode
of God's salvific work is itself a relational act and communicates
something of the nature of the God in whose image we are made.
Jesus, as the God-man, is the one in whom we see radical reciprocity
between human and divine; he is the revelation of the God who
communicates himself, and of true humanity which is realised in
response to God.
The imitation of Christ must take into account both the life and the
teaching of Jesus. As we noted in our openning chapter, Jesus'
personal message of forgiveness of sins is linked in the gospels
with our forgiveness of one another.
	 Indeed, throughout the
gospels, Jesus' teaching is concerned with relational themes:
-250-
forgiveness, love, service of others - and all this, unilaterally.37
As we saw in chapter one, the parables of the good Samaritan and the
prodigal son illustrate the unconditional nature of the demand that
we love God and our neighbour as ourselves. In Matthew 23:8ff we
hear Jesus speaking of the familial unity of humanity which exists
on the basis of God's fatherhood and which should prompt our service
of one another. Although we do not have time to explore this theme
here, we would also see as significant Jesus' attitude towards his
followers. They are described in familial terms; he prays that his
disciples will be one, even as he and the Father are one; and the
understanding of the Church as a coadunate entity, the body of
Christ, is clearly extremely important in the rest of the New
Testament.39
Jesus' teaching must not, of course, be seen in isolation from his
own life and person. Again as we saw in chapter one, Jesus'
relationship with the Father is the paradigmatic form of inter-
personal relationality, and self-giving to the Father and to others
is at the heart of Jesus' being. 	 It seems to us that the mode of
relationality most characteristic of Jesus' relationship with others
is one of self-abandonment. We shall explore this way of relating
to the other in some detail in the concluding chapter of this work.
Suffice it to say here that the New Testament witness presents us
with a picture of Jesus as the one who gave himself completely to
others, without condition or reserve and even unto death; the one
who declared that he had come not "to be served, but to serve, and
to give my life as a ransom for many."(Mark 10:45). Jesus'
relationship with others is never seen to be conditioned by fear or
animosity, even in the face of hostility. Jesus is regarded by the
New Testament as the one who is always available to the other, with
all the risks that such unconditional availability might involve.
Of primary significance then is the experience of Jesus on the
cross. It is at the cross that we are made aware of the depth of
Jesus' relationship with the Father both in his abandonment to the
Father's will, even to death, and in his cry of dereliction.
Furthermore it is at the cross that we see Jesus' rejection of the
category of stranger and enemy in his act of forgiveness toward
those who have caused his suffering.
We would suggest here that any truly Christian notion of human
coadunacy ought to entail the imitation of Christ whereby
-251-
relationship with the other is characterised by this self-
abandonment and unconditional availability.
Given the validity of all we have said above concerning grace and
the centrality of Christological empowering to coadunacy, it is
important not to marginalise the place of human agency in this
imitation of Christ if we are to preserve the integrity of human
particularity and avoid christological totalism where all of
humanity is subsumed into the person of Christ. Clearly belief in
Christ has not brought about true human coadunacy even within the
Church and, as often as not, the New Testament expresses the ideal
of communality in the form of a demand. Love of God and of neighbour
is found as a commandment on Jesus' lips. Similarly in Matthew's
account of the Sermon on the Mount we are told not to "resist an
evil person", to love our enemies and to thus be perfect as the
Father is perfect. 39 Insistence on easy social utopia is not part
of the Christian tradition and thus true human coadunacy has to be
achieved.	 There are conditions to be fulfilled before coadunacy is
an actuality for human being.
The second reason to stress the imitation of Christ as a human
response and decision is to avoid the tendency to so emphasize God's
activity in redemption that the particularity of the human other is
somehow subsumed in the divine subject. This is a theme which has
been pursued, in one form or another, throughout this thesis.
In speaking of the Christological dimensions of human coadunacy we
are, in a sense, returning to our preliminary concerns with
normative coadunacy and divine creativity. It is Jesus Christ who
is identified by the New Testament as the imago del and thus true
human being. It is thus through the person and work of Christ that
human being is re-created and restored. This image is seen to be
restored by Christ by virtue of the reconciliation he brings about
between human being and its Creator, and human being and itself. It
is this Christological empowering to reconciliation and restored
coadunacy which breaks into our existential experience of the
syndrome of fear and estrangement.
In Christ, who is the agent of creation, human being has restored to
It, by grace, the conditions necessary for coadunacy: reconcilition
with God, restoration of the imago, freedom from fear and, as
Pannenberg puts it, hope for a communal destiny with God and others.
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The presence of Christ among those who follow him and acknowledge
him as Lord always results in an empowering to community. This has
always been the experience of believers from the first disciples to
the present day. In this respect the Church represents a witness to
the potential for restored human coadunacy and also points forward
to a destiny where we might be one in Christ.
Alongside this emphasis upon Christological empowering we have
placed the notion of the imitation of Christ. This is necessary if
we wish to avoid a form of determinism which in its emphasis upon
grace, reduces the significance of human particularity and
otherness, and in so doing partakes of the brokenness of coadunacy,
rather than in its restoration.
In Christ we see the perfect example of coadunate divinity and
humanity. He is the true image of God, the one who both abandons
himself to the will of the Father, and also abandons himself to us
In the face of our estrangement.	 Both in his person and in his
teaching Jesus exemplifies the denial of estrangement which is
proper to those who are in the image of the triune God. Thus,
alongside human empowering to coadunacy in Christ, where God is
actively engaged in an act of re-creation, there must also exist
human response. This response must take the form of a strategy for
the imitation of Christ.	 The letter to the Philippians is worth
quoting here as it expresses exactly what we have in mind.
If you have any encouragement from being united with
Christ, if any comfort from his love, if any
fellowship with the Spirit, if any tenderness and
compassion, then make my Joy complete by being like-
minded, having the same love, being one in spirit
and purpose. Do nothing out of selfish ambition or
vain conceit, but in humility consider others better
than yourselves. Each of you should look not only
to your own interests, but also the interests of
others. Your attitude should be the same as that of
Jesus Christ: Who, being in very nature God, did not
consider equality with God something to be grasped,
but made himself nothing, taking the very nature of
a servant, being made in human likeness. And being
found in appearance as a man, he humbled himself and
became obedient to death - even death on a cross.
(Philippians 2:1-8)
In the following chapter we shall speak at some length concerning a
possible strategy for Christ-like self-abandonment and also the
significance of context for human coadunacy.
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CHAPTER EIGHT CONCLUSIONS: THE DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN COADUNACY 
In this chapter we intend to treat two distinct areas of human
relationality which have emerged as problematic throughout our
previous analytic chapters. Firstly, it would seem that for all the
thinkers with whom we have engaged it is the immediate self who is
prioritized within self/other relationality. Indeed not only is the
self prioritized but in some cases the other is actually understood
as subsumed by the self. We have suggested throughout this work that
this totalization of the self is at variance with a truly Christian
understanding of coadunacy which has the self-abandoning Christ at
its centre. It is the nature of this Christ-like self-abandonment
and the suggestion of a possible strategy to this end which will
occupy us during the first half of this chapter.
Our second area of concern here issues out of our observation that
among the thinkers with whom we have had to do the significance of
the context in which self/other relationality takes place appears to
be marginalised. By the context of relationality we have in mind
notions of situatedness and place. In the light of this apparent
omission we will spend some time discussing the possible
significance of situatedness and place for our understanding of
human coadunacy.
We have suggested that the notion of coadunacy be understood at its
most basic level in terms of persons in relation inhabiting an
environment. In the light of this rather crude definition the
following discussion will fall into two distinct parts. The first
will address the issue of human relationality, that is community
between the self and the Other, while the latter will deal with the
question of human involvement in an environment specifically as this
relates to situatedness and the notion of place.
1. The Self and the Other 
i. Structural Controls 
Before proceeding with a full discussion of coadunate relationality
it is important that we identify certain structural limits to the
notion which will help to guide us in establishing its shape.
The overriding factor in our consideration of human coadunacy has
already been spelled out: that it is founded upon the
creator/creature duality and the divine trinitarian relationality as
mediated to human being through the imago del. The following
controls, founded upon insights drawn from a previous analytical
chapters, thus suggest themselves: firstly, coadunacy has to do, at
its core, with inter-personal relating and therefore defies
reduction beyond the complex of the self and the other.
Concomitantly it is in opposition to isolationism and radical or
autonomous individualism.
Secondly, coadunacy refers to a non-absorptive relationality; that
is to say the self and the other, while unified and esential to each
other, remain distinct selves. There is no absorption of the self
and the other into a third category of coadunacy, just as the
Father, Son and Spirit are not absorbed into one undifferentiated
Godhead.
Thirdly, coadunate relationality is non-totalizing in that the self
is not subsumed in the other, nor the other in the self.
Finally, coadunacy has to do with a particular quality of relating
which takes the trinitarian character as its standard. Thus we will
expect to find categories such as love, mercy and justice inherent
within the notion of coadunacy.
Bearing these controls in mind we shall now proceed to discuss the
shape of the dynamic of coadunacy.
ii. The Stranger and the Availability of the Self 
There is a very real sense in which, no matter how isolated we may
be, we are always found to be in relation with other persons. This
relationship may be merely formal in that we are someone's child or
parent, or a relative of some kind, it may be simply functional,
manifesting itself in our dealings with shop assistants and various
forms of bureaucracy. Even antagonism and out-and-out isolationism
require us to be in relation, otherwise to whom are we antagonistic,
and from whom are we isolated? The point is that while we exist we
are always, to a greater or lesser extent, available to others even
if this availability is merely the prolegomena to a denial of the
other. Furthermore, even this wilful denial of the other must be a
denial in the face of the givenness of our relationship with the
other. The other who is alienated from me via an act of will on the
part of either of us is still other for me. I still encounter him
or her as a person, an embodied locus of particularity'.
Thus my enemy and even the stranger are never entirely free of the
complex of relationality. Indeed, it is this unavoidability of
relationality which refers us back to the protological basis of
coadunacy that human being is in essence created as persons in
relation and as such images the divine triune relationality. It is
the very being of humanity to be in relation, for to say human being
is to speak of the self/other complex, just as to speak of God is
always to speak of Father, Son and Spirit. The whole gamut of human
emotions and experiences are inextricably bound up with our
relatedness.	 Love, hate, jealousy, gratitude, greed, pain and joy
all find a place within the matrix of our relationality. When we
are denied the normal avenues of relationship we often find
surrogates in fictional characters, television personalities and
pets.
However, in speaking of coadunacy in accordance with our
aforementioned structural controls, we are concerned not merely with
the bare bones of the fact of human relationality but with a
particular quality of relating. If we are right 'in maintaining that
self/other relationality is at the very heart of human being then
our qualitative concerns with respect to human relationality are
precisely identifiable with the quality of being human. That is to
say that a view of human being as coadunate must seek to articulate
a more complete and satisfying understanding of what it means to be
human than do non-relational models.
In that coadunacy is a theological notion and more specifically a
Christian theological notion it must ultimately leave us with a view
of humanity which is consistent with the teachings of Jesus and the
witness of the Christian tradition concerning the quality of human
being. We have already considered the eschatological basis for
human coadunacy with respect to the restoration and transformation
of human being in the person and work of Christ, and thus will not
recapitulate here. Suffice it to say here that for our notion of
coadunacy to remain Christian it must be expressive of the dignity
and value attributed to humanity by its Creator.
That a lower level of relationality is in operation during our
interaction with, for example, an acquaintance whom we might nod to
on the train every morning than is the case with a life-long friend
with whom we grew up is clearly obvious. The question is, however,
what makes the relationship I have with a close friend qualitatively
superior to that which I have with a nodding acquaintance? By way
of an answer to this question we would like to suggest that the
quality of relationality is related to the level of availability.
By availability we mean the self's availability for and to the
other. Let us consider this availability factor more closely.
As has already been mentioned there is a sense in which we are
always available to the other, even if this availability is only
passive. If we can be referred to in any way, by sight or sound for
example, or even by second-hand description, then we are available
to the other in such a way that we can be reacted to. I have never
personally met with certain of the world's fist dictators nor have
they made any attempt to relate with me directly. Similarly I know
little about Mother Theresa and cannot really say that I have a
significant relationship with her. However both the dictators and
Mother Theresa are available enough to me through second-hand
sources for me to dislike dictator "X" and to like Mother Theresa.
In that I can declare my liking for the one person and my dislike
for the other, it might Justifiably be said that I relate to them.
However in that they are totally unaware of me there is a lack of
reciprocity such that a true dynamic of relationship cannot be said
to pertain. The other might well be available to me but I am not
available to the other unless, of course, I take steps to facilitate
my availability to them by visiting the aforementioned people in,
let us say, South America and Calcutta. It is only really by
meeting with these people that I might make myself available to them
and they might truly make themselves available to me.
The generalities of public availability such as are commonplace
among the famous and infamous, are really no basis for a
relationship. The famous are in the public eye, not in my eye. By
maintaining a rapid report rate it becomes possible for the media to
simulate the dynamic process of personal activity in such a way that
one might feel that one actually knows or has a relationship with
certain public figures, the royal family for example. A daily
report on what the Princess of Wales is wearing or doing can build
up an image which might be related to. The effect is akin to a
childrens' flick-book where an image in a slightly different pose is
printed on every page so that when the pages are flicked through at
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speed the illusion of a moving figure is created.
	 The more pages
and images, and the faster the flick rate, the smoother and more
convicing the image. Similarly with a film, we have a vast number
of complex images each being minutely different from its neighbours
such that when they are presented to us at a particular rate we
perceive the perfect illusion of activity.
	 But the truth is that
the images do not move.
In a similar manner successive images of particular persons are
presented to us via reports and second-hand accounts in such a rapid
fashion that the illusion of active personal dynamic is achieved.
This illusion is so convincing that we do quite often feel ourselves
to be in a real relationship with a real person, rather than with
what is at best a crude analogue of that person. We indulge in many
such one-sided pseudo-relationships where the other is either
constructed by some anonymous third party or even by ourselves.
There is a great trend within the childrens' toy industry to produce
toys which are "your friend": dolls with unique faces and birth
certificates, teddy bears with name tags and labels asking you to
take care of them. It is even possible to purchase a doll which
responds to your voice with its own random conversation, indeed it
is quite amusing to place 140 such dolls in the same room and watch
them converse with each other. In the computer industry the quest
for true artificial intelligence, while being a questionable one,
certainly has its advocates and even though such articifial
intelligence is still a reality only for science fiction, computers
are programmed to relate to us as if they were persons. 	 In the
parlance of the computer industry, we interface with the machines.
There are two points to be made concerning the sort of relating
described above, that is, with public images, simulated companions
such as talking dolls, and interactive machines. Firstly, and quite
obviously, we are not dealing with real persons but with simulcra of
persons, artificial constructs which are in no way synonymous with a
dynamic subject. Such simulcra are mere static images presented to
us by some anonymous agency. These are mythological persons
constructed in our image and made available to us by the
manufacturer or reporter or the media executive. They are made
available to us for they are unable to make themselves available. A
fascinating example of this image-making is to be found in the
phenomenon of the film star, particularly during the silent film
era2.
The second point to be made here is that while such simulcra of
persons cannot make themselves available to and for me as they are
not true selves, neither, by the same token, can I make myself
available to them.	 In other words there is no capacity for
acceptance within these artificial others. 	 Thus we find that an
image of a person is given to us, it does not give itself, and
further we cannot give ourselves to such an image. Ultimately we
are talking here of the dynamic of reciprocal availability between
the self and the other where the authentic giving of oneself as an
act of will is met with the authentic free acceptance of that gift
by the other, similarly as an act of will. Let us consider, then,
not the self confronted by the image of a person but by a true
person, the subject who is other to me and to whom I myself am
other.
We started by suggesting that the difference between my relationship
with an acquaintance and my relationship with a close friend might
be located in the level of availability of one to the other. Let us
pursue this thought further.
In my first encounter with the other the dominant experience is one
of alienation. The other conforms to the category of stranger.
Once we have assimilated the passive availability of the other as
embodied we are confronted by the threatening mysteriousness of the
stranger. The stranger is not mine nor is he or she for me, there
is no availability involved in the other who is stranger; nothing
of the self of the other is freely and willingly offered by the
stranger. The stranger remains a stranger because he knows that
knowledge is power and that to give knowledge of one self to another
is to give power over oneself to the others. Into the vacuum that
is the stranger we empty our fears and mistrusts, casting the other
in the image of the predator who is out to consume us if once given
advantage over us. This is the point of Hegel's master/slave
discussion, that we fear that our initial experience of the other
will give rise to a confrontation in which the other will seek to
dominate us.	 It is this fear which establishes estrangement as our
primary experience of the other; 	 as much as anything it is a
defensive posture.
The experience of the non-availability of the stranger is universal.
We need only to enter a so-called "public" place to be able to
identify the ways in which we deny ourselves for the other. Of
course the occupation of a public place is certainly a significant
step towards availability in that it brings the self and the other
together in proximity to each other. However, such benefits as this
bestows in terms of facilitating availability can be almost
completely obviated by our will towards estrangement. It is this
will towards estrangement, fuelled by fear and mistrust, that will
prevent two people sitting together in a doctor's waiting room from
conversing with each other. We communicate nothing of ourselves in
these encounters,	 our faces become impassive,
	 our language
monosyllabic. If we happen to be also in the company of a friend,
our conversations with that person are carried out in hushed
whispers.
When in a strange place I find myself loath to ask for directions
for fear of placing myself in the hands of a stranger. We dread
calling attention to ourselves, preferring rather the anonymity of a
particular uniform, be it a pin-striped suit or denim jeans.
Similarly we would rather concentrate our attentions upon anything
rather than the other person: a newspaper or magazine, a personal
hi-fi, the passing scenery or even our footwear. As strangers to
the other we present only an image in much the same sense as the
images of the famous which are presented to us in newspapers. Our
existence as strangers to the other is expressive of the same type
of unavailability as we found in the doll and the machine, more
sophisticated perhaps and reinforced by the presence of our physical
bodies in a place shared with the other, but a simulcra of a person,
nonetheless. I sat beside someone for months in a university
library, presenting an image of utter studious seriousness, before a
chance occurrence opened up the way beyond this construct and to a
relationship of infinitely greater significance. It is to a
consideration of the nature of this "chance occurence" that we shall
now turn.
Bearing in mind all that we have said concerning our experience of
the other as stranger and considering this in the light of the
obvious tendency of persons towards relationships with other
persons, we clearly find ourselves in the presence of a tension.
The resolution of this tension is the very act of making friends.
It is the transition from estrangement to communion, from the non-
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availability of the self to an at least partial availability. The
catalyst, or catalysts, which trigger off this dramatic transition
are extremely complex and it is not the task of this work to make an
examination of them in any detail. However, it is relatively
straightforward to catalogue some of the major factors involved.
Body language has been recognized of late to play a significant part
in the preliminary stages of human interaction, as have other forms
of non-verbal communication such as the wearing of certain clothes,
and being regularly present in certain places. Spoken language, no
matter how formal the style, may also provide clues pertaining to an
appropriate way into a relationship with another. A term that is
sometimes used to describe these agents which catalyse relationships
is sign or signal, and we shall utilize this terminology here.
A signal of availability must itself be an act of availability. By
making such a signal we are communicating something of ourself to
the other, albeit in a guarded way. Thus, even from within the
depths of our estrangement from the other, our essential being as
relational, founded upon the imago trinitatis, manifests itself in
our first tentative offering of ourselves to the other. Of course,
such signals of availability are not always actively directed at the
other. An aspect of my behaviour may be observed by the other and
interpreted as a signal. For example, let us return to my image of
studiousness in a university library. My estrangement from the
person sitting next to me might well have persisted had that person
not noticed my surreptitious reading of some science fiction
literature. It was this chance observation which prompted him to
express his appreciation of the genre, and thus initiate a
conversation from which would ultimately develop a close personal
friendship. So what is the nature of these signals such that they
can stimulate the dramatic process from stranger to friend?
As we have already mentioned a signal of availability, whether it is
active, such as wearing a badge expressing one's political
persuasion, or passive, for example engaging in a piece of non-
directive behaviour such as reading a book in a public place, is in
itself an act of availability. Although we may fear making
ourselves too available to the other and thus opening ourselves up
to abuse, we cannot stop being ourselves no matter how adept we
might be at rendering ourselves unavailable to the stranger. We
will generally dress in a manner we find pleasing, we will read what
we find interesting, we will often be found in places which we find
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congenial indulging ourselves in favourite pursuits. All these
factors, and many others, may serve as signals indicating a non-
threatening common ground upon which I and the stranger might meet.
This common ground appears to be constructed from a mutual exchange
of information concerning ourselves.
The point of such an exchange is that while it inevitably speaks of
a degree of mutual availability, it does not involve an imbalance of
power. For example, in our experience of estrangement there is in
operation not a dynamic of relationality but a static balance of
power.
	
I have no power over the stranger and they have no power
over me.	 In some ways this situation may be seen as analogous to
the keeping of state secrets at an international level. However
once I discover, via a signal of some sort, that the stranger shares
with me an appreciation of a certain type of literature I am free to
make this aspect of myself available to that person with little fear
that by doing so I might be placing myself in the power of the
other. For example, the person sitting next to me in the library
would be unlikely to approach me as a strangerand admit to a liking
for science fiction literature for fear that I might ridicule him
for his interests or simply reject this offering of personal
information as a matter of complete indifference to me. However,
this fear of my power to dismiss this aspect of the stranger is
dissipated when the basis for the experience of this power is
removed. In the light of the stranger's observation of the sign
indicating my enjoyment of science fiction, he is free to offer me
the same information concerning himself safe in the knowledge that
sharing the same knowledge about each other gives us the same power
over each other, and thus negates the potency of that power. To use
a crude but nevertheless useful analogy, you might well find a man
with a fine head of hair ridiculing a bald man, but you will never
see two bald men ridiculing each other for being bald.
Of course our day-to-day experience of the stranger and our
encounters with other persons are by no means as formal as the
preceding comments tend to imply. However despite this formalism,
which is sadly unavoidable in any attempt at describing
interpersonal relations in a systematic way, I believe the above
observations to be accurate to our preliminary experience of the
other, particularly as we encounter that other - as stranger. I would
suggest that often our fears, the transmission of signals of
availability and the balancing of powers between ourselves and the
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stranger operate at an unconscious, instinctive level rather than at
the level of cynical manipulation and out-and-out paranoia.
The process of developing friendship continues with an ever-
increasing availability to and for the other. With each new act of
availability, that is, with each new reciprocal communication of an
aspect of self which takes place between the self and the other,
there follows a reduction in the possibility of dominating power and
an increase in the power to participate. JUrgen Moltmann makes the
distinction between these two modes of empowering in his 1984-1988
Gifford lectures, God in Creation 
If science sets its sights on the acquisition of
power, then scientific knowledge is dominating
knowledge. We know something to the extent in which
we can dominate it. 	 We understand something if we
can 'grasp' it ... But belief in creation only
arrives at the understanding of creation when it
recollects the alternative forms of meditative 
knowledge.	 'We know to the extent to which we
love', said Augustine.	 Through this form of
astonished, wondering and loving knowledge, we do
not appropriate things.	 We recognize their
independence and participate in their life.	 We do
not wish to know so that we can dominate. We desire
to know in order to participate. This kind of
knowledge confers community, and can be termed
communicative knowledge, as compared with dominating
knowledge4.
With this reduction of the power to dominate the attendant fear of
domination is dissipated, and is ultimately replaced by trust. The
feared stranger is no more and the other has become the friend with
whom I can "feel at home". This "feeling at home" with another
speaks of the inclusion of the other into our personal existence.
Our home is often a place where we may go and shut out the stranger;
to be at home with someone is to see them not as strangers to be
shut out, but as part of our selves, and thus as participants in our
lives at the most intimate of levels. To the friend we are
vulnerable because when we enter our "home" so as to shut out the
rest of the world the friend is shut in with us.
Ultimately the process of signals and mutual exchanges of aspects of
ourselves gives way to free communion. At this point the careful
attention to the balance of power which characterises our
preliminary interaction with the other is transformed by trust into
unilateral self-availability.	 In other words, we begin to give of
ourselves without the assurance of a secure power-base from which we
are unassailable.	 We communicate with the other freely and without
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fear.	 It is for this reason that we do not have to establish a
common ground, via an exchange of information, for every aspect of
our lives before making it available to the other. 	 Mature
friendship does not continue as a never-ending process of mutual
disarmament.	 There is a very real sense in which we are still
potentially powerful, in a dominant way, over our friends and they
over us. Friendship always involves risks precisely because as the
friendship deepens, we no longer call upon our friends to divest
themselves of their power over us by vouchsafing to us similar
power, but rather we trust those friends not to exercise this power,
which remains theirs.	 It is for this reason that betrayal by a
friend is the cruellest betrayal of all.
We have spoken freely of the availability of the self, of self-
giving, or self-communication and such like, as an expression of
interpersonal relationality, but what exactly do we mean by such
phrases? It must be said that questions concerning what it is
exactly that we give to the other when we give ourselves or make
ourselves available to them are as difficult to address as the more
primitive questions concerning the actual nature and identity of
that self. However, I should suggest that in practice we have
little difficulty in recognizing who are our "good friends" and, at
least to an extent, why we think of them in such a way. My friends
are involved in rich communication with me, they tell me of
themselves, what they are doing and feeling, just as I tell them.
When I communicate with a friend in this way I am aware of myself
engaging in the same kind of discourse as I am when I indulge in
purely interior dialogue.	 In baring one's soul to a friend one is
articulating those inner truths about oneself which are normally the
subject-matter for our own internal conversations. 	 We talk
readily, almost hungrily, about who we are, our desires, fears,
loves and hates. I have never known it to fail that when I or a
friend begin to speak of our deepest and most personal feelings,
thoughts and experiences then a veritable cascade of intimacies are
brought forth from both parties, a cascade that is no respecter of
the lateness of the hour.
Not only do we make ourselves available to our friends through
communicating via words and signs, we also give of ourselves at an
emotional level. We share joy and pain, we sympathize and sometimes
even empathize with those whom we love. We are prepared to be a
resource for the other who is our friend, such that our emotional
energies are theirs to draw upon, to lighten the burden of their
pain and anguish without any apparent benefit to ourselves other
than the well-being of our friend. To love the other is to forget
oneself as a predominant concern, to make ourselves totally
available to and for the other.	 It is in this way, in losing
ourselves, that we gain ourselves. In this sense, in giving
ourselves over to the other as a resource we establish the hope that
such a resource will be available to us when we need it. This hope
is however always Just that - hope, never claim or demand. 	 It is
the hope that "love" will remember us. Kierkegaard clearly
understood this hope of being remembered by love in the act of
forgetting self when he wrote:
... the lover in his love thinks only about giving
fearlessness and saving another from death. Yet the
lover is not therefore forgotten. No, the one who
lovingly forgets himself, forgets his own suffering
to consider another's misery, forgets what he
himself loves in order lovingly to consider
another's loss, forgets his own advantage in order
lovingly to look at another's: truly such a one is
not forgotten. There is One who considers him: God
in heaven; or love considers him... The self-lover
is busy, he shrieks and shouts, and stands for his
rights in order to make certain of not being
forgotten - and yet he is forgotten; but the lover
who forgets himself, he is remembered by loves.
This forgetting of ourselves as an act of making a resource of
ourselves for the other extends beyond the emotional to the
material.
	 Thus our time, skills and financial resources are also
put at our friend's disposal. If a friend comes to us in distress
and in need of companionship we will fomgo- the pleasures of our
favourite television programme or the early night we have been
promising ourselves and spend time with that person. As a friend,
it is my business to be aware of any financial and material
inequalities which exist between myself and my friends and to act to
redress the imbalance. Thus within the community of friendship
there ought to be nothing that I can do by virtue of my financial
status that would be impossible for the rest of my friends.
In this brief discussion we have come a long way from the
self/stranger dichotomy characterized by mistrust, competition and
delicate balances of power to arrive at the self/friend relationship
of self-availability. The fact that the process described above is
observed to take place at all, at the very least in my experience,
speaks of a tendency towards relationality which has the potential
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to transcend the inherent alienation found within our world and
which Christian theology understands in terms of sin.
However, although we might identify this tendency towards
relationality with the - albeit "ruined" - nature of human being as
created in the image of the triune God, that is, with the
protological dimension of human creatureliness, there is
considerably more to be said before we can engage with the radical
aspect of human coadunacy as restored and transformed via the
reconciling and empowering work of Christ. We shall proceed now to
consider what a true dynamic coadunacy must involve if it is to
stand as expressive of the depth of human relationality as the image
of the divine relationality.
iii Coadunacy and the Dynamic of self-abandonment 
In speaking of the dynamic of coadunacy we are speaking of human
being as restored to its true mode as radically relational.
Coadunacy is that aspect of human being which in the beginning
defines us as essentially persons-in-relation and which, in the end,
through the reconciling and transforming work of Christ, is
expressive of human being created anew as communal being, to be one
just as the Father, Son and Holy Spirit are one.
Although, as we have repeatedly mentioned, our experience of the
movement from the other as stranger to the other as friend, may be
understood as an expression of our essential coadunacy as bearers of
the imago dei, the fact of estrangement still persists. It is this
middle term of the Christian story, the fall of humanity into sin,
into alienation and estrangement from its creator and itself, which
calls for a restored but also transformed coadunacy. By restoration
we have in mind the work of Christ by which he restores to us all
that was intended by God for human being in this primal act of
creation. In.	 transformation it is the re-creative activity of
Christ that we have to do with;	 that is, with the creation of a
humanity empowered to deny the alienating power of sin, to confront
it and negate it.	 It is this new possibility of confronting and
denying estrangement that is of the essence of a dynamic coadunacy
founded upon the new creation in Christ. We shall turn now to
consider this possibility for the denial of estrangement for it is
at this point that we encounter the true operation of coadunacy.
In the preceding discussion we began by identifying our primal
experience of the other in terms of stranger. The other is thus
always considered stranger, to be feared until proven a friend to be
trusted. Even given a desire that everyone we meet might want to
become our friend, it is that "become" which identifies the other as
primarily stranger to us.	 It is simply not true to experience that
people regard each other as friends and hope that they will not
become strangers. This order is always reversed. However, in
speaking of coadunacy we are attempting to articulate an
understanding of humanity as freed from fear and thus freed from the
other as stranger. It is at the very root of coadunacy's
radicalness that it denies the reality of the stranger. The dynamic
of coadunacy is our ontological birthright as relationality given
potency over estrangement via the reconciling work of Christ, who
frees us from fear and gives us the hope of eternal life. It is
important to stress again, at this point, that the basis for
humanity's capacity for the generation of social relatioships is a
protological capacity; that is to say it is human being as creature
which is being-in-relation. 	 The redemptive activity of Christ
empowers human being to overcome its alienation from itself as
communal being, restoring a true dynamic of coadunacy. 	 Thus the
Christian Church, rather than absenting itself from the rest of
human society by identifying the foundation of human relationality
solely upon the present work of Christ, and thus establishing itself
as stranger to the world, must stand as an example of the potential
for coadunacy which is our birthright by virtue of our created
humanity.	 Stanley Hauerwas calls such a community a "contrast
model":
The hallmark of such a community, unlike the power
of the nation-states, is its refusal to resort to
violence to secure its own existence or to insure
internal obedience. For as a community convinced of
the truth, we refuse to trust any other power to
compel thus the truth itself... The final task of
the Church is to exhibit in our common life the kind
of community possible when trust, and not fear,
rules over livesG.
The overcoming of estrangement and the denial of the other as
stranger calls for a movement towards the other which goes beond the
piecemeal availability of the self involved in the movement from
strange to friend, as described above. 	 The dynamic of coadunacy
entails nothing les than self-abandonment as the primal mode of
human relationality.
At its most basic level the self-abandonment which we see as giving
rise to true human coadunacy involves the negation of the category
of stranger in our dealings with the other. Thus the other is
encountered primarily as friend and neighbour, and elicits from us
an unconditional availability which is prior to any such signalling
conventions as described previously. 	 To re-use our legal analogy,
the other is first and always innocent until proven guilty.
To say self-abandonment must not be taken to have said self-
negation, for it is an affirmation of our true selfhood which is
only possible in the fullness of coadunate human existence, that is,
human being as a corporate being. In this self-abandonment we
follow the example of Christ who abandons himself to be incarnate,
who abandons himself to the abuse of humanity, who abandons himself
to the will of the Father and ultimately to death, without ever
turning that abandonment to the other into self-negation. In Christ
we see total availability to and for the other without reduction of
the self. In self-abandonment we are not talking of a weak-willed
acquiescence to the domination of others, but a will to total self-
availability to the other, empowered by the reconciling work of
Christ. In the gospel of Matthew we see this juxtaposition of power
and self-abandonment when it is recorded that as Jesus is being
seized by the chief priest's men one of his disciples attempts to
defend him, only to be told by Jesus "Put your sword back into its
place; for all who take the sword will perish by the sword. Do you
think that I cannot appeal to my Father and he will at once send me
more than twelve legions of angels?"(Matt.26:52-53) Similarly in
John's Gospel Jesus informs Pilate that he would have no power over
him unless it had been given to him (Jn.19:10-11).
It is this self-abandonment in the presence of the power to be
purely for self, that is, in the presence of the power to deny the
other, which constitutes the basis for the-dynamic of coadunacy. It
is to this reality that the Church is called; we are called to love
one another as Christ loves us and gave himself for us. This
community of self-abandonment in love and trust is what Stanley
Hauerwas means when he talks of the Church as a "community of
character", a "contrast model" to the world which is constituted by
strangers.	 And yet true coadunate existence is, as we have
maintained, the birthright of human being qua human being. The
Church is but the custodian of the dynamic empowering to overcome
human estrangement from others and from God by virtue of the work of
Christ. Thus the encountering of the other primarily as friend must
not be confined within the community of faith, for, as Christ
taught, the loving of those who love you must be coupled with a love
for those who do not, if we are to engage in truly rewarding
relationality. (Matt.5:46f).
This brings us to an important aspect of the dynamic of self-
abandonment as the reality of empowered coadunacy. True self-
abandonment, by its very nature and the nature of the estranged
world in which it is called to confront that estrangement,
inevitably involves personal risk. To give oneself over into the
hands of the other is, to misquote the Old Testament, a fearful
thing. For even when we are empowered to encounter all persons as
friends and neighbours, these are still mysterious and unknown
neighbours, and we would be fools to consider ourselves as
necessarily safe in their power. Nevertheless it is the act of
self-abandonment in the face of the other's power over us and our
attendant powerlessness which initiates the dynamic of coadunacy,
albeit in a potentially one-sided and thus incomplete way.
The dynamic of coadunacy as self-abandonment speaks of two potential
movements. In our encountering the other from the perspective of
our empowering to self-abandonment, we experience the twin poles of
anxiety and hope. We are anxious in the light of the potential for
rejection and domination by the other, but we hope that our self-
abandonment might meet with a reciprocal abandoning of the other
towards us. It is the possibility of either of these two poles
being realized which characterizes this dynamic of coadunacy, at
least initially, as involving extreme personal risk.
The realization of our hopes for true reciprocal self-abandonment,
founded upon our understanding of human being as essentially
communal, is brought about when we abandon ourselves to the other,
putting outselves in their hands to find that simultaneously they
have placed themselves into our hands. In this way true fellowship
and love are engendered without the need for covert exercises of
power with the inherent potential for domination that such exercises
of power necessarily involve. The other is met with open hands and
ultimate conorn for their well-being. In like wise, by abandoning
ourselves for the sake of the other, we hope that the responsibility
for our care and well-being might be taken up by the other. It is
in this way that we may truly "love our neighbour as ourselves", for
in loving our neighbour we hope that our neighbour will love us.
Thus the true dynamic of coadunacy involves a love of the other
which is ultimately reflexive, such that as Kierkegaard points out,
the lover who forgets himself is not ultimately forgotten by love'.
Although it must be confessed that most if not all of my friendships
and loves have developed via the process of gradual self-
availability as described previously, which transforms strangers
into friends, I think it true to say that these relationships do
exhibit the signs of a coadunate dynamic. Certainly I find myself
neglecting my own concern for my well-being in the light of my
concern for my wife and close friends, and this neglect of self has
grown out of a trust that my neglect of self will be met by similar
self-neglect from them, in the light of overriding care for me.
Such self-abandonment places us at the disposal of the other in that
we become a resource for them. In this way all that we are and all
that we have at our disposal is made available to the other. Such a
commitment to self-abandonment involves a radical attitude to life
and property. To be truly abandoned to the other is to identify any
disparity in material prosperity between myself and the other as
unacceptable and to understand all my personal skills and abilities
as being at the service of the other. Ultimately coadunacy as
abandonment of the self to the other is a dynamic which has
martyrdom as its entelechy, for this abandonment to the other must
be total, extending even to the laying down of one's life for tha
other. It is this preparedness to give up our lives which Jesus
identified as the greatest expression of love and is witnessed to
both in his own death, and in the deaths of the world's martyrs
throughout the ages.
Speaking of martyrdom brings us back to the aspect of self-
abandonment which is characterised by anxiety in the face of the
risk involved in abandoning ourselves to the other. Although we
abandon ourselves in hope, it is hope in the presence of risk. We
found our hope upon an understanding of human being as in the image
of the triune God, and thus as essentially coadunate, while our
anxiety is born out of our experience of the estrangement which
characterizes human existence. In denying the power of estrangement
we may abandon ourselves to the other, whomwe refuse to identify as
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stranger, thereby initiating the dlynamic of coadunacy, but we have
no guarantee that this self-abandonment will be reciprocated. It is
at the point of abandonment to the other in an environment
characterised by estrangement, rather than within the Christian
community empowered to coadunacy, that the greatest risk is to be
encountered, but it is also the place where our experience of
abandonment becomes most authentic.
We have chosen to utilize the term abandonment rather than, for
example, sacrifice, because of the sense of powerlessness within a
hostile environment which the former term conveys. With a term such
as sacrifice we are often concerned with specific acts of self-
giving motivated by particular situations. Further, in the notion
of self-sacrifice we take up the dual role of sacrificer and
sacrifice which provides us with the opportunity to retreat into the
former role as an aspect of ourselves which is retained for
ourselves. The language of self-abandonment leaves us no such
retreat in its implications of a one-way journey into a hostile
environment in which we are powerless, by the normal definition of
that term, and from which we are unable to return to a place of
safety. Once we choose to abandon ourselves to the other we are
irrevocably committed to a process which might end in true coadunate
relationality characterised by mutual love and care, or in
martyrdom.
Our abandonment in an estranged world is thus truly taking leave of
ourselves. The common associations with the word abandonment call to
mind babies left on door-steps or in parks and other public places
or the ancient oriental practice of exposing unwanted children to
hostile environments. Our abandonment to the other in the face of
an environment which is characterized by estrangement is nonetheless
drastic. At the very least our self-offering might be rejected, and
although this experience is far from fatal we must all have
experienced the pain and emotional hurt associated with such
rejection. An example of the kind of pain that we feel in these
instances might be found in our experience of "first love". In the
midst of our adolescent confusion we are often very vulnerable and
the rejection of our first overtures of mature love can cause deep
hurt. We become melancholy and distant, we lose our appetite, we
find it impossible to concentrate. On the other hand, rejection by
the other might cause little more than embarrassment, which we often
attempt to hide with outbursts of indignaEion and anger. 	 However,
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the point is that rejection always hurts us and the more we offer
the greater the potential for hurt. Nobody likes to have a gift
flung back at them.
Yet true self-abandonment presents a very great temptation to the
other, for to be truly abandoned to the other is to place power over
oneself unilaterally into the hands of the other and, as we have
been told, power has a tendency to corrupt.
The logic of the dynamic of coadunacy as self-abandonment in the
midst of estrangement, while denying the other as stranger 
simultaneously affirms the possibility of the self as victim. In
this possibility we see the dynamic of coadunacy as truly the
imitatio Christi'. In the Sermon on the Mount Jesus associates
divine perfection with the ability to love one's enemies and
encourages his hearers to aspire to this perfection (Mat.5:43-48).
During the same discourse Jesus speaks of self-abandonment in the
face of victimization in these well known words:
You have heard that it was said, 'Eye for eye and
tooth for tooth'.	 But I tell you, Do not resist an
evil person.	 If someone strikes you on the right
cheek, turn to him the other also. And if someone
wants to sue you and take your tunic, let him have
your cloak as well. If someone forces you to go one
mile, go with him two miles. Give to the one who
asks you, and do not turn away from the one who
wants to borrow from you.9
In this passage we see Christ's rejection of what we have called the
"balance of power" which is maintained between the self and the
stranger, typified in the lex talionis, and his affirmation of
abandonment to the other despite victimization. To be a victim of
the other whom we regard as neighbour, but who regards us as a
stranger, is as inevitable to the movement of self-abandonment in an
estranged world as was the movement of Christ to the cross. In a
world dominated by fear and acquisitiveness abuse of the abandoned
self is an all-too real possibility, indeed it is most likely a
probability. Once the fear of the peculiarity of self-abandonment
is overcome by the other, the tendency towards self-serving and
domination begin to assert themselves. Thus we cannot be surprised
to find that if we make of ourselves a resource for the other then
we are likely to be exploited in the same way in which all the
world's resources are exploited. We need only imagine for a moment
the scenario which would develop around a person who left their home
unlocked, their money and possessions accessible to all and
publicised their willingness to undertake any task or labour for the
sake of and in the service of others. There can be little doubt
that such a person would very soon lose all they had and be swamped
by demands to take on all the wearisome labours imaginable. In
short, self-abandonment might easily be transformed, in an estranged
world, into slavery or self-negation.
We have said previously that coadunacy as self-abandonment does not
involve self-negation. Indeed it is impossible to abandon oneself
to the other as the ultimate expression of self-availability if
there is no self to make available. Similarly abandonment to the
other is to the good of the other, not to their detriment, which a
continuation in alienation and self-centeredness most assuredly is.
Kierkegaard focuses clearly upon the necessary limitations on self-
abandonment when he points out that we are commanded to love our
neighbour as ourself and not better than oneself:
...God you must love in unconditional obedience even
if that which He demands of you may seem injurious
to you ... A man, on the contrary, you must only -
yet, no, this is the highest - you must love a man
as yourself; if you can better perceive his best
than he can, then you will not be able to excuse
yourself by the fact that the harmful thing was his
own wish, was what he himself asked for. If this
were not the case, then there might quite rightly be
something said about loving another man better than
yourself; for this love would consist in: despite
your own conviction that it would be harmful to him,
obediently doing it because he asked it, or
adoringly, because he wished it. But this you
simply have no right to do; you are responsible if
you do it, just as the other is responsible if he
should misuse his relationship to you in this way'°.
the dynamic of coadunacy must not be identified with any sentimental
naivety or irresponsible acquiescence to abuse. As we stated
earlier in our outlining of the controls that limit the dynamic of
coadunate relationality, coadunacy is non-absorptive and non-
totalising. That is to say, the self and the other remain distinct
selves in a relational dynamic we call coadunacy. They are neither
reduced to a single -synthetic moment nor is the one absorbed into
the other.
The point at which self-abandonment encounters the above controlling
principles is one of obvious tension. It would certainly be
possible to deploy these controls in such a way as to attempt to
defuse the inherent risk involved in self-abandonment to the other.
Indeed it would be impossible to militate against such an
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illegitimate utilization of these limiting factors. Ultimately the
onus is always upon each one of us as to whether we will choose to
engage in truly coadunate relationships with the other, be that
other known or unknown. It is this will to coadunacy manifested in
the will to self-abandonment which properly guards against coadunacy
lapsing into self-negation. Although we understand the Christian
gospel as proclaiming the possibility of empowering to coadunacy as
the recreation of human being, nevertheless this empowering engages
with already existent, albeit estranged, human creatureliness. Re-
creation is not creation ex nihilo and thus encounters concrete
human will. This will might respond to the offer of empowering to
coadunacy, it might reject it in favour of a radical individualism
or, more likely, it might fail to respond at all, lapsing into
apathy and from thence to estrangement by default.
We have considered at some length the nature of coadunacy as a
movement of the self to the other. However our preliminary
definition of coadunacy involved not only the other self, but also
the environment in which we are situated or placed. As you recall,
we spelled out our concern to articulate an understanding of human
being as essentially a complex involving self,
	 other and
environment". In the following section of this chapter we shall
attempt to examine the significance of the human experience of
situation and place, particularly as they relate to our notion of
coadunacy.
2. The self and its environment 
i. Situatedness 
Humanity does not exist within an experimental vacuum, we are
influenced by the world we live in and in turn we affect it.
Changes in temperature, in seasons, in the atmosphere we breatheand
the food we eat link us intimately with our environment. Indeed, in
our utilization of tools and our being located in a particular place
we often extend our perception of the immediate self beyond our
bodies to incorporate the object or location in question. It is in
this that humanity exercises its relation to a total context which
is the triune God's by virtue of his existing as a context.
Humanity follows the divine structure of oneness with a context
which it is (by virtue of its Trinity) by constantly establishing an
intimate unity with the context j . 	it (i.e. humanity) is.
This notion of situatedness or contextual unity has received some
very valuable consideration of late from within the post-critical
and phenomenological schools of thought.	 In Levinas' writings we
find this understanding under the heading of habitation 12 ;	 in
Polanyi we have the notion of indwelling 13. However it is in the
writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty that we find the clearest
articulation of this theme of indwelling or embodying.
For Merleau-Ponty the atomistic character of critical thought is
regarded as simply inadequate to the task of describing and
understanding human knowing and experience. One is not made aware
of individual stimuli to ears and eyes and nose and skin in a
piecemeal fashion, but rather as a composite whole.	 The terminus
for our experience of the world is, of course, the body. Our
bodies, argues Merleau-Ponty, are not simply objects in a world
alongside other similar atomistic objects, but are rather that which
gives form and orientation to our world. 	 Merleau-Ponty speaks of
the body as,
the darkness needed in the theatre to show up the
performance."
It is because our bodies are the point of intersection between two
planes, these being our immediate selves and our world, that we may
experience the world at all. Merleau-Ponty is quite adamant that we
exist as persons in a world, within a context and not within some
neutral objective realm of pure criticism from which we might make
objective judgments founded upon indubitable data. It is his view
that philosophy should become, and must become the only adequate
interpreter of meaning by virtue of its recognition of man's
essential place within his context. 	 Here we would substitute
theology for philosophy, but the sentiment expressed is the same:
it (philosophy) alone goes all the way in the
effort to know what Nature and History and the World
and Being are, when our contact with them is not
only the partial and abstract contact of the
physical experiment and calculation, or of the
historical analysis, but the total contact of
someone who, living in the world and in Being, means
to see his life fully, particularly his life of
knowledge and who, an inhabitant of the world, tries
to think himself in the world, to think the world in
himself, to unravel their humbled essences and to
form finally the significant 'Being'.1E'
Merleau-Ponty calls us to vacate the illusory domain of essences, as
does Levinas, from whence we attempt to grasp the "pure object which
the minds soars over". To inhabit such a realm is so to distance
ourselves from experience that we must ask the question - is it
still really our experience? Merleau-Ponty would answer no. Just
as Mary Midgley points out that man is bound to his context and
becomes nothing more than a "shrivelled petal" 16 when removed from
it, so too does Merleau-Ponty stress the absolute human necessity of
situatedness.
The point is that as human beings we belong in and are part of a
created world and this to such an extent that our abstraction from
our world via individualism, epistemic solipsism or Levinas'
totalism represents a real reduction in our essential humanity.
This environment of brute existence and essence is
not mysterious: we never quit it, we have no other
environment. The facts and essences are
abstractions: what there is are worlds and a world
and a Being not a sum of facts or a system of ideas,
but the impassibility of meaninglessness or
ontological void.., it is, whatever we may say, this
world, this Being that our life, our science, and
our philosophy inhabit.'7
In short we exist within a context with which we are actively
engaged and not simply observing. For, ultimately, "...there is no
essence, no idea, that does not adhere to a domain of history and of
geography" 19. In a way which is similar to Polanyi, when he speaks
of tools as extensions of our bodies, "we pour ourselves out into
them and assimilate them as part of our own existence. We accept
them existentially by dwelling in them" 19, so Merleau-Ponty speaks
of a re-configuration of our body image in the light of its
Indwelling a particular environment or object:
To get used to a hat, a car, or a stick is to be
transplanted into them, or conversely, to
incorporate them into the bulk of our own body. 20
Merleau-Ponty's discussion of human situatedness is a vital step
forward in the understanding of humanity as residing not within the
autonomous individual but within the contextual complex comprising
of the Other and the environment. On its own it stands as an
attractive common-sense approach to the question of human knowledge
and existence in the world. However, when coupled with the
transcendent dimension as expressed in the notion of the triune God
who is the model and image for contextual identity and true humanity,
the insights of Maurice Merleau-Ponty become even more compelling
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and are recognisably coadunate in their approach to the problems of
our existence.
ii.	 Place.
Alongside the primarily subjective and internalized conception of
situatedness, as discussed above, there stands the more concrete and
external notion of place as it is often spoken of by geographers and
architects.
To feel a sense of belonging when inhabiting a certain geographical
place is an experience common to all of us. The place we refer to
as "home" exerts a very unique influence over us, which is not
easily transferable to any other object or location. It is part of
our very humanity to be placed and to respond to such places in a
variety of different ways. Some places, such as the town we grew up
In or the church we got married in, hold a special significance for
us while other places are simply background locations for our
everyday activities. Yet despite the vast range of our possible
responses to particular places, one thing is certain: we are never
divorced from the phenomenon of place. Humanity is always located,
always is in some place, regardless of the intensity of our
Involvement with that place.
E. Relph writes, quoting Heidegger:
To be human is to live in a world that is filled
with significant places:	 to be human is to have
your place. The philosopher Martin Heidegger
declared that a 'place' places man in such a way
that it reveals the external bonds of his existence
and at the same time the depths of his freedom and
reality.2'
Both our identity and our security are intrinisically bound up with
our sense of place. We identify ourselves by referring to the
house, street, town in which we live and the country to which we
belong.
The expression of place-related identity has many different levels
of emphasis depending upon the sort of self-identification we are
seeking to convey. Within the context of immediate locality within
a particular street, for example, we might be identified by the name
or number of our house. A different identification comes into play
when supporting a local football team, or expressing regional
differences or when one's country goes to war. Indeed, were extra-
terrestrial contact to become a commonplace, a sense of planetary
identity would no doubt become relevant.
But what exactly is a place? and what constitutes the identity of a
place such that we, as human beings, can and indeed must participate
in it?
Relph begins his analysis of place by distinguishing between various
aspects of the related notion of space 22. Primitive space is the
un-selfconsciously experienced space of basic human behaviour,
experienced at an instinctive level as our sense of dimension.
Primitive space, as such,	 relates directly to our bodies and
senses. It has been suggested by others 23
 that there exists a
certain number of archetypal settings that are necessary for
fundamental human behaviour to continue without interruption. These
settings are related to a particular human activity such as eating,
sleeping and sheltering. There are those who would further
maintain, from their study of animals, that there is a fundamental
biological attachment to a particular place of security which is
precognitive and which powerfully expresses all those attachments
normally attributed to the notion of home.24
The value of such an analysis of primitive space, particularly for
our purposes, is that it would seem to indicate what Relph refers to
as "a deep and presymbolic differentition of and attachment to
space". 2s In other words it indicates that the basic human desire
to belong in a place is more than the result of sociological
conditioning, but evidences an essential and constitutive aspect of
humanity's biological make-up.
The next level of spatial awareness is far more immediate and
egocentric being referred to as perceptual space. 2s This is the
space in which we act, it is in and through this space that we have
direct contact with the places around us, and in and through which,
to make use of a biblical allusion, "we live and move and have our
being". Perceptual space provides us with the framework within
which we define things and settings as close to us or far away from
us, crowded or empty, man-made or natural. Certain perceptual
spaces constitute places of great personal significance to us.
These are the places to which we commit part of ourselves and which,
in turn, give themselves up to us in a reciprocal act of identity
enhancement.	 Such perceptual spaces, where personal, are not
uniquely private. We may share a public landscape or place as well
as experience the intrinsic continuity between your place and mine.
G. Matorz expresses the depth of our involvment in perceptual space
in this way:
We do not grasp space only by our senses... we live
in it, we project our personality into it, we are
tied to it by emotional bonds, space is not just
perceived... it is lived.
Thus as we move beyond the unconscious experience of primitive space
towards the more immediate and personally involved level of
perceptual space we find humanity's essential unity with its context
asserted once again.	 Just as the triune God is not outside of 
himself so humanity is not outside of its place. To say "human
life" is already to have said human place for, as Matorz has pointed
out, space is lived and not perceived from some point outside.
Existential space is that space which receives its definition and
structure from the particular culture to which we belong. 29 The
meaning of such space is in a constant state of flux as it undergoes
a never-ending process of restructuring as a result of human
activities.
	 In short, existential space is that space which is
defined by society and experienced by the individual. 	 Such space
may be defined as sacred, in the case of a church, or authoritative,
for example a police station or No. 10 Downing Street. Indeed even
places with a particular aesthetic value may only hold such meaning
by consensus.29
What is significant here is that wherever human beings gather
together in a society they imbue their surroundings with special
meaning. Once again space is not simply a receptacle in which to
exist, but it is a context which is intrinsically bonded to human
life. Certain public settings serve as extensions of the corporate
life of a community. Our personal sense of the sacred is heightened
while in a church building, while our appreciation of nature might
be accentuated during a walk in the local park. Particular public
meeting places, such as parish halls, village greens or the local
pub, often heighten our sense of unity with the community. Indeed,
the example of the public house is particularly interesting as it
does not necessarily have to be "our local" for it to generate a
feeling of comradeship and unity. I have found it to be the case
when, for example, walking round Yorkshire and the Lake District
that stopping off at a previously unknown inn would generate a
certain sense of human community, albeit at a somewhat nebulous
level.
War graves and places symbolising human suffering also produce
emotional responses within us even when the events being referred to
took place before we were born. It is through our essential
relationship with space and place that we maintain our continuity
with past generations and with humanity in its widest sense. Many
primitive cultures, such as the Australian aborigines, maintain a
far more profound relationship with their landscape than do we in
the West, each element of the land possessing an importance
significance for them. A. Rapoport writes:
Every feature of the landscape is known and has
meaning - they then perceive differences which the
European cannot see ... As one example, every
individual feature of Ayer's rock is linked to a
significant myth and the mythological beings who
created it. Every tree, every stain, hole and
fissure has meaning. Thus what to an European is an
empty land may be full of noticable differences to
the aborigines...3°
We do not simply internalise our feelings and experiences, nor do
our actions evaporate the moment after we have performed them, but
rather they become part of a total context of internal and external
reciprocity. The place where I proposed to my wife is as integral to
that experience as are my own personal memories of it. Indeed the
weather, the noises, the trees, the buildings and the very time of
day were woven together with our words and feelings to form a living
and lived in experience. To abstract us from the place, or to
pretend that the incident took place elsewhere would beggar the
whole experience.
Our whole, lives are full of such experiences, not all of them as
profound as a proposal of marriage, but nevertheless experiences
which took place. Indeed it is a cause for much concern that,
within developed industrialised countries in particular, a high
degree of uniformity of place is being evidenced. Big department
stores, airports, fast-food chains, shopping malls, offices and new
towns are the same the world over. It is thus becoming increasingly
difficult to attach symbolic significance to a particular place when
that place fails to express any actual particularity.3'
In connection with this problem of spatial uniformity, it has become
quite common within developed countries to hear of architectural 
space.	 By this is meant that space which is "created" by city and
town planners as they seek to utilize society's living space along
functional and economic lines.	 There are two points that must be
made concerning this planned or architectural space.	 Firstly, it
involves a conception of space as a neutral and plastic commodity to
be manipulated according to purely pragmatic criteria. Secondly,
planned space is non-experienced space, it is an abstract and
detached space, or what Relph refers to as "two-dimensional map
space", inasmuch as those who have to do with such planning relate
to the space involved primarily via maps and blue-prints.
The consequences of such a view of space are too involved to discuss
here, however we have already made reference to one of them. The
tendency towards a uniformity of space and place must result, at
least in part, from a prefabricated modular mentality which seeks
to create human living space by shifting and manipulating a number
of conventional architectural forms within the confines of a map of
a given area. Whether that area be in Brazil or Japan, the results
are the same: high-rise office blocks, suburban housing developments
and factories all selected off the architectural peg.33
a. What is place?
Whereas the term space properly refers to a broad general context
and setting, the notion of place, involves a focusing of our
attentions and intentions upon a specific location which is at once
part of the larger spatial context and yet also stands at a distance
from it. The phenomenon of place is not an easy one to define as it
manifests itself upon many different and yet interrelated levels,
ranging from the broad geographical identification of a land-mass to
a particular corner of a particular room. Place is, to use Relph's
terminology, a multifaceted phenomenon of experience.
We shall now look at some of the different facets of place, in an
attempt to assess the nature of the identity of places. Having done
this we shall move on to the most important issue, as regards this
present work, that of our relationship to and experience of place.
b. The identity of place 
There would appear to be four basic elements which need to be
included into any discussion concerning the identity of place.
These are physical appearance, activities, meanings and what has
been referred to as the spirit of place.3s
The first of these elements has to do with the distinctive landscape
of a place, its topography, overall setting and climate. It is
these things to which we immediately respond when encountering a new
place. We ask questions such as, where does this path lead? where
can I park my car? how far away is the sea? We respond to the
climate, thinking it either too hot or too cold, we notice striking
features of the landscape such as a cathedral, forest or monument of
some sort. All these things play on our senses and allow us to
build up a physical picture of the place we are in which contributes
to its overall identity.
In a similar way we continue our identification of a place by asking
what happens in it. Is it a holiday resort or a financial centre?
Is work scarce or plentiful? what takes place in this or that
building? Often the physical appearance of a structure will provide
us with a clue as to the activities which take place within it.
K. Lynch points out that certain environmental settings act upon us,
like custom and tradition, triggering off patterns of behaviour at
an unconscious level;	 for example, being reverent in church and
relaxed on the beach.37
However, the identity of a place is more than just the sum of its
physical appearance and the activities performed within it. The
attribution of meaning and significance to a place by a person or
group of persons is a vital component of the identity of that place.
The experience of a place as my place or as a beautiful place or an
awful place may well be founded in its appearance or activities, but
that is not to say that they belong to or are inherent in that
place. It is we, as human beings, who bestow meaning upon places.
We "name them", we arrange objects in them and we fill them with
significance as we live out our lives in them.
There is no one static meaning which can be said to encapsulate the
identity of a place for all people and all time. The meanings of a
place are as numerous as the people who know it. Consider for
example the site of Auschwitz or Buchenwald - are they sites of
victory for a "master race" or places of sorrow or shame? Is a
public house a place of communal refreshment or a den of iniquity?
and are this country's cathedrals beautiful pieces of architecture
to be preserved, tourist attractions to be marketed, places of
worship or scandalous wasters of money and resources?
It is the result of the complex interplay which takes place between
these facets of place which make up the very identity of a
particular place. As Relph puts it:
What is significant here is the way in which
physical setting, activities and meanings are always
interrelated. Like the physical, vital and mental
components of behaviour that Merleau-Ponty (1967)
identifies, it is probable that they constitute a
series of dialectics that form one common structure.
Physical context and activities combine to give the
human equivalent of locations within the 'functional
circle' of animals (see Cassirer 1970, p.26);
setting and meaning combine in the direct and
emphatic experience of landscapes or townscapes;
activities and meaning combine in many social acts
and shared histories that have little reference to
physical setting. All of these dialectics are
interrelated in a place, and it is their fusion that
constitutes the identity of that place.3°
We have separated out from the rest of the elements which make up a
place's identity the aforementioned notion of the "spirit of place".
This is due to the difficulty in addressing this factor in any
cognitive manner. A place's "spirit" or "atmosphere" may be
contributed to by the three factors already discussed above, and yet
it remains unchanged despite physical alterations, changes in
activity and the attribution of a different meaning to a given
place.	 The spirit of a place is its soul, it is what makes this
place this place as opposed to any other place in the cosmos. It
has to do with the ghosts which haunt a place, long-forgotten people
and events which, although historically insignificant in accordance
with the prevailing canons of historiography, are nonetheless
"recorded" by their setting, captured and held by their place.
Indeed, just as we speak of events "taking place", so too should we
think of "places taking events".
Lawrence Durrell sums up this notion of a place's spirit when he
writes, somewhat whimsically, of lancscapes bestowing their own
distinctive character upon those living in them:
I believe you could exterminate the French at one
blow and resettle the country with Tartars, and
within two generations discover to your astonishment
that the national characteristics were back at norm
- the restless metaphysical curiosity, the
tenderness for good living and the passsionate
individualism:	 even though their noses were flat.
This is the invisible constant in a place.39
If human beings are indeed coadunate entities, whose existence and
identities are intrinsically bound up with "the other" and with
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their external contexts, then it should in no way surprise us to
find,	 as we appear to have done, evidence of a reciprocal
relationship pertaining between humanity and its "place". 	 We name
places, act in places, fill places with meaning. They, in turn,
augment our identities by reflecting them back at us; they help to
define our activities and behaviour, they capture the spirits of
bygone generations and mediate them to us in the present, thus
enriching our lives and enhancng our solidarity with the whole of
humankind. Indeed our looking to various old or ancient places and
our concern to preserve them speaks both of our need to be related
to the part but also our desire that the present be mediated to the
future. 4-0
Now that we have some small notion of the structure of a place's
identity, let us go on to consider how we, as human beings, relate
to and experience places.
c. The human experience of place 
The human desire to belong to and within a community and setting is
best referred to as a need for "roots". This botanical image brings
to mind the organic relationship that exists between a living entity
and its environment, Simone Weil writes, concerning human
root edness,
To be rooted is perhaps the most important and least
recognised need of the human soul. It is one of the
hardest to define. A human being has roots by
virtue of his real, active and natural participation
In the life of the community, which preserves in
living shape certain particular expectations for the
future. This participation is a natural one in the
sense that it is automatically brought about by
place, conditions of birth, profession and social
surroundings.	 Every human being needs to have
multiple roots. It is necessary for him to draw
well-nigh the whole of his moral, intellectual and
spiritual life by way of the environment of which he
forms a part.'"
There are two important points which arise out of Simone Well's
observations.	 Firstly, human rootedness is a natural phenomenon,
that is, it is of the essence for humanity.	 Secondly it is
absolutely necessary for truly satisfying human existence. 	 The
second of these factors derives, obviously, from the first.
To be rooted is to belong within a place, as well as to a people.
"My place" provides me with a perspective on the rest of the world
and allows me to identify myself within that world.
	 As we have
mentioned previously, our immediate consciousness of self is
extended to incorporate the environment in which we are situated.
It is little wonder, therefore, that many people who have had to
endure the crisis of having their homes burgled liken the experience
to a form of rape.
K.Lynch, quoting Harvey Cox, refers to a woman from the Czech town
of Lidice which was totally effaced by the Nazis. She tells us
that, notwithstanding the loss of her family, her most profound
shock came when she returned to Lidice to find it no longer existed,
not even to the extent of scattered remains and ruined buildings.
The woman from Lidice was thus totally displaced, as the setting
which formed the matrix of her experience of the past and sense of
progression into the future, of her apprehension of human community
and activity and of her sense of belonging within a distinctive
identifiable place ceased to be.
In a similar instance Isak Dinesen tells us of the Masai tribe of
East Africa and the way in which they sought to short-circuit the
crisis of displacement, despite the reality of physical relocation:
The Masai when they were moved from their old
country, north of the railway line, to the present
reserve, took with them the names of their hills,
plains and rivers, and gave them to the hills,
plains and rivers in the new country.42
In the case of the woman from Lidice, her place had "died" before
she was given the chance to effect even a partial transfer of
significance from it to a new setting.
In our modern transient society we are constantly forced to relocate
for economic and social reasons. We have therefore developed
various methods for transferring the significance of "home" from one
locale to another. Thus it is that we seldom, if ever, sell
everything we own when we move to a new place, but rather carry with
us a vast array of objects which we arrange about us in an attempt
to duplicate our previous environment. We take great pleasure in
unpacking a favourite picture or a much-loved piece of furniture.
And yet, despite our efforts to carry our homes about with us, we
are still confronted by the strange streets and unknown buildings
which make up our "new place" and roots, once dug up, are
exceedingly difficult to re-establish. Indeed, the place that we
refer to as "home" tends to remain home no matter how long we have
been absent from it.
Vincent Vycinas writes of home as:
an overwhelming, inexchangeable something to which
we were subordinated and from which our way of life
was orientated and directed, even if we had left
home many years before.43
Relph refers to home as "an irreplaceable centre of significance".
One's home is not simply a house or the place where one happens to
live, nor is it a place to which we have a certain degree of
attachment. Home is the place where we feel we belong. it is the
place that we truly care for and with which we share an almost
symbiotic relationship. It is the place that we know "like the back
of our hand".
This sense of possessing a deep and organic bond with a particular
place can be found expressed in a variety of sources: in the Old
Testament writings concerning the Hebrews' relationship with the
land which God had given them44, in the fictional work of Stephen
Donaldson49, and in the poems of William Blake 46. It is similarly
to be found in the pre-literate experiences of African tribes
people, Australian aborigines and Americani Appalachian farmers47.
This unity of human experience as regards the importance and indeed
the necessity of our belonging to a place prompts Relph to conclude
that:
A deep relationship with places is as necessary, and
perhaps as unavoidable, as close relationships with
people; without such relationships human existence,
while possible, is bereft of much of its
significance.4°
It should be clear, in the light of our brief discussion of the
phenomenon of place, how important this notion is to the concept of
coadunacy. Human beings do not simply "feel" that they ought to be
situated but actually are situated within real space and real
places.
Coadunacy involves both the inner psychological desire to belong
within a context and also the actual concrete involvement within
such a context. Just as the divine trinity both desires to exist
and actually causes itself to exist within an environment defined by
its own self-designated dimensions 49, so too does coadunate humanity
exist within a place created by God, but defined by humanity's
symbiotic relationship with that place. To utilize an image from
the Old Testament, while God created a garden man and woman were
appointed as gardeners to tend and live in it.
The dynamic of coadunacy initiates in human beings a return to their
roots, roots which run through a community of people and also deep
into the bricks and mortar, the earth and sky and water of the
places in which they belong. The significance of such places
increases aswe absorb their characters and pass on to them aspects
of our own identities through our activities, our arranging of
objects and the attribution of meaning to and within them. In a
like way, the triune God may be regarded as acting within himself,
in constant dynamic relationship with himself via the process of
perichoresis, which pertains between the elements of the Godhead
and, further, attributing a variety of meanings to himself as his
own environment.
Gabriel Marcel has said:	 "An individual is not distinct from his
place;	 he is that place."	 While this can only be said to be
partially true of humanity, it is wholly true of God.s°
It is because God freely constitutes an environment which is his own
identity and consequently acts within it, that we, as created in his
image, are free to form our places as extensions of our identities,
to create out of existing space settings which enrich and are
enriched by our being there. It is this fundamental belonging to a
place and its belonging to us which we claim is part orhumanity's
essential coadunacy as founded upon the imago del.
If the above claim is to be taken with any seriousness at all then,
concomitantly, we must express serious concern with regard to the
contemporary malaise often referred to as placelessness. By
placelessness is meant the sense of transience, of belonging nowhere
and to no-one, which appears to pervade the more industrially
developed societies. Placelessness is encouraged by many factors:
the never-ending quest for promotion or the better-paid job which
makes us sit loose to our present context and prevents us from
putting down firm roots; the uniformity of modern architecture with
its modular mentality, which produces whole blocks of identical
suburban houses and offices such that we find it increasingly
difficult to differentiate one place from another; mass-produced
consumer goods which threaten to do for the interiors of our
buidings what architects and town planners are doing to the
exteriors, and the intensive large-scale programmes of change and
alteration to our towns and cities, organized and executed by
anonymous planners at any alarming rate s '.	 It is these things,
coupled with numerous other factors, which threaten to render human
being placeless and efface yet another aspect of the divine image
from human life and that as such represent an on going challenge to
Christian theology.
What we have sought to do in this work is to highlight the challenge
that privatism, isolationism and the totalization of the subject
presents to theology. Our own attempts at formulating a notion of
coadunacy are clearly limited but it is hoped that by reintroducing
this notion and filling it with a specifically theological content
we may have provided the blueprints for a uniquely Christian
theological tool for engaging with the aformentioned problems of
radical individualism.
NOTES 
1. Cf. R. Jenson, "The Body of God' s Presence", in Creation. 
Christ and Culture.
2. In Woody Allen' s film "The Purple Rose of Cairo" the
unreality of the film persona is dramatically portrayed when a
character from a film crosses into the real world and finds it
Impossible to operate within it as a true person.
3. In Ursula Le Gum's Earthsea trilogy the basis of a sorceror' s
power lay in his knowledge of the names of people and things.
This idea of power through knowledge of a person' s name is
common throughout the world' s mythologies and legends.
4. J. Molt mann, God in Creation p.32, cf. Barth, Dogmatics in 
Outline, p.48.
5. Kierkegaard, The Works of Love, in A Kierkegaard Anthology,
ed. R. Bretall, p. 307.
6. S. Hauerwas, A Community of Character, p. 103.
7. cf. p.267 above and note 5.
8. On the theme of Christ as victim, cf. H. E. W. Turner, The
Patristic Doctrine of Redemption, p. 22f, P. Ricoeur, The
Symbolism of Evil, p.328 and J. S. Whale, Victor and Victim: The 
Christ ian Doctrine of Redemption.
9. Matt. 5: 38-42.
10. Kierkegaard, The Works of Love, in A Kierkegaard Anthology 
p. 287.
11. Cf. p. 7f f above.
12. Cf. Levinas,	 p. 152f f.
13. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (PK) p. 55f f. Cf. also the notion
of "life-worlds" as found in the writings of phenomenologists
such as P. Berger.
14. M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception , p. 100-101.
15. M. Merleau-Ponty, Visible and Invisible, p. 108-109.
16. M. Midgley, "Towards a New Understanding of Human Nature: the
Limits of Individualism", in How Humans Adapt: A Biocultural 
Odyssey, ed. D. J. Ortner, Smithsonian Press, 1983. p. 522
17. M. Merleau-Ponty, Visible and Invisible, p. 117.
18. ibid. p. 115.
19. Polanyi, PK p. 59.
20. M. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 143.
21. E. Relph, Place and Placelessness (PP), p. 1.
22. ibid. p. 8.
23. M. Spivak, "Archetypal Place", in Environmental Design 
Research, ed. F. E. Preiser, St roudsberg, Pa: Dowden, Hutchinson
and Ross, 1973, cited Relph.
24. So Portmann in M. Grene, Approaches to Philosophical Biology,
N. Y.: Basic Books, 1965.
25. Relph, PP, p. 9.
26. ibid. p.9-10.
27. ibid.
28. ibid p.12.
29. Forests and mountains, for example, may be regarded both as
places of dark foreboding, or magnificent grandeur, places of
peace and tranquility or fear and danger. Similarly the slag
heaps of industrial areas, while in the first instance
constituting an eye-sore upon the land, may, having become
covered in grass, provide an aesthetically pleasing adjustment
to the topography of a previously flat and uninteresting
landscape. Cf. Lynch, What Time is this Place? Ch, 1.
30. Rapoport, "Australian Aborigines and the definition of place"
in Environmental Design, ed. W. J. Mitchell, Vol. 1. Los Angeles,
1972, p.14-15, cited Relph.
31. Cf. Ralph p.20
32. Relph, PP, p.27.
33. ibid. p.24-5. Relph continues his discussion of space with
the categories of cognative and abstract apace, These notions
properly have to do with the more abstract and mathematical
understandings of space and are therefore of little relevance
to our present discussion.
34. ibid. p.29.
35. ibid. p.46ff. Relph makes reference here to Camus'
description of Oran in his book The Myth of Sisyphus,
N.Y.:Vintage Books, 1955, p.130-131. Commenting on his
bringing together of the three elements that make up a place,
"static physical setting, the activities, and the meanings",
p.46-47.
36. In R.Zelazny's "Amber" chronicles, we are given an interesting
insight into the nature of place. It describes how members of
the royal family of Amber could transport themselves to any
conceivable time and place simply by calling to mind the
appearance of that place and, while actually moving, imagining
its features appearing one by one, as they continued on their
way. By this process they would eventually construct, feature
by featured, the required place from their mental picture of
it. Cf. particularly Nine Princes in Amber 1972 and The Guns 
of Avalon 1985.
37. Lynch, What Time is this Place? p.40.
38. Relph, PP, p.48.
39. ibid. p.30.
40. Lynch, What Time is this Place? p.40.
41. cited Ralph, p.40.
42. Out of Africa, cited Lynch, op.cit., p.41.
43,	 cited Relph, p.39.
44.	 Cf. H. Snyder, Liberating the Church, p.46, who refers to
W. Brueggemann's argument that
The Bible is not,... the story of God and his people
only, but of God, his people and the land. Land,
both as "actual earthly turf" and as symbol of
rootedness or "historical belonging," ... is "a
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central,	 if not the central theme of biblical
faith."	 Keeping the biblical focus on the land
before us "will protect us from excessive
spiritualization, so that we recognize that the
yearning for land is always a serious historical
enterprise concerned with historical power and
belonging."
W.Brueggemann, The Land.
45. S.Donaldson, The Chronicles of Thomas Covenant, particularly
The Wounded Land 1980, and The Illearth War 1986.
46. W.Blake, Complete Poems.
47. Relph, PP, p.39.
48. Relph, p.41.
49. cf. Chapter 7, p.241ff above.
50. ibid. p.43.
51. Cf. Lynch, op.cit.,
Our new suburbs and new towns... seem all begun
yesterday and completely finished then. There is no
crevice through which one can venture back or
forward. p60
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